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INTRODUCTION

The use of direct democracy is at its highest level in more than
one hundred years.' The direct initiative, which is the primary focus of
this Article, allows private citizens to bypass the traditional legislative
process and make binding laws, often in highly contentious areas of
public policy. 2 The 2000 elections, for example, placed directly before
voters the issues of school vouchers, physician-assisted suicide, samesex marriage and other gay and lesbian rights, gun control, campaign
finance reform, bilingual education, gambling, medical use of
marijuana, and sentencing for drug offenders, as well as some of the

1.
A new record was set for direct-legislation activity when more than 350 initiatives and
referenda appeared on state ballots during the 1990s. See David B. Magleby, Direct Legislation
in the American States, in REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD 229-31 (David Butler & Austin
Ranney eds., 1994); Nathaniel A. Persily, The Peculiar Geography of Direct Democracy: Why the
Initiative, Referendum, and Recall Developed in the American West, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 11,
38 (1997). That record will almost certainly be broken in this decade given that more than two
hundred ballot measures appeared on state ballots during the 2000 elections alone. See F.T.
McCarthy, Ballot Initiatives: Pot and Vouchers, ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 2000, at 2000 WL 8144316;
Tom Squitieri, Voters Are Knee Deep in Ballot Measures, USA TODAY, Nov. 7, 2000, at 2000 WL
5794717.
2.
Julian Eule described the direct initiative as "substitutive direct democracy" because it
"offers a stripped down version of lawmaking free from the constraints-and ... the
safeguards--of the legislative framework." Julian N. Eule, JudicialReview of Direct Democracy,
99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1511-12 (1990). In contrast, the referendum requires legislation that is
enacted by the legislature to be referred to the electorate for subsequent ratification or rejection.
See id. at 1512. Professor Eule characterized the referendum as "complimentary direct
democracy" because it adds an additional tier to the lawmaking process. See id. This Article, like
Eule's seminal work, is concerned primarily with substitutive direct democracy. See id. at 1513.
It should be noted, however, that several jurisdictions authorize the indirect initiative, which
allows private citizens to refer ballot measures to the legislature for consideration. If the
legislature fails to enact the proposal after a designated period of time, the measure is
subsequently presented to the voters. See id. at 1511. Professor Eule treated the indirect
initiative as substitutive direct democracy because "the voters ultimately vote on the measure."
Id. In addition to being far less common, the indirect initiative is less problematic than the direct
initiative for purposes of this Article because legislative consideration of an indirect initiative
allows for some deliberation concerning the merits of a proposal and the creation of lawmaking
records that can be utilized for interpretive guidance. Although this Article therefore focuses
primarily on the direct initiative, the description of the initiative process and the reforms
advocated below could generally be applied to the indirect initiative as well.
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perennial favorites-tax reform and environmental policy. 3 The
prominence of direct democracy in American government is likely to
increase in the foreseeable future as a result of widespread public
support for the process, as well as technological innovations, like the
Internet, that promise virtually instant access to voters' preferences. 4
Not surprisingly, as the use of direct democracy has come to
play a more prominent role in the formulation of public policy, this
type of lawmaking has also received closer scrutiny from legal
scholars, 5 governmental commissions, 6 and the media.7 Although
direct democracy undoubtedly has its supporters among these ranks, a
number of commentators have criticized initiative lawmaking on a
variety of theoretical and practical grounds. Some advocate the
outright abolition of initiative lawmaking on constitutional grounds;
3.

For a database of all statewide initiatives and referenda appearing on ballots since

1990, see NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGIS.,

BALLOT MEASURES

DATABASE:

STATEWIDE

INITIATIVES
AND
REFERENDA
[hereinafter
BALLOT
MEASURES
DATABASE],
at
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legman/elect/dbintro.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
4.
See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, The People: The Least Accountable Branch, 4 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 1 (1997) (lamenting that the Internet "has become the darling of
governments, politicians, and citizens around the world," which "could enable the United States
to effect a system of massive self-rule. Technological capacities make a town-meeting style of
democracy more attractive than ever, or so the argument goes."); Eben Moglen & Pamela S.
Karlan, The Soul of a New Political Machine: The Online, the Color Line and Electronic
Democracy, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1089, 1092 (2001) ("[T]he Internet may give added strength to
the appeal of 'unmediated expression'-that is, the ability of individuals to express their
preferences directly, rather than through institutional filters. This may further fuel pressures for
direct, rather than representative, democracy.").
5.
See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice
Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707 (1991); Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection
and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527 (1994); Sherman J. Clark, A Populist
Critique of Direct Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434 (1998); Eule, supra note 2, at 1503;
Elizabeth Garrett, Money, Agenda Setting, and Direct Democracy, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1845 (1999);
Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation,and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86
MICH. L. REV. 930 (1988); Richard L. Hasen, Parties Take the Initiative (and Vice Versa), 100
COLUM. L. REV. 731 (2000); Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent:" Interpretive
Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995); Symposium, New Structures of
Democracy, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. No. 4 (2001); Symposium, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. No. 4 (2001);
Symposium, Voices of the People: Essays on Constitutional Democracy in Memory of Julian N.
Eule, 45 UCLA L. REV. No. 6 (1998); Symposium, Redirected Democracy: An Evaluation of the
Initiative Process, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. Nos. 3-4 (1998); Symposium, Perspectives on Direct
Democracy, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE No. 1 (1996-1997); Symposium, The Legitimacy of
Direct Democracy: Ballot Initiatives and the Law, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 371 (1996);
Symposium, The Bill of Rights vs. the Ballot Box: Constitutional Implications of Anti-Gay Ballot
Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (1994).
6.
See, e.g., CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING
CALIFORNIA'S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (1992); PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD F. FEENEY,
IMPROVING THE CALIFORNIA INITIATIVE PROCESS: OPTIONS FOR CHANGE (1992).
7.
See, e.g., DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND THE
POWER OF MONEY (2000); PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: CALIFORNIA'S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA'S
FUTURE 188-256 (1998).
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some advocate increased regulation of the procedures by which
proposed measures are enacted; and others advocate more stringent
judicial review of successful ballot measures. 8
The fundamental problem with direct democracy is that it
allows private citizens to make laws free from the electoral
accountability and other structural safeguards of representative
democracy. 9 Those structural safeguards are designed to encourage
careful deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking in the legislative
process.' 0
Moreover,
assuming
that
direct
democracy
is
constitutionally permissible, measures enacted directly by the
electorate raise difficult issues of statutory interpretation because of
the illusiveness of the underlying "voter intent."'" A number of
commentators have suggested that such concerns should compel
courts to engage in a different-and ordinarily more stringent-form
of judicial review for direct democratic measures than they do for
ordinary legislation. 12 By and large, however, courts have not done
so.

13

8.
For examples of each of these respective approaches, see Hans A. Linde, When Initiative
Lawmaking Is Not 'Republican Government': The Campaign Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L.
REV. 19, 41-43 (1993) (articulating five proposed tests for state courts to apply to invalidate
successful ballot measures under the Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution); John
Gastil et al., There's More Than One Way to Legislate: An Integration of Representative, Direct,
and Deliberative Approaches to Democratic Governance, 72 COLO. L. REV. 1005, 1024-28 (2001)
(endorsing a proposal for "Citizens Initiative Review," which would result in the establishment of
"randomly-selected citizen panels to inform the judgment of the mass electorate" in ballot
campaigns); Eule, supra note 2, at 1558 ('The purpose of this article is to suggest that courts
take a harder look when constitutional challenges are mounted against laws enacted by
substitute plebiscite.").
9.
See Eule, supra note 2, at 1513-48.
10. See Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 3847 (1985).
11. See Schacter, supra note 5, at 123-47.
12. See Eule, supra note 2, at 1558 (advocating heightened judicial scrutiny of successful
ballot measures); Schacter, supra note 5, at 153 (proposing the application of special interpretive
rules for direct democracy that would "resolve statutory ambiguity based on underlying ideas
about 'democratizing' the direct lawmaking process"); see also Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The
Referendum: Democracy's Barrierto Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1, 23 (1978) (arguing for
"heightened scrutiny" of ballot measures "similar to that recognized as appropriate when the
normal legislative process carries potential harm to the rights of minority individuals"); Priscilla
F. Gunn, Initiatives and Referendums: Direct Democracy and Minority Interests, 22 URB. L. REV.
135, 158 (1981) (proposing "an automatic heightened level of scrutiny when lawmaking
procedures deprive minority groups of fundamental safeguards," which would subject successful
ballot measures with a disparate impact on minorities to strict scrutiny); Mihui Pak, The
Counter-MajoritarianDifficulty in Focus: Judicial Review of Initiatives, 32 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROBS. 237, 262-73 (1999) (arguing that in the absence of procedural reform, all successful ballot
measures should be strictly scrutinized by courts); Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of
Initiatives and Referendums in Which Majorities Vote on Minorities' Democratic Citizenship, 60
OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 410 (1999) (arguing that courts should apply strict scrutiny to successful
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This Article accepts the premise that direct democratic
measures, and initiatives in particular, raise special concerns that
demand attention. Existing proposals for reform, however, are either
flawed, incomplete, or impracticable, in large part because
commentators have failed adequately to confront the "myth of popular
sovereignty" in direct democracy. This myth assumes that initiatives
appear almost magically on ballots and in statute books as a result of
the "will of the people," rather than the work of the unelected, and
largely unaccountable, special interest groups that draft, finance, and
lobby on behalf of the measures. 14 This Article argues that the myth of
popular sovereignty in direct democracy should be rejected and that
ballot initiatives should no longer be romanticized as lawmaking by
"the people," but rather should be viewed as lawmaking by "initiative
proponents" whose general objective is either ratified or rejected by
15
the voters.
Rejecting the myth of popular sovereignty in direct democracy
would resolve the primary difficulties that are currently associated
with judicial review of successful ballot measures.1 6 First, candid
recognition that successful ballot measures constitute lawmaking by
initiative proponents would eliminate the evidentiary difficulties
associated with establishing an impermissible purpose by the
electorate when courts assess the constitutional validity of successful
ballot measures. By focusing on the statements of the initiative
proponents during a ballot campaign, and utilizing the ordinary tools
of discovery in civil litigation, courts would be able to assess the
motivations that led to a ballot measure's enactment. This approach
ballot measures when "the initiative has unduly burdened a minority group's civil
participation").
13. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981) ("It is
irrelevant that the voters rather than a legislative body enacted [the statute under
consideration], because the voters may no more violate the Constitution by enacting a ballot
measure than a legislative body may do so by enacting legislation."); Craig B. Holman et al.,
Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The Changing Role of State and Federal Courts, 31 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1239, 1246 (1998) ('The courts have generally operated under the presumption that
both legislation and initiatives are subject to similar standards of review and constitutional
scrutiny.").
14. See infra Part II.
15. Although this conclusion is supported by the work of leading legislation scholars, see
Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitutions, Canons, Direct Democracy,
1996 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 477, 519 (recognizing that "[d]irect democracy consists of two separate
processes: proposal by well-organized interests and ratification by the electorate"); Schacter,
supra note 5, at 111 (explaining that "the direct lawmaking process gives powerful leverage to
initiative drafters, who are situated to construct a phantom popular intent through strategic
drafting"), they have not advocated the adoption of procedural reforms of the kind suggested in
this Article.
16. See infra Parts II.C & III.C.
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would also have the advantage of holding initiative proponents
directly accountable for respecting constitutional values during the
lawmaking process. Moreover, treating the initiative proponents as
the relevant lawmakers in direct democracy would allow courts to
continue utilizing an intentionalist methodology to interpret
successful ballot measures without resorting to a counterproductive
fiction of "voter intent."
On the other hand, an express recognition that direct
democracy involves lawmaking by initiative proponents intensifies the
tension between direct democracy and representative government, the
problems associated with the delegation of lawmaking authority to
unelected actors in a democracy, and the absence of structural
safeguards to encourage careful deliberation and reasoned
decisionmaking in the lawmaking process. 17 Critics of direct
democracy have failed to recognize, however, that initiative
proponents are not the only unelected lawmakers in our democracy.
Administrative agencies have freely enacted binding rules based on
broad delegations of authority from the legislative branch ever since
the New Deal. Although this development has always been considered
constitutionally suspect, courts have allowed it to continue unabated,
largely because administrative law has adopted alternative structural
safeguards to replace those provided in the traditional legislative
process by representation and the requirements of Article I, Section 7.
Specifically, administrative agencies must comply with the notice-andcomment procedures of the Administrative Procedure Act, and their
final rules must withstand hard-look judicial review. Those safeguards
ensure that agency officials engage in careful deliberation and
reasoned decisionmaking during the lawmaking process and have
thereby legitimized agency lawmaking.
This Article does not claim that the proponents of direct
legislation are like administrators in all respects, but there are some
remarkable similarities for the purposes of this project. First, direct
democracy and agency lawmaking were both championed during the
progressive movement to achieve instrumental goals that were
allegedly frustrated by a cumbersome, unresponsive, or corrupt
legislative process.18 Second, both forms of lawmaking deviate from

17.

See infra Part 1II.

18.

See, e.g.,

THOMAS E. CRONIN,

DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS

OF INITIATIVE,

REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 38-59 (1989) (describing the development of direct democracy in the
states); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth Branch:
Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions, 1987 DUKE

L.J. 387, 392-94 (describing the progressive support for, and influence upon, the development of
administrative government based on the characterization of agencies as apolitical experts).
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the procedures set forth in the Constitution and are therefore
inherently suspect. 19 Finally, in both cases, there is a legitimate
concern that elected representatives will punt on difficult choices
facing the polity and shift responsibility for the most controversial
issues of public policy to less accountable actors. 20
Notwithstanding these concerns, lawmaking by administrative
agencies has been effectively constrained and legitimized by the
adoption of procedural safeguards and hard-look judicial review of the
reasoning underlying agency decisions. 21 This Article argues, for the
first time, that a similar model is needed to constrain the proponents
of ballot measures and thereby legitimize the use of direct
democracy. 22 It therefore draws on the agency model to propose
amending state laws that regulate direct democracy to subject the
proponents of initiatives to the requirements of public deliberation
and reasoned decisionmaking that presently constrain administrative
agencies. The Article argues that unlike previous proposals, such
reforms of initiative lawmaking would promote careful deliberation,
improve the legislative product, and provide a heightened standard of
judicial review that is well established and directly responsive to the
serious structural shortcomings of the current method of lawmaking
by "the people."
I.

THE SHORTCOMINGS OF LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE AND PROPOSALS

TO MODIFY JUDICIAL REVIEW
A. The Tension Between Direct Democracy and Representative
Government
It is commonly recognized that the Framers of the United
States Constitution were intimately concerned with the potential for
"faction" within the populace and the resulting "tyranny of the

19. See infra Parts L.A & III.A.
20. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation After Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass'ns, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 452, 485 (2002) (recognizing that those in favor of renewed
enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine in administrative law argue "that delegation disserves
democracy because it allows Congress to avoid responsibility for the hard choices underlying
law"); Phillip Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, Direct
Democracy, and the Privatizationof the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 421, 434 (1998)

(expressing a concern regarding "the timidity of California politicians on important matters
because of the specter of the initiative").
21. See infra Parts III.B & IV.B.
22. See infra Parts III-IV.
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majority."23 One of the principal structural devices the Framers
adopted to safeguard against these concerns was representative
democracy, which was intended to ensure that lawmaking was the
product of thoughtful deliberation by elected representatives, rather
than the passions or narrow self-interests of the people. 24 The Framers
23. James Madison was particularly concerned about "factions," or what we might describe
today as special interests--"a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or minority of
the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the
community." THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 78 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). He explained
that "[a] mong the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to
be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction." Id.
at 77.
Madison believed that "minority factions" would normally be restrained "by regular vote" and
the related principle of majority rule. Id. at 80. The tyranny of the majority, however, was a
cause for greater concern because majority factions could sacrifice "the public good and the rights
of other citizens" to their "ruling passion or interest." Id. The rights and interests of minorities
would be insecure "[i]f a majority be united by a common interest." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at
323 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Madison famously warned that "there are particular
moments in public affairs when the people stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit
advantage, or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for measures
which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to lament and condemn." THE
FEDERALIST No. 63, at 384 (Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). Because notions of civic virtue
and public education were insufficient to guard against this form of tyranny, the Framers
recognized that the United States Constitution needed to incorporate structural safeguards to
counteract majority passions. See Eule, supra note 2, at 1522-31 (providing an influential
discussion of the republican safeguards contained in the Constitution); Sunstein, supra note 10,
at 31-49 (same); see also Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, The New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491,
1512-20 (2002) (explaining that separated powers, federalism, and accountability check
oppressive lawmaking and that the "communion of interests" historically reflected by
representation provided an additional safeguard by ensuring that "legislators effectively burden
themselves as they burden others"); Charlow, supra note 5, at 534-41 (explaining that in
response to the perceived threat of faction, "the framers devised a scheme of government
containing several safeguards against majority tyranny," which were "intended to filter bare
majority preferences and to protect electoral minorities").
24. Madison distinguished representative democracy from the "pure democracies of Greece,"
and explained that the "total exclusion of the people in their collective capacity" from directly
making policy for the national government had a number of perceived advantages. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 23, at 386-87. First, the pluralism encouraged by a large federal
government would protect against the possibility that sufficient numbers of people would develop
a common desire to oppress minorities. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 23, at 82-84;
Sunstein, supra note 10, at 40. Second, the process of representation would itself "refine and
enlarge the public views by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose
wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of
justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations." THE FEDERALIST
NO. 10, supra note 23, at 82. Representatives in a large republic would necessarily be exposed to
a host of different perspectives that would prevent them from becoming unduly attached to
parochial concerns.
Extend the sphere [of the Republic], and you take in a greater variety of parties and
interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common
motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a motive exists, it will be more
difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength and act in unison with each
other.
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also devised a system of separated powers with checks and balances,
including bicameralism and presentment, which would constrain the
three branches of government from operating without a certain level
of consensus. 25 As Cass Sunstein has explained, the picture that
emerges from the constitutional structure "has been aptly termed
'deliberative democracy.' "26 Because the safeguards of republican
democracy are absent from direct democracy, however, lawmaking by
27
initiative is in tension with this constitutional structure.
See id. at 83. Moreover, professional representatives would have the leisure to learn about the
problems of the day and reflect upon appropriate solutions through a process of deliberation and
debate. In short, elected representatives would be capable of engaging in a process of reasoned
deliberation from which the common good would emerge. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 41.
25. While faith in the capacity of representatives to legislate for the common good may
strike modern observers as elitist, utopian, or naive, the constitutional framework contains
additional structural safeguards that were designed to encourage deliberation and consensus in
the legislative process even when elected representatives are less than virtuous. See Sunstein,
supra note 10, at 43 ('The structural provisions of the Constitution attempted to bring about
public-spirited representation, to provide safeguards in its absence, and to ensure an important
measure of popular control."). In this regard, the Framers established a system of separated
powers so that "ambition [would] be made to counteract ambition." See THE FEDERALIST No. 51,
supra note 23, at 322. This was accomplished at the outset by establishing a national
government of limited and enumerated powers. As the Tenth Amendment makes explicit, "[t]he
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. The
Constitution therefore establishes a federal system of government in which the national
government competes with the states for their respective spheres of authority. See THE
FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 23, at 323 (explaining that "[tihe different governments will
control each other" under a federal system).
The Constitution, of course, also divides the enumerated powers of the national government
into three distinct branches. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III. For a discussion of some of the virtues of
separation of powers, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 23, at 321-25. Moreover,
Congress's legislative authority is subject to Article I's requirements of bicameralism and
presentment. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. An identical bill therefore has to be enacted by
both the Senate and the House of Representatives to become law. This requirement not only
ensures that two separate representative bodies deliberate over the advisability of proposed
legislation (thereby increasing the perceived advantages of representation), but the different
composition of those chambers also broadens the constituencies served by the legislative process.
See CRONIN, supra note 18, at 30-32 (describing the purposes of bicameralism and the varying
composition of the two chambers of Congress). Once the requirement of bicameralism is satisfied,
however, a bill does not become law until it is approved by the President, or until a two-thirds
majority in both chambers votes to override an executive veto. Accordingly, a bill cannot become
law unless there is either majority support for the measure in both chambers of Congress and
executive approval or an unusually high level of congressional demand for the proposed
legislation.
26. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 45 (quoting Joseph M. Bessette, Deliberative Democracy:
The Majority Principle in Republican Government, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION?
102 (R. Goldwin & W. Schambra eds., 1980)).
27. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 23, at 81-84 (rejecting the use of direct
democracy at the national level by distinguishing between a "pure Democracy" and the "republic"
that was being established); see also Charlow, supra note 5, at 531-48 ("The proposition that
there is a constitutional problem with plebiscites stems from the idea that although our
government derives its ultimate legitimacy from the will of the people, majoritarianism is not the
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Despite this tension, the Supreme Court has held that the
constitutionality of a state's direct democratic institutions is
nonjusticiable 28 and has therefore refused to interpret the provision of
the United States Constitution that "guarantee[s] to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government." 29 Because direct
democracy is nonetheless constitutionally suspect, 30 a number of
central premise on which our government is based."); Eule, supra note 2, at 1525 (concluding
that "most of the ways the Constitution devises to filter majority preferences are absent from
direct democracy-at least from the substitutive version"); Frickey, supra note 20, at 423
(recognizing that the framers struck a balance between "the desire for democratic government
with the need for stability, protection of individual rights, and efficiency" "by designing a
representative government rather than a more direct form of democracy"); Frickey, supra note
15, at 478-81 (describing direct democracy's "formal and functional tension with republican
values and form"); Hamilton, supra note 4, at 2 (explaining that the Framers chose
representative democracy and rejected direct democracy); Linde, supra note 8, at 24 ("That a
republican form of government meant representative, not direct, democracy could not be stated
more emphatically."). But see Alan Hirsch, Direct Democracy and Civic Maturation,29 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 185, 186-202 (2002) (arguing that "contrary to the prevailing view in the legal
community, the founding fathers believed in direct democracy, and the Constitution embodies
it"); Robert G. Natelson, A Republic, Not a Democracy? Initiative, Referendum, and the
Constitution's Guarantee Clause, 80 TEX. L. REV. 807, 836 (2002) (claiming that "[t]he historical
record is flooded with statements in which participants implicitly assume that republics may
employ direct citizen lawmaking").
28. See Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912), dismissing writ of error to
review 53 Or. 162, 99 P. 427 (1909).
29. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
30. See Eule, supra note 2, at 1545 ("In the end, my claim is that direct democracy is
constitutionally suspect, not impermissible."). Several commentators have argued that the
Supreme Court should overrule Pacific States and address challenges to the constitutionality of
direct democratic measures under the Guarantee Clause on the merits. See Erwin Chemerinsky,
Cases Under the Guarantee Clause Should Be Justiciable,65 U. COLO. L. REV. 849, 952, 967-68
(1994); Cynthia L. Fountaine, Note, Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and
Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 755-76 (1988); Hamilton,
supra note 4, at 13-14. Moreover, Hans Linde, a prominent legal scholar and former Justice of
the Oregon Supreme Court who has written extensively on direct democracy, has argued that
state courts have an independent duty under the Supremacy Clause to enforce the provisions of
the Guarantee Clause, and that certain initiative measures should be invalidated under that
provision. See generally Hans A. Linde, On Reconstituting "Republican Government," 19 OKLA.
CITY U. L. REV. 193 (1994); Hans A. Linde, PracticingTheory: The Forgotten Law of Initiative
Lawmaking, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1735 (1998); Hans A. Linde, State Courts and Republican
Government, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 951 (2001); Linde, supra note 9, at 19.
Although the foregoing proposals would plainly alleviate some of problems of direct
democracy, a close examination of the Guarantee Clause is beyond the scope of this project.
Instead, this Article accepts Julian Eule's claim that direct democracy is constitutionally
suspect-not that it is impermissible. It bears noting, moreover, that courts would almost
certainly be reluctant unilaterally to take a more aggressive approach to reviewing the validity
of successful initiative measures under the Guarantee Clause. In contrast, because the proposals
advocated in this Article would require positive enactment under state law, the heightened
judicial scrutiny of successful ballot measures described below would have greater democratic
legitimacy-and pose fewer concerns regarding the countermajoritarian difficulty-than efforts
to review the validity of successful ballot measures more stringently under particular
constitutional provisions. See infra Parts III.C & IV.B.
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commentators have suggested that courts should review the validity of
certain direct democratic measures more stringently than traditional
legislation to compensate for the absence of safeguards against
majority faction that are provided by representative democracy and
the separation of powers. 31 For example, Julian Eule argued that the
constitutionality of some direct democratic measures deserves a
"harder judicial look" because the availability of judicial review is the
only structural safeguard against the risk of majority tyranny in the
32
initiative context.
The clearest example Professor Eule provided of what this
"harder judicial look" would entail was in the equal protection
context. 33 Under current equal protection doctrine, legislation that is
facially neutral but has a disparate impact on certain protected groups
can only be invalidated by a plaintiffs demonstration that the
measure was enacted with a discriminatory purpose. 34 Professor Eule
identified the difficulties of establishing the discriminatory purpose of
a law that is enacted directly by the voters rather than by a
legislature. 35 Public debate about the merits of a proposed ballot
measure by the electorate is minimal, and voting is conducted in
private. 36 Moreover, even if it were possible to determine the
subjective intentions of thousands of individual voters, a number of
lower courts have barred judicial inquiry into their motivations. 37 For
example, Professor Eule observed that the Fifth Circuit has held that
the First Amendment "assures every citizen the right to 'cast his vote
for whatever reason he pleases.'" According to the court, while racial
prejudice, for example, is "neither socially admirable nor civically
38
attuned, [it is] not constitutionally proscribed."
In response to this evidentiary dilemma, Professor Eule
recommended either relaxing the burden of proving discriminatory
purpose and allowing the introduction of nontraditional sources, such
as media accounts and exit polls, to establish impermissible bias, or
39
abandoning the discriminatory purpose requirement altogether.
Professor Eule did not limit this approach, however, to equal
31. See supranote 12.
32. See Eule, supra note 2, at 1548-73.
33. See id. at 1561-68; see also Charlow, supra note 5, at 550-60 (summarizing and
evaluating Eule's proposals); Frickey, supra note 15, at 485-90 (same).
34. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237 (1976).
35. Eule, supra note 2, at 1561-62.
36. Id. at 1561.
37. Id.
38. Id. (quoting Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 663 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1981)); see also id. at
1561-62 & nn.259-62 (citing additional authorities for the sanctity of the secret ballot).
39. Id. at 1562.
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protection claims raised by members of suspect classes that already
receive judicial protection under strict scrutiny review, but seemed to
apply his proposal to other groups as well, including "the
40
underrepresented poor" and "non-English speaking persons."
Finally, Professor Eule appeared to endorse more stringent judicial
review of successful ballot measures that would ordinarily be assessed
under the rational basis standard of review in cases where "[t]he
absence of structured factfinding ... and the dangers of classification
inherent in a process of naked aggregation" disadvantage "the
powerless whose voices are stifled in the unfiltered setting of direct
41
democracy."
B. InterpretiveDilemmas in Direct Democracy
Aside from the constitutionally suspect nature of direct
democracy, lawmaking by initiative also raises potentially difficult
problems of statutory interpretation. These problems were well
documented in a seminal article by Jane Schacter, a leading scholar of
statutory interpretation. 42 Professor Schacter demonstrated that when
courts interpret direct democratic measures, they routinely purport to
apply the same intentionalist principles that dominate the
interpretation of ordinary legislation. 43 Rather than ascertaining the
intent of a legislative body, however, courts in the direct democratic
context typically claim to be furthering the "popular intent" of the
electorate. 44 Beyond this concession, courts seem unwilling or unable
40. Id. at 1560, 1567-68.
41. Id. at 1568-72.
42. See Schacter, supra note 5, at 107; see also Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The
Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002); Jane
S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court Statutory
Interpretation:Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1
(1998); Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory
Interpretation,108 HARV. L. REV. 593 (1995).
43. Schacter, supra note 5, at 117-19.
44. Id. For similar conclusions about the methodology used by courts to interpret successful
ballot measures in particular states, see Linda A. Cistone-Albers, Deconstructionist and
Pragmatic Analyses Reveal the "Intent to Discriminate" in Proposition 227-A California
Initiative, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 215, 252-56 (2000) (describing a federal court's reliance on the
statutory text, legal precedent, and "voter intent" to review a ballot initiative to end bilingual
education in California, but noting the court's self-declared incompetence to consider empirical
evidence submitted by the litigants regarding the merits of the proposal); Jack L. Landau,
Hurrah for Revolution: A CriticalAssessment of State Constitutional Interpretation,79 OR. L.
REV. 793, 873-83 (2000) (describing the approach of Oregon courts to the interpretation of
constitutional amendments enacted by initiative, and claiming that while the touchstone is
"voter intent," the courts have wavered between application of a strict textualist approach and
the use of broader historical materials, including the measure's title, materials in the ballot
pamphlet, and news articles "that may have influenced the voter thinking at the time"); Jack L.
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to differentiate measures enacted directly by the electorate from those
enacted through the ordinary legislative process when they are
45
confronted with interpretive questions.
Professor Schacter also demonstrated, however, that when
courts ascertain the popular intent of the electorate, they rely almost
exclusively on formal legal sources of meaning, including the language
of the ballot measure, the language of related statutes, canons of
statutory construction, legal precedent, and information from ballot
pamphlets, which is sometimes used as a substitute for traditional
legislative history. 46 At the same time, courts routinely ignore media
accounts and advertising as sources of popular intent, even though the
social science literature suggests that those sources are most likely to
47
influence the positions of voters in ballot campaigns.
Landau, Interpreting Statutes Enacted by Initiative: An Assessment of Proposals to Apply
Specialized Interpretive Rules, 34 WILLAMETITFE L. REV. 487, 489, 491-99 (1998) (recognizing that
"[tihe courts seem to have taken for granted [sic] fact that the traditional model of statutory
interpretation applies to initiated enactments" and that they will therefore "frequently attempt
to ascertain legislative-that is, voter-intent, by applying various interpretive canons and by
examining the text of the enactment and its 'legislative history,' as embodied in the voters'
pamphlet and similar extrinsic materials"); Sean Pager, Is Busing Preferential?An Interpretive
Analysis of Proposition 209, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 3, 12-16 (1999) (describing the approach of
California courts to interpreting initiatives and indicating that voter intent is always the
paramount consideration); Cathy R. Silak, The People Act, the Courts React: A Proposed Model
for Interpreting Initiatives in Idaho, 33 IDAHO L. REV. 1, 10-19 (1996) (explaining that for
purposes of statutory interpretation and constitutional review, courts in Idaho "see no essential
difference between measures enacted by initiative and referendum and those created through
the usual legislative process") (quoting Westerberg v. Andrus, 757 P.2d 664, 670 (Idaho 1988));
Philip A. Talmadge, The Initiative Process in Washington: Implications and Effects, 24 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 1017, 1017 n.1 (2001) (stating that "[t]he Washington Supreme Court reviews
initiative measures just as it would legislatively enacted bills"); Stephen Salvucci, Note, Say
What You Mean and Mean What You Say: The Interpretationof Initiatives in California, 71 S.
CAL. L. REV. 871, 875-83 (1998) (describing the methodology used by California courts to divine
the "voter intent" of a ballot measure and identifying some its problems).
45. See Schacter, supra note 5, at 119 ("In particular, there is little indication that courts
modify the interpretive sources they consult to accommodate the particular structural dynamics
of the direct legislative process.").
46. Id. at 119-23; see also Pager, supra note 44, at 12-15 (stating that when California
courts seek to identify the voter intent, they rely initially on the text of the ballot measure but
will resolve ambiguities by considering arguments and summaries found in the ballot
pamphlet-especially those drafted by the initiative proponents-historical context, and
contemporaneous constructions by the legislature or relevant administrative agencies); Elizabeth
A. McNellie, Note, The Use of Extrinsic Aids. in the Interpretation of Popularly Enacted
Legislation, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 165-66 (1989) (reporting that state courts "tend to limit their
inquiry" into extrinsic sources of statutory interpretation "to an examination of the official voter
pamphlet or at most the pamphlet and the initiative's statement of purpose, thereby ignoring
evidence of intent in the media debate that precedes an election").
47. See Schacter, supra note 5, at 119-23; see also id. at 131-38 (canvassing social science
research regarding influences on voter behavior in ballot elections); CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN
FIN., supra note 6, at 197-226 (concluding that "[vioters rely heavily on election information
received from the news media and campaign advertisements in deciding how to vote, especially
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Judicial inquiry into the popular intent of the electorate is
inherently problematic for a number of reasons. First, the
characteristic problems of intentionalism in traditional statutory
interpretation are magnified in the direct democratic context. 48 For
example, even if one were to accept the rather dubious premise that
any individual voter intent existed on a particular interpretive
question, courts simply could not cumulate what might be millions of
voter intentions on the issue. 49 Similarly, although it may be
reasonable to assume that legislators have some detailed knowledge of
the intended meaning of traditional legislation, many of the particular
legal consequences of new initiative laws are systematically
unforeseeable to the general electorate. 50 Voters generally lack "any
detailed knowledge of the legal context surrounding a proposed
initiative." 5 1 Moreover, voters are often unfamiliar with the technical
legal jargon that is used in the text of ballot measures. 52 Indeed, a
host of empirical evidence suggests that most voters do not even read,
53
much less understand, the text of direct democratic measures.
Professor Schacter argued that the sources courts rely upon to
identify the voter intent underlying direct democratic measures result
in a paradox, which she described as "the Inverted Informational

for ballot propositions in which many of the traditional voting cues frequently are not available");
CRONIN, supra note 18, at 118 ("In many states, the most important aspect of the media in issue
elections is paid television political advertisements."); DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 6, at 126
(explaining that initiative voters rely heavily on newspapers and television for information about
ballot measures); DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN

THE UNITED STATES 133-34 (1984) ("In proposition elections, voters rely almost entirely upon the
mass media for information about propositions."); BETTY H. ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA, AND THE
GRASS ROOTS: STATE BALLOT ISSUES AND THE ELECTORAL PROCESS 245-48 (1987) (indicating that

sloganeering campaign advertisements are sometimes critical sources of information
initiative voters, especially when they do not read newspapers).
48. Schacter, supra note 5, at 124-26.
49. Id. at 124-25.
50. Id. at 127-28.
51.

for

Id.

52. Id. at 123.
53. Id. at 139-40, nn.136-44; see also CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 6, at 261
(finding that "[v]ery few people actually read initiative texts, and their legalese constitutes an
intimidating part of the [ballot] pamphlet"); CRONIN, supra note 18, at 74 (reporting the results
of a survey conducted in four states in which between fifty-four and seventy-four percent of
respondents "strongly agree[d]" or "somewhat agree[d]" with the statement that "[tihe initiative
and referendum measures on the ballot are usually so complicated that one can't understand
what is going on"); DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 6, at 136 (reporting the results of a voter
survey indicating that less than seventeen percent of voters said that they "usually" read the
legal text); MAGLEBY, supra note 47, at 118-19 (conducting a comprehensive "readability" study
of ballot language in four states, and concluding that less than twenty percent of the adults in
any of those states could have been expected to have the requisite levels of education).
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Hierarchy." 54 On one hand, the formal sources at the center of judicial
interpretation of direct democratic measures-statutory language,
legal texts, and, to a lesser extent, official ballot materials-are widely
ignored by, or incomprehensible to voters. 55 On the other hand, the
sources most heavily consulted by voters-media and advertising-are
routinely ignored by courts and are, in any event, unlikely to be used
effectively as judicial sources of popular intent. 56 As a result, "the
hierarchy of interpretive sources that courts consult in the asserted
service of locating popular intent is roughly inverse to the hierarchy of
informational sources that voters consult most regularly in ballot
57
campaigns."
This paradox is likely to endure because it is unrealistic to
expect voters to become familiar with the legal landscape surrounding
an initiative measure. 58 Moreover, a judicial inquiry into the media
accounts and advertising that actually influenced the voters is
unlikely to yield any unbiased or determinate answers to the
interpretive questions facing courts.5 9 Thus, the purported judicial
inquiry into the popular intent of the electorate is likely to be an
60
exercise in futility.
54. Schacter, supranote 5, at 130.
55. Id. at 130, 139-44.
56. Id. at 130-38.
57. Id. at 130.
58. See id. at 130, 139-44.
59. Id. at 130, 144-47.
60. Id. at 147 (concluding that "the gap between judicial and voter practices seems
enduring-perhaps inevitable"). Professor Schacter briefly considered the advisability of forgoing
intentionalist principles in the interpretation of direct democratic measures and relying instead
on the other leading theories of statutory interpretation. Id. at 146-47, 149-50. She correctly
concluded, however, that the other prevailing theories of statutory interpretation do not fare
substantially better in this context. See id. First, in addition to its other characteristic problems,
strict textualism and its reliance on the "plain meaning" of an enactment would seem
unjustifiable when it is widely understood that most voters do not read or understand the
language of initiative measures, which are often poorly drafted in the first place. Id. at 150. For
more extensive critiques of the purported objectivity of textualism, see, e.g., William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 668-70 (1990); Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling
Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in ConstruingStatutes in the 1988-89 Term of the United
States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 300-06 (1990); Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of
Authority in Statutory Interpretation:An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1080-81,
1084-88 (1992). For discussions of the poorly drafted nature of many initiative measures, see,
e.g., CRONIN, supra note 18, at 70-77 (describing the shortcomings in voters' understanding of
ballot issues); ELISABETH R. GERBER ET AL., STEALING THE INITIATIVE: How STATE GOVERNMENT
RESPONDS TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY 110 (2001) (explaining that "to obtain victory at the ballot
box[,]" "some initiative proponents may have no choice but to write an initiative in vague or
ambiguous language"); Eule, supra note 2, at 1516 ("Considering the complexity and obtuseness
of some measures, it's a wonder that anyone knows what he or she is voting on."); Frickey, supra
note 15, at 481 ("For a variety of reasons, direct democracy is probably more likely than
legislative lawmaking to produce ambiguous statutory text."); Schacter, supra note 5, at 139-40
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Professor Schacter ultimately concluded that what her study
"most strongly suggests is that the informational dynamics of direct
lawmaking impede deliberation and create opportunities for strategic
abuse of the process" by initiative proponents who draft the language
of ballot measures and typically have sufficient expertise to
understand the existing legal landscape into which their measures
will fit. 61 In order to address these concerns, she recommended
constructing a distinct "interpretive approach" for direct democratic
measures. 62 The goal of such an interpretive approach would be to
"resolve statutory ambiguity based on underlying ideas about
63
'democratizing' the direct lawmaking process."
Specifically, Professor Schacter would encourage deliberation
in the interpretation of direct democratic measures by making the
process of litigating the meaning of ambiguous ballot measures open
to a broader range of perspectives. 64 Although she acknowledged that
"[tihe judicial process is not a perfect substitute for a more robustly
deliberative initiative process," Professor Schacter concluded that
courts should maximize "procedural opportunities for participation by

(describing the complex nature of many ballot proposals). Moreover, purposive approaches, which
may seem like the most intuitively appealing solution to this problem, are fundamentally flawed
in the initiative context because they are based on legal process assumptions of coherent action
by rational actors in an ongoing legislative process, which cannot plausibly be applied to the oneshot process of direct decisionmaking on a single subject by the electorate. See Elizabeth Garrett,
Who Directs Direct Democracy?, 4 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 17, 32-33 (1997) (explaining that
legal process assumptions of coherence and reasoned decisionmaking are highly problematic in
the context of direct democracy); Frickey, supra note 15, at 486-87, 506 (same). In any event,
furthering the "purpose" of the electorate on the broad question actually considered by voters is
unlikely to provide any meaningful guidance in a concrete case. See Schacter, supra note 5, at
146-47.
61. Schacter, supra note 5, at 154, 156-59; see also id. at 128 (recognizing that, unlike
voters, an initiative's drafters are capable of understanding the 'legal context" surrounding a
proposed initiative and "the technical legal jargon that is used in the text" of ballot measures);
BRODER, supra note 7, at 70 (quoting an initiative consultant who recognized that "[s]ince every
initiative seems to be tested in the courts, [a proposal] better be legally sufficient to accomplish
the purpose"); id. at 72 (reporting that lawyers retained by the initiative proponents "counsel
their clients on the arguments between supporters and opponents about the effects of the
initiative, and.., prepare for the almost inevitable day when the initiative, if approved, is
challenged in the courts"); Frickey, supra note 15, at 519 (explaining that "[u]nlike the electorate
as a whole, many of the active participants (such as trial lawyers and insurance companies on
tort-reform issues) are frequent 'players' in the repeat game of direct democracy" who can be
expected to pay attention to legal decisions and respond accordingly); Garrett, supra note 60, at
30 (recognizing that "ballot proposals are drafted by repeat players who can learn the rules of
statutory interpretation and behave accordingly").
62. Schacter, supra note 5, at 152-64; see also Frickey, supra note 15, at 490-94
(summarizing and evaluating Schacter's proposals).
63. See Schacter, supra note 5, at 153.
64. Id. at 155-56.
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a range of interests."65 These opportunities could be provided by
liberally granting motions for leave to intervene or to file amicus
curiae briefs by interested parties, as well as by considering
"appointing pro bono representation for unrepresented, or even
66
unorganized, interests."
Professor Schacter also argued that courts should adopt rules
of construction that would create disincentives for initiative
proponents strategically to manipulate the process. 67 She ultimately
rejected a rigid rule of narrow interpretation for all initiatives because
of the strong status quo bias inherent in such a rule and the need to
differentiate between particular ballot measures. 68 Nonetheless, she
advocated interpreting ambiguous initiative language narrowly when
it seems especially likely that the ballot measure is potentially tainted
by the manipulation of "highly organized, concentrated, and well69
funded interests."
C. The Indirect and Selective Nature of Existing Proposalsfor
Modified JudicialReview
Professors Eule and Schacter have persuasively described the
fundamental problems with direct democracy and proposed some
intriguing reforms. The willingness and ability of courts to implement
their proposals is, however, open to question. 70 More important for
present purposes, their proposals seek to address pervasive structural
problems of initiative lawmaking indirectly by altering the nature of
judicial review for some individual ballot measures, rather than by
directly reforming the initiative process itself.71 The remainder of this
65. Id. at 156.
66. Id.
67. See id. at 156-59.
68. See id. at 160-61.
69. Id. at 157-59.
70. See Frickey, supra note 15, at 487, 492 (concluding that the most significant problem
with Eule's and Schacter's proposals may lie in their implementation).
71. Robin Charlow has persuasively criticized Eule's specific proposals, in part, on the
grounds that, while he claimed that direct democracy is constitutionally problematic as an
institution because of the absence of structural filters against majority faction that are inherent
in the traditional legislative process, his reforms focused on the substantive constitutionality of
individual measures enacted by the electorate. See Charlow, supra note 5, at 559. In other words,
while Eule's attack focused on the structure of the lawmaking process, he proposed a remedy
that would address the substantive results of the process, rather than the faulty process itself.
See id. Moreover, some of Eule's suggestions seemed to assume a change in the essential nature
of the meaning of certain constitutional provisions in the special case of direct democracy. See id.
at 561-64.
To the extent that Eule's proposals could be justified on the grounds that successful ballot
measures deserve less deference than traditional legislation as the product of a deliberate,
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Article accepts Eule's and Schacter's concerns, but argues that a more
straightforward and effective solution is available for the problems
they identify. As explained below, this solution would require, first, a
candid rejection of the myth of popular sovereignty in direct
democracy and, second, the adoption of procedural safeguards to
encourage careful deliberation during the lawmaking process and hold
initiative proponents accountable for their actions.
II. REJECTING THE MYTH OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN DIRECT
DEMOCRACY

A. The Myth of PopularSovereignty in Direct Democracy
Direct democracy is commonly perceived as a mechanism to
bypass an inefficient and unresponsive legislative process in order to
permit lawmaking by "the people." 72 The philosophical legitimacy of

rational, and benign lawmaking process, see id. at 573-74 ("If the reasons for according deference
to legislative decisionmaking are not applicable in the plebiscitary context, it would be
appropriate for courts to afford less deference to the public as lawmaker than to the
legislature."); Frickey, supra note 15, at 485-87 (explaining that many important constitutional
doctrines, including deferential review of the rationality of most legislation, "are based on
presumptions rooted in benign judicial assumptions about the legislative process"), this
conclusion would seem to apply to all direct democratic measures. See Frickey, supra note 15, at
493 (recognizing that "the informational and deliberative problems associated with direct
democracy are endemic, not just limited to the unusual case"); infra Parts II-III. Nonetheless,
Eule selectively chose certain types of initiatives for more stringent judicial review, without
explaining why the categories of suspect classifications that trigger heightened scrutiny under
current equal protection doctrine are inadequate or should be expanded only in the context of
direct democracy. See Charlow, supra note 5, at 593-625 (discussing the purposes of heightened
judicial scrutiny under equal protection doctrine and concluding that "there does not appear to
be any substantial reason to confer additional judicial protection on some groups disadvantaged
by plebiscitary results that do not otherwise receive special judicial solicitude when adversely
affected by legislative enactments"). But see Frickey, supra note 15, at 486-87 (concurring "with
Eule that courts ought to adopt less utopian assumptions about the outcomes of direct democracy
than they do about legislative products"). In short, Eule's proposals seemed to be based more on
a substantive disagreement with existing equal protection doctrine than on any particular
feature endemic solely to direct democracy. See Charlow, supra note 5, at 629-30 ('To those for
whom equal protection challenges seem inadequate, it is often not so much that plebiscites are
different as it is that equal protection challenges probably appear generally inadequate to
remedy discrimination, even when legislative or executive action is involved."). As Professor
Schacter acknowledged, her reform proposals were similarly selective and indirect. See supra
notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
72. See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 27, at 185 ("Unsurprisingly, the sense of failure of
representative government has increased talk of expanding direct democracy, whereby the
People themselves make laws."); Robert F. Williams, State ConstitutionalLaw Processes, 24 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 169, 205 (1983) (recognizing that the adoption of direct democracy "was another
indication of public dissatisfaction with state legislatures" and that "[t]he initiative allowed the
people to take direct action when the legislature refused to act").
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this form of lawmaking has therefore depended, in large part, upon a
belief that popular sovereignty and the will of the people can be
expressed in their purest form through the adoption of popularly
initiated measures. 73 Indeed, the Populist and Progressive reformers
that initially championed direct democracy were strongly influenced
by the precedent of the Swiss Cantons and the town meetings of
colonial New England.7 4 The small size of those communities and
existing limitations on the franchise meant that all eligible voters
could attend and participate in those meetings. In a sense, then, the
legislative products of those meetings could perhaps plausibly be
considered the "will of the people" living in those communities.
Drawing upon this precedent, the reformers of the Populist and
Progressive movements sought to return power to the people by the
adoption of direct democracy. 75 Supporters of direct democracy
believed that it would "break the crushing and stifling power of our
great party machines, and give freer play to the political ideas,
aspirations, opinions and feelings of the people. It will tend to relieve
us from the dominance of partisan passions, and have an elevating
and educative influence upon voters." 76 Accordingly, William S. U'Ren,

73. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 5, at 435-36 (explaining that the assumption that direct
democracy provides the clearest expression of "the voice of the people ... is at the heart of the
populist case for direct democracy"); Richard B. Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot
Initiative: Procedures That Do and Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 58 (1995) ("An important
variant of the concept that the initiative is a perfection of democracy is the claim that the
initiative allows expression of pure majoritarian will, and that this is a virtue.").
74. See BRODER, supra note 7, at 23 (describing the New England town meeting); Collins &
Oesterle, supra note 73, at 54 (indicating that Americans who had visited Switzerland "led the
movement to promote the initiative and referendum in this country"); David B. Magleby, Let the
Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13,
19 (1995) (recognizing that "the New England town meeting is frequently cited as a successful
use of expanded voter decision-making," but claiming that this example "has worked only in
small polities"); Persily, supra note 1, at 15 (describing "the American legacy of town meetings
and the experience of the Swiss cantons" as "the idyllic, even if misplaced, paradigm for the
institutional development of the tools of Progressive democracy").
75. For more thorough discussions of the historical development of direct democracy in the
states, see BRODER, supra note 7, at 23-41; CRONIN, supra note 18, at 38-59; MAGLEBY, supra
note 47, at 20-47; SCHRAG, supra note 7, at 188-94; Collins & Oesterle, supra note 73, at 53-63;
Robert Henry, Deliberations About Democracy: Revolutions, Republicanism, and Reform, 34
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 533, 554-62 (1998); Persily, supra note 1, at 15-38; David Schuman, The
Origin of State Constitutional Direct Democracy: William Simon U'ren and "The Oregon System,"
67 TEMP. L. REV. 947, 949-51, 953-56 (1994). Kenneth P. Miller has recently distinguished
populist and progressive conceptions of direct democracy and claimed that while modern-day
populists continue to prefer unmediated lawmaking by "the people," contemporary progressives
tend to favor structural reforms of the initiative process to promote good government. Kenneth P.
Miller, ConstrainingPopulism: The Real Challenge of Initiative Reform, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1037, 1039-45 (2001).
76.

NATHAN CREE, DIRECT LEGISLATION AND THE PEOPLE 16 (1892), quoted in CRONIN,

supranote 18, at 47-48.
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the leading proponent of direct democracy in Oregon, argued that
"[t]he one important thing was to restore the lawmaking power where
it belonged-in the hands of the people." 77 In this spirit, the platform
of the Populist Party in 1892 proclaimed that the goal of direct
democracy was "to restore the government of the Republic to the
78
hands of the 'plain people,' with which class it originated."
The vision of direct democracy as lawmaking by the people was
expressly incorporated into the constitutions of those states that
adopted the initiative and referendum during the Progressive
Movement. Those constitutions typically "reserve" the power of
initiative and referendum for "the people." 79 As a result, direct
democracy is constitutionally justified in the states precisely as a
means by which the electorate can retain an important measure of
popular sovereignty and directly pass legislation favored by a majority
of voters.
Modern-day supporters of direct democracy typically justify the
use of the initiative and referendum on similar grounds.80 As one
proponent of initiative measures told the Oregonian newspaper in
77.

CRONIN, supra note 18, at 49.

78. Populist Party Platform (1892), quoted in CRONIN, supra note 18, at 38.
79. See OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1 ("The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a
General Assembly... but the people reserve to themselves the power to propose to the General
Assembly laws and amendments to the constitution, and to adopt or reject the same at the polls
on a referendum vote .... "); OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1 ("The legislative power of the state, except
for the initiative and referendum powers reserved to the people, is vested in a Legislative
Assembly, consisting of a Senate and a House of Representatives."); CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 1 ('The
legislative power of this State is vested in the California Legislature which consists of the Senate
and Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum.");
ME. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1:
The legislative power shall be vested in two distinct branches, a House of
Representatives, and a Senate, each to have a negative on the other, and both to be
styled the Legislature of Maine, but the people reserve to themselves power to propose
laws and to enact or reject the same at the polls independent of the Legislature, and
also reserve power at their own option to approve or reject at the polls any Act, bill,
resolve or resolution passed by the joint action of both branches of the Legislature. [;]
ARIZ. CONST. art. 4, pt.1, § 1(1):

The legislative authority of the State shall be vested in the Legislature... but the
people reserve the power to propose laws and amendments to the Constitution and to
enact or reject such laws and amendments at the polls, independently of the
Legislature; and they also reserve, for use at their own option, the power to approve or
reject at the polls any Act, or item, section, or part of any Act, of the Legislature. [;]
IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 1 ("The people reserve to themselves the power to approve or reject at
the polls any act or measure passed by the legislature ... [and] [t]he people reserve to
themselves the power to propose laws, and enact the same at the polls independent of the
legislature.").
80. See, e.g., Lynn A. Baker, Constitutional Change and Direct Democracy, 66 U. COLO. L.
REV. 143, 144 (1995) (recognizing that direct democracy is "[oiften heralded as the purest and
highest form of democracy"); Hirsch, supra note 27, at 209-17 (claiming that a more direct
democracy could be an important means of promoting the civic maturation of the people).
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1996, the initiative process "is the only thing we have to protect
ourselves from the abuses of big government. I hate to see the people
taken advantage of by [unscrupulous] lawyers, crooks, and smoothtalking, conniving politicians."8 1 Indeed, the apparently widespread
public support for the initiative and referendum can be explained
largely as a result of the common perception that direct democracy is a
vehicle for the expression of the popular will. Public opinion polls that
examine the level of support for direct democracy frequently pose
questions such as whether we should "trust our elected officials to
make public decisions on all issues" or whether "voters [should] have a
direct say on some issues."8 2 Not surprisingly, those polled
overwhelmingly respond that the "voters should have a direct say."8 3
Similarly, courts that review the constitutional validity of
direct democratic measures frequently express the view that direct
democracy is an expression of popular sovereignty and the will of the
people.8 4 For example, in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc., the United States Supreme Court rejected a challenge to a city
ordinance that required zoning variances to be approved by
referendum on the grounds that this requirement unconstitutionally
delegated lawmaking authority to the people.8 5 The Court explained:
A referendum cannot.., be characterized as a delegation of power. Under our
constitutional assumptions, all power derives from the people, who can delegate it to
representative instruments which they create. In establishing legislative bodies, the
people can reserve to themselves power to deal directly with matters which might
8
otherwise be assigned to the legislatures 6

The Court proceeded to compare the referendum to the New England
town meeting "as both a practical and symbolic part of our democratic
processes," which are "means for direct political participation,
81. BRODER, supra note 7, at 201 (quoting Loren Parks).
82. See Gallup Organization, The Gallup Study of Public Opinion Regarding Direct
Democracy Devices (Princeton, N.J., Sept. 1987) (conducted for Thomas E. Cronin), cited in
CRONIN, supra note 18, at 80; see also Mark DiCamillo & Mervin Field, Public Divided on the
Efficacy of Legislation Enacted by Elected Representatives vs. Ballot Propositions, FIELD POLL,
Release No. 1940, at 2 (Nov. 11, 1999) (reporting that sixty-two percent of California voters still
consider statewide ballot proposition elections "a good thing," but noting that a positive response
to the same question had diminished from a high of eighty-three percent in 1979 when the poll
was first taken).
83. See Gallup Organization, The Gallup Study of Public Opinion Regarding Direct
Democracy Devices (Princeton, N.J., Sept. 1987) (conducted for Thomas E. Cronin), cited in
CRONIN, supra note 18, at 80.

84. See Clark, supra note 5, at 444-45 (claiming that judicial decisions suggest that
"representative democracy has come to be seen as a second-rate form of popular sovereignty,"
while "[d]irect democracy... appears to give us the pure and unadulterated voice of the people
themselves").
85. 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976).
86. Id. (citation omitted).
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allowing the people the final decision, amounting to a veto power, over
enactments of representative bodies. The practice is designed to 'give
citizens a voice on questions of public policy.' "87 Accordingly, the
Court concluded that the nondelegation doctrine, which prohibits the
standardless delegation of lawmaking authority to nonlegislators, "is
inapplicable where, as here, rather than dealing with a delegation of
'8
power, we deal with a power reserved by the people to themselves."
In Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, the
Supreme Court invalidated a local ordinance that limited financial
contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot
measures on the grounds that such limitations violate the First
Amendment.8 9 The city claimed that such regulations were necessary
to achieve the compelling governmental interest of avoiding corruption
in the lawmaking process, which the Court had earlier recognized in
upholding limits on campaign contributions to election candidates and
their committees in Buckley v. Valeo. 90 The Court distinguished
Buckley by explaining that "[r]eferenda are held on issues, not
candidates for public office. The risk of corruption perceived in cases
involving candidate elections simply is not present in a popular vote
on a public issue."91 The Court therefore concluded that "[w]hatever
may be the state interest or degree of that interest in regulating and
limiting contributions" in a candidate election, "there is no significant
state or public interest in curtailing debate and discussion of a ballot
measure."92 While the risks of quid pro quo corruption may be absent
in the initiative context, the Court underestimated the possibility that
"the people" could be unduly influenced by the results of unlimited
special interest contributions to ballot campaigns.
Members of the Supreme Court have continued to invoke the
rhetoric of popular sovereignty when they confront challenges to the
constitutional validity of direct democratic measures. In Romer v.
Evans, the Court invalidated an initiated amendment to the Colorado
Constitution under the Equal Protection Clause.9 3 The amendment
purported to prohibit state and local governments from enacting,
87. Id. at 672-73 (quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971)).
88. Id. at 675.
89. 454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981).
90. 424 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1976).
91. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. at 298 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S.
765, 790 (1978)); see also id. at 302 (Blackmun, J. & O'Connor, J., concurring) (claiming that
"curtailment of speech and association in a ballot measure campaign, where the people
themselves render the ultimate political decision, cannot be justified" as necessary to prevent
quid pro quo corruption or its appearance).
92. Id. at 299.
93. 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
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adopting, or enforcing "any statute, regulation, ordinance or policy
whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation, conduct,
practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of
or entitle any person or class of persons to have or claim any minority
status,
quota preferences,
protected
status
or
claim
of
94
discrimination."
In his "vigorous[]" dissent, 95 Justice Scalia
chastised the majority, in part, for setting aside the result of "this
most democratic of procedures" in which "all the citizens of the State"
responded negatively in a single issue election to the question of
whether "homosexuality should be given special protection." 96 Justice
Scalia pointedly criticized the majority not only for reaching the wrong
result in the case, but for substituting its own "elite" values for those
97
of "the people" of Colorado.
The Supreme Court is hardly alone in invoking the image of
popular sovereignty when engaging in judicial review of ballot
measures. 98 Indeed, the previous section explained that when courts
interpret ballot measures, they routinely purport to further the
"popular intent" of the electorate.9 9 The entire notion of "popular

94. Id. at 624.
95. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 647 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 652. Justice Scalia concluded his opinion with this argument:
The people of Colorado have adopted an entirely reasonable provision which does not
even disfavor homosexuals in any substantive sense, but merely denies them
preferential treatment. Amendment 2 is designed to prevent piecemeal deterioration
of the sexual morality favored by a majority of Coloradans, and is not only an
appropriate means to that legitimate end, but a means that Americans have employed
before. Striking it down is an act, not of judicial judgment, but of political will.
Id. at 653 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
98. Similar invocations of the rhetoric of popular sovereignty in direct democracy can be
found in opinions of state and lower federal courts. See, e.g., Coalition for Econ. Equity v. Wilson,
122 F.3d 692, 699 (9th Cir. 1997) (cautioning that judicial invalidation of a successful ballot
measure based on an erroneous legal premise "operates to thwart the will of the people in the
most literal sense" and that "[a] system which permits one judge to block with the stroke of a pen
what 4,736,180 state residents voted to enact as law tests the integrity of our constitutional
democracy"); Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. Tinney, 583 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Cal.
1978) (explaining that because the state constitution provides that "the people reserve to
themselves the powers of initiative and referendum," courts must "liberally construe[ ]" the
power of initiative "to promote the democratic process") (citations omitted); see also Holman et
al., supra note 13, at 1250, 1253 (finding that "courts in some states, including California,
express considerable deference to initiatives and have shown a reluctance to overturn them in
their entirety," and explaining that while "the federal courts have not been perceived as showing
a similar reluctance to review and invalidate initiatives[,] [i]t is not at all clear at this point
whether this perception is valid"). But see Kenneth P. Miller, Courts as Watchdogs of the
Washington State Initiative Process, 24. SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1053, 1075 (2001) (claiming that
"[a]lthough they do not expressly say so, some judges seem to apply a higher level of scrutiny to
initiatives").
99. See Schacter, supra note 5, at 117-19; supra Part I.B.
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intent" is premised on direct democracy's capacity to represent the will
of the people. Moreover, courts that seek to implement this popular
intent often "use impassioned prose to characterize the initiative as
democracy in its purest form, as the closest we can come to genuine
100
popular sovereignty."
A few commentators have questioned whether the specific
provisions of successful initiative measures truly represent the will of
the people.1 0 1 Moreover, scholars have repeatedly pointed out that the
100. In re Estate of Thompson, 692 P.2d 807, 808 (Wash. 1984); Schacter, supra note 5, at
151 (citing Yoshisato v. Superior Court, 831 P.2d 327, 333 (Cal. 1992)).
101. See Frickey, supra note 15, at 519 (recognizing that "it is much too simplistic to view
direct democracy as simply a lawmaking process that replaces the legislature" and that "[d]irect
democracy consists of two separate processes: proposal by well-organized interests and
ratification by the electorate"); Schacter, supra note 5, at 128-30:
The unfamiliarity of legal terminology to many voters creates powerful leverage for
the initiative's drafters, for it enables them to have an unseemly private dialogue of
sorts with the courts, who also understand these terms. Through careful use of
terminology, drafters can construct a desired-but largely phantom-popular intent.
Similarly, David Magleby has explained as follows:
In the initiative process, the voter is only partially legislator. Voters generally are not
permitted to participate in the drafting of initiatives, nor may they amend the
measure, as legislators can. There are no hearings, markup, floor debate, or
conference between the two houses to work out technical issues or modify the bill to
make it more acceptable. Sponsors of initiatives rarely circulate their proposals before
the petition phase, and once this phase begins, the language of the measure cannot
change. Voters instead face an initiative crafted entirely by the sponsors on which
they may only cast a "yes" or "no" vote. They may in fact favor the concept behind the
initiative but object to some specific parts of the proposition. The lack of prior
consultation may explain why initiatives are often extreme in their approach and
prone to defeat by voters, even though a majority of voters may favor the broad issue
concern of the initiative.
Magleby, supra note 74, at 43-44.
Julian Eule also recognized the limitations of popular sovereignty in direct democracy when
he described the electorate's likely understanding of one particularly complex insurance
initiative:
On one level [this proposition] represents a clear expression of citizen sentiment. It
effectively conveyed to the legislature the level of voter concern and dissatisfaction on
an issue marked by legislative cowardice. The particulars of the enacted reforms,
however, represent little more than the speculative musings of the drafters who were
then able to harness a frustrated, angry, and financially drained electorate into
passage, based largely on Ralph Nader's endorsement and the promise of lower
premiums. To suggest that the voters approved, let alone understood, the many facets
of [the proposition] is pure mythology.
Eule, supra note 2, at 1570-71. Professor Eule therefore concluded that "[i]t is not immediately
evident what warrants judicial deference to electoral policy judgments that the electorate never
actually made." Id. at 1570. Several judges have made similar observations, typically in a futile
effort to invalidate initiatives that they did not think the voters could have fully understood. See,
e.g., Bates v. Jones, 127 F.3d 839, 844 (9th Cir. 1997) (Reinhardt, J.) (invalidating a term limits
measure under the federal Constitution because "a state initiative measure cannot impose a
[lifetime ban on running for an office] when the issue of whether to impose such a limitation of
those rights is put to the voters in a measure that is ambiguous on its face and that fails to
mention in its text, the proponents' ballot arguments, or the state's official descriptions, the
severe limitation to be imposed"), vacated and rev'd, 131 F.3d 843 (1997) (en banc); Brosnahan v.
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ideal of popular sovereignty in direct democracy is undermined by low
voter turnout in general, a pronounced drop-off in voting on initiative
measures in particular, and the race- and class-based disparities
between those who vote and those who do not in both of these
contexts. 10 2 Despite this recognition, many commentators have joined
the general public and the courts in accepting the premise that direct
democracy is a meaningful reflection of the popular will.10 3 In any
event, most commentators seem to agree that "the voters" are the
relevant unit of analysis for purposes of judicial review. 104 This Article
Brown, 651 P.2d 274, 292-94 (Cal. 1982) (Byrd, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing the initiative process
and claiming that a ballot measure that amended numerous provisions of the state constitution
was invalid under the state's single-subject rule because the voters may have "favored some of
[the measure's] provisions, without realizing the effect of other, less-publicized sections").
102. Professor Eule put this problem succinctly when he questioned whether direct
democracy accurately reflects the majority will:
To begin with, less than half of the adult American population regularly vote-a level
of electoral participation that is by far the lowest found in any Western country....
Citizens of higher social and economic status are far more heavily represented among
voters than among those who abstain, a class skew virtually unparalleled in any other
political system conducting free elections. This bias is exaggerated by the nature of
who "drops-off' for ballot measure voting. Compared with voters generally, people who
typically vote on propositions are disproportionately well-educated, affluent, and
white. Minorities, the poor, and the uneducated are thus doubly underrepresented in
the plebiscite. They are both less likely to turn out and less likely to vote on
propositions if they do.
Eule, supra note 2, at 1514-15; see also CRONIN, supra note 18, at 66-70 (stating that "the less
educated, the less well-off, the young, and minorities.., are less likely to vote in ballot issue
elections" and reporting that "a 5 to 15 percent drop-off or falloff of voter participation is common
in state issue elections"); MAGLEBY, supra note 47, at 100-18 (discussing the representativeness
of voters who decide statewide propositions and claiming that "[d]ata on the levels of voter
participation in elections having statewide propositions show that on the average 15-18 percent
of those who turn out do not vote on statewide propositions"); Magleby, supra note 74, at 33-34
('Voting on ballot propositions only amplifies the social class bias in participation, because those
with lower incomes or less education tend to skip voting on ballot questions at much higher
rates"). Nonetheless, the extent of voter drop-off in ballot elections varies by election and issue
and in some instances disappears altogether. See CRONIN, supra note 18, at 67 (explaining that
while "voter falloff is typical, voter 'turnon' occurs when controversial and highly visible issues
are placed on the ballot"); Richard Briffault, Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 135859 (1985) (book review) (claiming that drop-off rates for ballot initiatives are not unusually high
when one compares the rate of voting on ballot measures with "voter participation in legislative
races," rather than "the candidate contests with the highest turnouts-Presidential and
gubernatorial elections").
103. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 5, at 434-35 (recognizing that "commentators... have
defended or described direct democratic outcomes as the voice of the 'people themselves,' " and
explaining that such characterizations have gone "largely unchallenged"); Hirsch, supra note 27,
at 185 (describing direct democracy as the process "whereby the People themselves make laws");
see also infra notes 265-66 (describing views of commentators that illustrate the myth of popular
sovereignty in direct democracy).
104. See Charlow, supra note 5, at 574-93 (comparing the 'legislature" to the "public as
lawmaker" for purposes of assessing the level of judicial deference that is appropriate toward
direct democracy); Eule, supra note 2, at 1507 ("The thesis of this Article is that arguments for
judicial restraint indeed play out differently when courts review the constitutionality of direct
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argues that the myth of popular sovereignty in direct democracy
should be rejected and ballot initiatives should no longer be
romanticized as lawmaking by "the people"; instead, they should be
characterized as lawmaking by "initiative proponents" whose general
objective is either ratified or rejected by the electorate.
B. The Role of InitiativeProponents
Contrary to the myth of popular sovereignty in direct
democracy, initiative measures do not magically become state law as a
result of the "will of the people." 10 5 Rather, such measures are
conceived, drafted, sponsored, and promoted by identifiable
individuals or groups that favor a specific policy proposal. 106 These
expressions of the electorate."); id. at 1562 (arguing that "the very recognition of the
fundamental way in which a voter's responsibility differs from a legislator's constitutional
obligation, as well as the inevitable evidentiary obstacles to assessing electoral motivation,
demands a different judicial treatment of the law produced by the electorate"); see also Lazos
Vargas, supra note 12, at 404 (stating that judicial invalidation of "actions taken directly by the
public" raises countermajoritarian concerns and places "a lone judge ... in a position of having to
tell possibly millions of voters that the voters' will is inconsistent with that single judge's
understanding of fundamental constitutional values"); Linde, supra note 8, at 41-44 (arguing
that initiative measures that appeal to the "collective passion" of the voters should be invalidated
by state courts under the Guarantee Clause of the federal Constitution); Mark Tushnet, Fear of
Voting: Differential Standardsof Judicial Review of Direct Legislation, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
373, 379-80 (comparing the legislative and initiative processes to assess the appropriate level of
deference for purposes of judicial review and stating that "the comparative question needs to be
formulated precisely: given a particular policy proposal,... is the quality of deliberation likely to
differ when that proposal is considered by a legislature or by the people directly?").
105. See Frickey, supra note 15, at 533 (claiming that the mythic nature of popular
sovereignty has never been "more obvious than in the consideration of direct democracy in the
states today"); Hamilton, supra note 4, at 10 ("The idea that [direct democracy] in any way
promotes valuable democracy is a product of the self-rule myth. A worse decision-making process
could not be imagined."); Linde, PracticingTheory, supra note 30, at 1741 (questioning "[t]he
populist assertion that direct lawmaking by those who vote on initiative measures is the act of
'the people,' for which lawmaking by elected representatives is a regrettably necessary
surrogate").
106. See BRODER, supra note 7, at 91-161 (describing an "initiative war in close-up"); Frickey,
supra note 15, at 519 (recognizing that the electorate "does not control the drafting and
circulation of proposed ballot measures"); Garrett, supra note 60, at 18 (stating that "special
interests, not ordinary citizens, generally frame the terms of the debate concerning ballot
measures" and concluding that they "have a comparative advantage in determining both what
questions are placed on the ballot for popular decision and how those questions are drafted");
Schacter, supra note 5, at 129 (claiming that "the popular-intent approach [to statutory
interpretation of ballot measures] enables small groups to appropriate the political authority of
the electorate through the leverage of statutory drafting").
This Article's references to "initiative proponents" are intended to include the registered
sponsors of ballot measures, their hired consultants, and those who voluntarily draft and
promote measures on their behalf. When this Article advocates judicial review of statements of
the initiative proponents during the ballot campaign, it contemplates that courts would also
consider public statements by major financial contributors and those who make campaign
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initiative proponents typically represent particular special interests
and are increasingly multimillionaires who seek to influence public
policy on their pet issues. 0 7 Not only are the proponents unelected
and not sworn to uphold the Constitution, but they sometimes do not
even live in the state or locality in which their measure has been
proposed.1 08 Nonetheless, the initiative proponents are the driving
force behind drafting direct democratic measures, qualifying them for
the ballot, and leading the campaigns to convince the electorate to
vote in their favor' 09-often spending millions of dollars in the
process. 110

expenditures in coordination with the initiative proponents. See infra Part III.C. Jurisdictions
that apply the agency model to direct democracy should require all of these individuals and
groups, rather than just a few designated representatives, to be identified pursuant to state law.
Cf. CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9002 (West 1996):
Prior to the circulation of any initiative or referendum petition for signatures, a draft
of the proposed measure shall be submitted to the Attorney General with a written
request that a title and summary of the chief purpose and points of the proposed
measure be prepared.... The persons presenting the request shall be known as the
"proponents." [;]
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-104 (West 2002):
At the time of any filing of a draft as provided in this article, the proponents shall
designate the names and mailing addresses of two persons who shall represent the
proponents in all matters affecting the petition and to whom all notices or information
concerning the petition shall be mailed.
107. See BRODER, supra note 7, at 171, i91-92 (describing one wealthy initiative sponsor as
"a lowly born aristocrat of talent teeing up fixes for the masses out of a sense of nerd oblige" and
indicating that "[pilenty of other millionaires have also found the initiative handy for
'empowering' voters to endorse the initiatives' sponsors' agendas"); see also Peter Schrag, The
Fourth Branch of Government? You Bet, 41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 937, 938 (2001) (explaining
that "the remarkable success that Bill Zimmerman and his colleagues have had in liberalizing
state drug laws" was "financed by deep pocket funders-in his case by financier George Soros
and two other multi-millionaires"); id. at 941 (pointing out that "one man, Bill Sizemore, who has
become a sort of one-stop-shopping initiative conglomerate as developer, sponsor, and campaign
organizer, qualified six measures for the ballot" in Oregon in the fall 2000 elections).
108. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 227 (1999)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[fin recent years, the initiative and referendum process has come
to be more and more influenced by out of state interests which employ professional firms doing a
nationwide business.") (citations omitted). Richard Hasen has recently observed, however, that
political parties have begun to use the initiative process to further their own political agendas.
See generally Hasen, supra note 5, at 731. Although political parties are electorally accountable
in ways that most initiative proponents are not, this development is still problematic because it
allows politicians to engage in lawmaking free of the structured deliberation and other
constraints inherent in the traditional legislative process.
109. Elisabeth Gerber has described the role of the initiative proponents in direct democracy
as follows:
The interest group determines the content and language of the proposition. In
conjunction with state election officials, it selects the name and official description of
the measure. It heads the effort to qualify the measure for the ballot and often
coordinates the formation of a coalition of core supporters. It then leads the
supporting coalition by coordinating fundraising and campaign efforts. Initiative
proposers often provide substantial financial and nonfinancial resources to the
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Even prior to beginning the formal process required to qualify
an initiative for the ballot, the initiative proponents must
conceptualize a policy proposal, draft the language of the measure,
and begin to formulate the campaign strategy that will be used to
lobby the public on its behalf."n Increasingly, initiative proponents
hire members of an "initiative industry," composed of professional
campaign consultants who often specialize in direct democracy, to aid
in this process.11 2 The proponents and their consultants are capable of
conducting sophisticated research on the existing legal landscape in
order to draft the measures to achieve their intended results with an
eye toward future judicial review." 3 Moreover, it is not unusual for
them to use focus groups and conduct polls to determine how most
4
effectively to promote or "spin" their measures to the voters."
initiative campaign. They are involved in defending
postelection amendments and legal challenges as well.

their

measure

against

ELISABETH R. GERBER, THE POPULIST PARADOX: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE AND THE PROMISE
OF DIRECT LEGISLATION 44-45 (1999).
110. See BRODER, supra note 7, at 163-64 (providing data on initiative spending and
describing a record-setting initiative election in which competing gaming interests spent $92
million); GERBER, supra note 109, at 4-5 (providing data on "the enormous level of spending in
direct legislation campaigns"); MAGLEBY, supra note 47, at 149 tbl.2 (providing data on campaign
spending for ballot initiatives in California from 1958 until 1982).
111. See BRODER, supra note 7, at 70-71 (explaining that "[t]he first step in the initiative
process is drafting the legal language as if it were a statute or a bill in the legislature," but
noting that because the proposal "will be voted on by average citizens after A political campaign,
it must be written with an eye to probable opposition tactics" and that "politics is so pervasive
that the lawyers want the professional campaign consultants in the room right from the
beginning ') (internal quotations omitted).
112. For more detailed discussions of the initiative industry, see BRODER, supra note 7, at
43-89; MAGLEBY, supra note 47, at 59-76; see also SCHRAG, supra note 7, at 188-256; Garrett,
supra note 5, at 1851 ("Providing professional signature gatherers is one of the many services
offered by the growing initiative industry, which consists of political professionals who assist
groups in obtaining the required number of signatures, meeting legal and procedural challenges
to ballot access, and managing the campaign itself."); Garrett, supra note 60, at 19:
[RIelatively small groups that can organize, amass substantial resources, and deploy
their resources effectively can dominate the process of direct democracy. These small
groups are involved on all levels-from drafting the direct legislation to collecting the
signatures required to place a question on the ballot and from framing the debate
during the campaign to influencing the eventual outcome. [;]
Magleby, supra note 74, at 30 (recognizing that a "highly profitable" "initiative industry which
specializes in direct-legislation politics has grown in several states" and that "[professionals help
draft measures, circulate petitions, manage campaigns, provide polling, and produce media");
David McCuan et al., California'sPolitical Warriors: Campaign Professionals and the Initiative
Process in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS 55-70 (Shaun Bowler et al. eds., 1998).
113. See supranote 61.
114. David Broder interviewed a number of participants in the initiative process and
reported that the proponents and their consultants routinely draft proposals with the subsequent
ballot campaign in mind. For example, one campaign consultant reported:
'Mvany times the way in which we would draft an initiative would be influenced by the
polling and the campaign consultant's input. You want them all at the table, because
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In most states and municipalities, the official role of the
initiative proponents begins at the outset of the formal direct
democratic process when a proposed ballot measure is drafted and
filed with the appropriate public official. 115 Once a proposed ballot
those who do the best job [of drafting the proposal] are ultimately going to have the
best campaign. And sometimes ... we have to tell the client, 'Don't do this. We've
tested this. We've put it in the best fashion possible and you can't win this. Or if you
are determined to try, it will take such-and-such an amount of resources.'"
BRODER, supra note 7, at 71-72.
Similarly, the initiative proponents and their consultants conduct substantial research to
construct an effective ballot campaign. Broder quoted extensively from an interview with Ben
Goddard, an initiative consultant, and described the process as follows:
"We will bring in outside consultants with appropriate expertise to do a thorough
analysis of the proposition-to see what the economic effects will be, the legal effects,
the policy effects." Often, [Goddard] said, the proposition has been poorly drafted with
ambiguities or overreaching language.
The content analysis shapes the arguments that go into the voters' pamphlets, used
by many states to inform the citizenry about issues on the ballot .... "Your pamphlet
arguments are doubly important," Goddard said, "because when you make your ads,
you can say, 'The voters' pamphlet says such-and-such.' You don't tell them that it's
your argument in the voters' pamphlet."...
Once the content analysis is finished, "you start your research process to determine
which arguments will push people's buttons," Goddard said. This can be a lengthy,
pain-staking process, requiring panels with different political and demographic
makeups, and a constant refining of the arguments they hear. "When this qualitative
research is finished, you do your broad polling to be able to quantify the results: This
argument is likely to shift opinion by this percentage."
The next step is to decide "who are credible messengers," Goddard said. Often the
answers are surprising. "Doctors do not have credibility on health care issues," he
said. "Nurses do.
Expert opinion doesn't count for much. People know you can hire experts to say
almost anything you want said. ... So we get ordinary people, or actors who seem like
ordinary people ....
"We operate on the premise that most people will vote their self-interest," Goddard
said, "so if you show them they can best defend themselves by voting a certain way,
they will move to that position in very large numbers."
Id. at 73-77; see also id. at 77-83 (describing additional interviews regarding the tactics of
initiative proponents and their consultants).
115. See, e.g., OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(2)(e) ("An initiative petition shall be filed not less than
four months before the election at which the proposed law or amendment to the Constitution is
to be voted upon."); CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, INITIATIVE GUIDE (explaining that "[t]he first step in
the process of qualifying an initiative is to write the text of the proposed law" and that "[o]nce
the text of the initiative measure has been written, the proponent(s) must submit a draft of the
proposed initiative measure to the Attorney General" for a title and summary of the proposed
measure), at http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/init-guide.htm (last visited Feb. 18, 2003). A number
of states provide assistance in the drafting of initiative proposals, but they do not require the
proponents to accept this assistance or allow governmental officials to amend proposed ballot
measures without the consent of the initiative proponents. See, e.g., CAL. SECY OF STATE, supra
(stating that "[t]he initiative measure's proponent(s) may obtain assistance from the Legislative
Counsel in drafting the language of the measure" if they meet certain requirements, but the
proponents "also may seek the assistance of their own private counsel to help draft the text of the
proposed law, or they may choose to write the text themselves"); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-40105 (West 2002) (requiring the initiative proponents to submit a proposed measure to "the
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measure is filed, the proponents are required to circulate initiative
petitions and acquire a certain number of signatures from registered
voters, who purport to express their support for placing the measure
on an upcoming ballot. 116 This signature requirement, which is
sometimes higher for proposed constitutional amendments than for
statutory provisions, is typically based on a percentage of the voters
117
who participated in a previous election.
The signature requirement is, of course, intended to weed out
frivolous proposals and ensure the existence of an appropriate level of
public support for a proposed measure. 118 This public support was
originally evidenced by the participation of a significant number of
volunteer petition circulators who felt intensely enough about a
proposal to devote their time and effort to the cause. 11 9 Moreover, the
signatures themselves were thought to reflect deliberate consideration
of the underlying policy proposal by registered voters who signified
their support for placing the measure on the ballot.120
directors of the legislative council and the office of legislative legal services for review and
comment" prior to circulation of the initiative petitions); see also CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN
FIN., supra note 6, at 91-92, 99-103 (describing the drafting assistance that is available for
initiative proponents in some states).
116. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. 7 ("Eight per cent of the legal voters may propose any law
and ten per cent may propose a Constitutional Amendment by initiative petition, and every such
petition shall include the full text of the measure so proposed."); CAL. CONST. art. II § 8(b) (2001)
("An initiative measure may be proposed by presenting to the Secretary of State a petition that
sets forth the text of the proposed statute or amendment to the Constitution and is certified to
have been signed by electors equal in number to 5 percent in the case of a statute, and 8 percent
in the case of an amendment to the Constitution, of the votes for all candidates for Governor at
the last gubernatorial election."); OR. CONST. art. IV, § 1(2)(b) ("An initiative law may be
proposed only by a petition signed by a number of qualified voters equal to six percent of the
total number of votes cast for all candidates for Governor at the election at which a Governor was
elected for a term of four years next preceding the filing of the petition."); see also MAGLEBY,
supra note 47, at 36-44 (surveying state signature requirements).
117. See id.; Magleby, supra note 74, at 22 tbl.1 (indicating that the average number of
signatures required is 7.5% of registered voters, with requirements ranging from 2% in North
Dakota to 15% in Wyoming for statutory questions). A number of states also impose geographic
distribution requirements to force proponents to demonstrate support in multiple parts of the
state. See id. at 21.
118. See, e.g., MAGLEBY, supra note 47, at 41 ("Signature thresholds are intended to keep the
ballot free of frivolous or unreasonably narrow propositions."); Garrett, supra note 5, at 1850
(describing the twofold purpose of signature requirements as demonstrating public support for a
vote on the question and educating the electorate).
119. See Garrett, supra note 5, at 1853-54 ("The ability of a group to command large
numbers of volunteers is itself a convincing demonstration of public support").
120. Elizabeth Garrett has pointed out that some historians claim that signature drives were
occasions for public deliberation in the early days of direct democracy. "Supporters would bring
[initiative] petitions to meetings of civic groups and churches, and people would [allegedly]
debate the merits of the proposal as they considered whether to sign." Id. at 1850. But cf.
BRODER, supra note 7, at 52 (claiming that the practice of paying for the collection of signatures
to place an initiative on the ballot "sprang up within the first decade of the Progressive era-the
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The dominant role played by the initiative industry in modern
petition drives has substantially undermined the ability of the
signature requirement to serve its intended purposes. 121 Signaturegathering firms are typically paid on commission and sometimes
charge as much as $2.50 per name. 122 Moreover, the registered voters
who are asked to sign initiative petitions generally do not reflect upon
the wisdom of the proposed policy, but are persuaded instead by the
argument that they should support placing the measure on the ballot
to "let the people decide."'123 Indeed, petition circulators appear
actively to discourage potential signatories from engaging in the
relatively time-consuming activities of reading the language of the
measure and asking substantive questions, much less thoughtfully
debating the policy's merits. 24 In light of these increasingly common
practices, it is not surprising that commentators have concluded that
sufficiently well-financed initiative proponents can utilize the
initiative industry to obtain enough signatures to qualify virtually any
first decade!-as if to mock the pretensions of those public-spirited reformers who brought the
idea to America").
121. See BRODER, supra note 7, at 52-69, 172-74, 187-88 (describing the tactics of paid
petition circulators); Garrett, supra note 5, at 1850-51 (claiming that the growth of the initiative
industry and the use of paid petition circulators prevents signature threshold requirements from
serving their purpose in most cases).
122. BRODER, supra note 7, at 63; cf. Garrett, supra note 5, at 1851 (describing fees of up to
$1.50 per name). The practice of using signature gathering firms to qualify an initiative for the
ballot is certain to continue in light of the Supreme Court's holding that a state's prohibition of
paid petition circulators violates the First Amendment. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 428
(1988); see also Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999) (holding
that a Colorado law that regulated initiative petition circulators violated the First Amendment
in several respects).
123. See BRODER, supra note 7, at 54 (describing the basic technique of the "table method" of
gathering signatures and indicating that hesitant voters will usually sign a petition after being
reminded that "[t]his is just to get it on the ballot"); CRONIN, supra note 18, at 62-64 ("Some
people who either cannot resist the pressure to sign or are persuaded by the argument that this
group deserves the right to present the issue to the voters sign the petition even though they are
opposed to the measure."); Garrett, supra note 5, at 1851 (indicating that "most studies reveal
that people are willing to sign without reading the question, without thinking about it much, and
certainly without deciding to support the proposition on its merits"); Magleby, supra note 74, at
15 ("Petition circulators frequently use the argument, 'the voters should decide,' to persuade
people to sign petitions that place initiatives on the ballot.").
124. See BRODER, supra note 7, at 54 (stating that professional signature-gatherers find
"arguing" to be "a waste of time" and explaining that "[i]f they encounter any significant
resistance, they simply move on to the next prospect, hoping to find someone more pliable");
CRONIN, supra note 18, at 63 ("Even when a group plays by the rules, an incentive exists to get
as many people to sign as fast as possible."); Garrett, supra note 5, at 1851 ("The primary hurdle
blocking supporters is finding enough circulators who can approach a sufficient number of
citizens within the short time frame allowed to gather signatures."); Garrett, supra note 60, at 20
("Those who gather signatures through the more traditional 'booth-in-the-shopping-mall' method
structure their interactions with the public to discourage extended discussion and to avoid even
revealing what issue the petition proposes to place on the ballot.").
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initiative measure for the ballot. 125 Commentators have also
recognized that "money increasingly appears to be a necessary
126
condition" for waging a successful ballot campaign.
Every state that authorizes the initiative process prohibits the
proponents from making substantive amendments to the language of a
ballot measure's text once an initiative petition is circulated to the
voters for their signatures. 127 The justification for this rule, which is
apparently based on a desire to honor the policy preferences of the
registered voters who signed the initiative petitions, is often accepted
without critical examination. 128 Nonetheless, these prohibitions on
amendments
effectively
preclude initiative proponents from

125. See Garrett, supra note 5, at 1852-53 ("There is no disagreement in the literature that
using paid circulators overseen by a professional firm virtually guarantees ballot access.").
126. Id. at 1847; see also GERBER, supra note 109, at 61-62 (finding that "monetary resources
are necessary to run an effective media-intensive statewide direct legislation campaign," but that
"they may not be sufficient" to ensure electoral success). One initiative consultant bluntly
explained to David Broder: "When somebody walks in [with an initiative proposal], I always ask
the million-dollar question, which is, 'Where's your million dollars?' It's very difficult to qualify
something for less than a million dollars." BRODER, supra note 7, at 84 (quoting Tom Hiltachk);
accord Todd Donovan et al., Contending Players and Strategies: Opposition Advantages in
Initiative Campaigns, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra note 112, at 94 (reporting that "the
average qualification costs in California were about $1 million" by the mid-1990s).
127. See MAGLEBY, supra note 47, at 184 (explaining that because the initiative process
forecloses amendments, voters must affirm or reject ballot propositions in toto); Eule, supra note
2, at 1556 (indicating that "[m]ajoritarian preferences cannot be softened or diluted by political
compromise" in the initiative process); Frickey, supra note 20, at 437 (stating that "[o]nce the
petitions are floated to the public for signature," a ballot proposition is "an unamendable
matter"); Frickey, supra note 15, at 523-24 (describing a highly problematic initiative proposal
and lamenting that "once this ballot proposition was drafted and circulation for signatures had
begun, there was no method of providing public consideration and refinement"); Garrett, supra
note 60, at 31 (recognizing that initiative opponents "cannot seek compromise to accommodate
their concerns ... because the text of a proposal cannot be changed once it has been placed on
the ballot"); Magleby, supra note 74, at 18 (recognizing that "[tihere are ... no provisions for
amendment or modification of the initiative once it begins petition circulation"); Miller, supra
note 75, at 1052 (recognizing that after the ballot petition is circulated for signatures, "the
measure cannot be amended again, even by the proponents, even if it becomes apparent that the
measure contains a flaw that should be corrected"). In those states that authorize the indirect
initiative, the proposed ballot measure must typically be enacted in an unamended form by the
legislature to preclude a subsequent vote by the electorate. See MAGLEBY, supra note 47, at 3536:
If, after a specified time, the statute has not been approved by the legislature or if the
legislature has amended the original initiative in a way unacceptable to the original
proponents, the proponents may then gather the remaining required signatures and
submit the original initiative to the voters for approval or rejection.
128. Given the minimal attention that voters who sign initiative petitions devote to the
substance of proposed ballot measures, see supra notes 123-24 and accompanying text, it would
appear that the prohibition against amending ballot measures after initiative petitions are
circulated is based on a fiction, much like that of the "myth of popular sovereignty" in direct
democracy generally.
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correcting, improving, or compromising on the language of a proposed
measure that qualifies for the ballot. 129
After an initiative proposal qualifies for the ballot, the
proponents and their consultants lead the campaign to convince the
electorate to vote in favor of the measure. 130 Although initiative
campaigns are increasingly financed by wealthy sponsors, other
measures receive financial support from consortia of existing interest
groups and campaign committees formed specifically to promote an
initiative proposal. 13 1 Moreover, the costs of conducting a controversial
or contested initiative campaign have soared in recent years. 132 For
example, the ballot campaigns in California during the 1996 election
cycle cost $141,274,345--only slightly less than the national
presidential election conducted in the same year.133
The proponents engage in a variety of activities to promote
their measure during a typical initiative campaign. These activities
include the behind-the-scenes work of negotiating with state officials
over the initiative's title and official summary, as well as lobbying
interested individuals and groups for financial and electoral
support.134 Indeed, endorsements of an initiative measure from
interest groups, elected officials, celebrities, and the media can
provide useful information to the electorate in a context where other
common voter cues, including a candidate's name recognition and
129. See supra note 127; infra note 215.
130. See supra note 114 (describing the formulation of a ballot campaign).
131. See BRODER, supra note 7, at 163-97 (describing the financing behind a number of direct
democratic measures); GERBER, supra note 109, at 59-100 (describing group characteristics,
resources, and spending in ballot campaigns).
132. See supra note 110.
133. BRODER, supra note 7, at 164.
134. See id. at 111 (discussing "the now-traditional fight over the ballot language that
describes each initiative"); id. at 163 (explaining that "bjlust as in presidential campaigns, the
first test for any contender is the ability to raise the needed money"); see also Collins & Oesterle,
supra note 73, at 93-99 (describing the procedure for titling an initiative in Colorado and
claiming that "an officious citizen can use the process" to his or her advantage); William A. Lund,
Note, What's in a Name? The Battle over Ballot Titles in Oregon, 34 WILLAMETrE L. REV.143,
144-45 (1998) (discussing the procedures for providing ballot titles in Oregon and other direct
democracy states); McCuan et al., supra note 112, at 70 (stating that the attorney general's
provision of a title and summary is a "critical juncture" that "often involves group members in a
long negotiating process with the state's attorneys"). Indeed, the fight over the attorney general's
characterization of the initiative measure can itself lead to contentious litigation. See BRODER,
supra note 7, at 178 (describing initiative proponents who were emboldened by a victory in the
courts over the official ballot description of an initiative); SCHRAG, supra note 7, at 214 (claiming
that the language of the title and summary "is so crucial it often becomes the subject of a
separate court battle before it reaches the ballot itself'); Collins & Oesterle, supra note 73, at 95
('Many ballot title controversies end up in the Supreme Court of Colorado, most brought by
aggrieved initiative proponents, and a select few brought by petition opponents, with the court
upholding the title board in all but a few cases.").
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political party, are absent. 135 As those who live in initiative states well
know, the proponents and their financial backers typically lobby the
electorate directly by engaging in extensive print, radio, and television
advertising on behalf of their measures. 136 The proponents sometimes
appear on talk radio programs and in other public forums to gain
support for their policy proposals. 37 Unfortunately, much of this
discourse with the electorate is conducted in a simplistic, partisan,
and sometimes misleading fashion.138
Not surprisingly, if organized opponents of an initiative
measure exist, they will typically engage in similar tactics to convince

135. See BRODER, supra note 7, at 78 (describing "the careful selection of endorsers" as one of
the "principles of initiative campaigns" identified by an attorney who specializes in them);
Jeffrey A. Karp, The Influence of Elite Endorsements in Initiative Campaigns, in CITIZENS AS
LEGISLATORS, supra note 112, at 149-65 (conducting a case study on the effects of Tom Foley's
endorsement in a ballot campaign and concluding that "mass opinion is shaped in part by elites
when their positions are known"); Schacter, supra note 5, at 135-36 (indicating that
"endorsements" of ballot measures are prominent "information shortcuts" that are available to
voters in ballot campaigns); cf. MAGLEBY, supra note 47, at 151-59, 165 (recognizing that "much
disagreement exists [in campaign literature] over how large a role media and elite endorsements
play in determining the outcome of proposition elections" and claiming that "[tihe role of elites in
the process of direct legislation is limited").
136. See supra note 110 (describing the high levels of spending in ballot campaigns). A
number of direct democracy states provide information regarding ballot campaign spending on
their Web sites. See, e.g., CAL. SEC'Y OF STATE, CAL-ACCESS: CAMPAIGN FINANCE ACTIVITY
(providing information regarding all of the campaign committees that have organized to support
or oppose propositions and ballot measures on California's statewide ballot), at
http://cal-access.ss.ca.gov/CampaignlMeasures (last visited Feb. 17, 2003); OR. SECY OF STATE,
POLITICAL COMMITTEES (providing a database to search for campaign spending by political
committees in Oregon, including those that support or oppose ballot measures), at http:/sosvenus.sos.state.or.us:8080/elecsrcbelfi$.startup (last visited Feb. 17, 2003).
137. See BRODER, supra note 7, at 177 (describing initiative proponents who "represented the
affirmative side" of a ballot question "in public debates and on innumerable talk-show
interviews").
138. See id. (describing the initiative industry as "a huge industry devoted to the
manipulation of public opinion"); CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 6, at 199
(explaining that campaign advertising in ballot contests has developed "a reputation for
innuendo, deception and exaggeration"); ZISK, supra note 47, at 264 (finding that ballot
campaign advertisements are "simplistic" at best and "deceptive" at worst); Eule, supranote 2, at
1517 (claiming that "[i]llustrations of deceptive advertising and sloganeering abound" in ballot
campaigns); Frickey, supra note 20, at 441 (claiming that "[a] largely unmotivated and
unaccountable electorate is much more prone to influence by campaigns based on fear and
misunderstanding, if not outright misrepresentation"); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Campaign
Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the First
Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505, 570 (1982) (indicating that ballot campaigns are "marked by
gross exaggeration, distortion, and outright deception"); Becky Kruse, Comment, The Truth in
Masquerade: Regulating False Ballot PropositionAds Through State Anti-False Speech Statutes,
89 CAL. L. REV. 129, 147-51 (2001) (criticizing the use of "increasingly sophisticated, often
misleading ads" in ballot campaigns and providing several notable examples); Schacter, supra
note 5, at 131 (recognizing that advertising in initiative campaigns is "avowedly partisan and
intended to persuade rather than inform").
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the public to vote against a proposed measure.1 39 It is also increasingly
common for initiative opponents to qualify their own "counterinitiative" for the ballot in an effort either to move the status quo in a
more favorable direction or to encourage confused voters simply to
vote against all of the measures on a particular subject.' 40 The
opponents commonly focus their campaigns on describing the "parade
of horribles" that would result if an initiative measure were
enacted. 4 1 Indeed, the opponents can "ambush" the proponents with
negative advertising against a measure at the tail end of a campaign,
conservative tendency to vote
hoping to capitalize on the electorate's
42
measure.1
against any doubtful
Because of the amount of time required to produce media
advertisements and the tendency of the proponents and opponents to
engage in heavy advertising shortly before an election, the advertising
from both sides tends to draw upon carefully orchestrated strategies
that were conceived in advance of the time that the opposing groups'
advertisements reached the airwaves. 143 As a result, the
advertisements tend to focus on peripheral issues and "talk past one
another," instead of reflecting much true deliberation or dialogue
about the substantive merits of the measure. 144 The groups producing
the advertisements are limited in their ability directly to respond to
charges made by the opposing parties in the days before an election.
Ballot pamphlets, which are distributed to the voters prior to
the election in a number of states, provide one tool for a modicum of
139. See Lowenstein, supra note 138, at 580.
140. See Eule, supra note 2, at 1517-18 ("A recent innovation in obfuscation has been the
placement of competing propositions on the ballot, leaving voters completely baffled about which
one does what."); Magleby, supra note 74, at 24 (describing the oppositions' use of counterinitiatives); Elizabeth M. Stein, Note, The California Constitution and the Counter-Initiative
Quagmire, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 143, 155-57 (1993) (describing the development of the
counter-initiative as a strategy utilized by the initiative opponents in ballot campaigns).
141. See BRODER, supra note 7, at 91-161 (describing the tactics of initiative opponents in
one ballot campaign); id. at 156 (claiming that "[n]ever once in all their ads and all their
mailings did the opponents of [the measure] engage the basic question" raised by the proposal,
but "basically they threw up a lot of dust, creating bogus scares about the people behind [the
measure] and the consequences of its passage").
142. See id. at 114 (quoting an initiative campaign consultant who explained, "When you're
on the negative side, you basically just try to create doubts."); GERBER, supra note 109, at 56
("One consequence of voter risk aversion is that if campaigners expect voters to behave this way,
opponents of direct legislation propositions may design their campaigns to emphasize and
cultivate uncertainty about a proposition, even further biasing voters' tendencies to favor the
status quo."); Donovan et al., supra note 126, at 99 (recognizing that initiative proponents "must
overcome voter tendencies to 'just vote no' when in doubt").
143. See BRODER, supranote 7, at 91-161 (describing an "initiative war in close-up").
144. See id.; Adam Winkler, Beyond Belotti, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 133, 184-85 (1998)
(claiming that "[m]ass media advertisements" in ballot campaigns "tend to encapsulate issues
into often deceptive slogans and catch-phrases, eschewing substantive examination").
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deliberation and debate prior to an initiative election. 145 The
proponents routinely submit statements on behalf of their measure for
inclusion in such ballot pamphlets. 146 The ballot pamphlets also
contain "objective" descriptions of the general purpose and effect of an
initiative, which are typically drafted by public officials or committees
composed of proponents and opponents of the measure.1 47 Finally, the
ballot pamphlets typically contain statements in opposition to the
measure, which are drafted by individuals and groups seeking to
48
defeat the measure at the polls.
If an initiative measure receives the requisite amount of
electoral support-typically an affirmative vote from a majority of the
participating voters-the measure is enacted. 149 Successfully enacting
a measure, however, is not necessarily the end of the road for the
initiative proponents. Often, the validity of successful initiative
measures is challenged on statutory and constitutional grounds in the
courts. 50 Although the attorney general in most states is charged with
the task of defending legislation in the courts, the initiative

145. For a detailed discussion of ballot pamphlets in initiative and campaign elections, see
generally Peter Brien, Voter Pamphlets: The Next Best Step in Election Reform, 28 J. LEGIS. 87
(2002); see also CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 6, at 227-63 (describing California's
ballot pamphlet and other state-sponsored sources of information available to voters in ballot
campaigns); CRONIN, supra note 18, at 80-83 (discussing ballot pamphlets and estimating that
between thirty and sixty percent of those who go to the polls read them and rely upon them as
important sources of information); MAGLEBY, supra note 47, at 136-39 (describing the
advantages and shortcomings of ballot pamphlets); Frickey, supra note 20, at 437 (claiming that
"the voter pamphlet might be so gargantuan (Oregon's ran 247 pages in 1996) as to be worthless
to all but the most dedicated or fixated voters"); Schacter, supra note 5, at 141-44 (describing the
use of ballot pamphlets in some jurisdictions and claiming that "they pose many of the same
problems-albeit ones not as severe-as statutory language").
146. A report on the initiative process, which was prepared by the City Club of Portland,
pointed out that anyone can buy an advertisement in the Oregon ballot pamphlet for $500, and
warned that "[t]here are no procedures for screening purchased arguments for accuracy. A totally
false statement of fact . . . can be published with no opportunity for rebuttal in the pages of the
pamphlet." CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN OREGON 26 (1996) (on

file with author).
147. See CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supranote 6, at 236-37.
148. See supra notes 145-46.
149. See MAGLEBY, supra note 47, at 38-39, tbl. 3.1 (summarizing state procedures for direct
legislation and providing information regarding the vote necessary for successful enactment of
ballot measures).
150. BRODER, supra note 7, at 72 (recognizing that legal challenges to successful ballot
measures are "almost inevitable"); MAGLEBY, supra note 47, at 52-53 (claiming that because
courts "have not hesitated to declare a particular initiative in conflict with the state or federal
constitution ....
successful initiatives are almost always challenged in the courts"); Gerber et al.,
supra note 60, at 4 (explaining that "[m]any initiatives that win at the ballot box are challenged
in the courts"); Holman & Stern, supra note 13, at 1240 (explaining that "public policies
formulated through the initiative process often become embroiled in controversy and [are]
scrutinized by the courts").
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proponents sometimes assist public officials in defending their
measures. 151 Alternatively, the proponents are routinely granted
permission to intervene in lawsuits to support the validity of their
measure and obtain a favorable judicial construction. 152 Even when
successful ballot measures are upheld by the courts, the initiative
proponents are sometimes forced to engage in additional litigation,
lobbying, or oversight activities to ensure that responsible public
officials take appropriate action to implement the measure after it is
enacted. 153
In contrast to the dominant role played by the initiative
proponents in direct democracy, the role of "the people" is quite
limited. The voters do not write the language of ballot measures; nor
do they typically engage in meaningful public debate about the
advisability of a proposed policy.' 54 With the possible exception of
unusually high-profile initiative elections, some voters may not know
anything about a measure prior to entering the voting booth. 15 5 In
most jurisdictions, the actual text of an initiative measure is not even
151. See GERBER ET AL., supra note 60, at 34-108 (reporting the results of case studies of the
implementation of successful ballot measures); GERBER, supra note 109, at 44-45 (recognizing
that initiative proponents "are involved in defending their measure against postelection
amendments and legal challenges as well").
152. See id.; Bates v. Jones, 904 F. Supp. 1080, 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ('The individualized
interest of official proponents of ballot initiatives in defending the validity of the enactment they
sponsored is sufficient to support intervention as of right.") (citing Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d
727 (9th Cir.1991), vacated as moot, Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997);
Wash. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Spellman, 684 F.2d 627, 629-30 (9th Cir. 1982)).
153. See GERBER ET AL., supra note 60, at 20-21, 109-10 (explaining that "[a]ll initiatives
require government actors to implement and enforce them" and describing the methods available
to initiative proponents for sanctioning government actors who "thwart initiative proponents'
intentions").
154. See Frickey, supra note 20, at 437 ("It would be fanciful to suggest that the electorate
collectively has the same basis of information and opportunity for fruitful deliberation about a
ballot measure as the legislature does for important pending bills."); Frickey, supra note 15, at
506 (recognizing that "the electorate never formally convenes at all, to deliberate or otherwise");
Hamilton, supra note 4, at 15 ("Direct democracy, or the public initiative, lends itself to
misguided yes/no votes, not to the scrutiny, deliberation, compromise, and horse-trading
necessary to solve hard social problems with some hope of finality."); Schacter, supra note 5, at
155-56 (claiming that several "factors leave citizen-lawmakers poorly situated to deliberate about
proposed initiatives").
155. See CRONIN, supra note 18, at 71 (reporting the results of a survey in which twenty-two
percent of likely voters reported being "not too informed, or not at all informed about the specific
issues" in an upcoming ballot election); MAGLEBY, supra note 47, at 135 (reporting the results of
a survey in which twenty-three percent of California voters reported having no sources of
information about a ballot measure); Susan A. Banducci, Searchingfor Ideological Consistency in
Direct Legislation Voting, in CITIZENS AS LEGISLATORS, supra note 112, at 132 (explaining that
"a voter is not likely to be exposed to any information about the measure before entering the
voting booth" if "a proposed ballot measure is noncontroversial," and that "[even if the measure
is controversial and information is available, the complexity of the measure may make it difficult
for voters to translate preferences into electoral choice.").
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presented to the voters at the time they cast their ballots. 15 6 Even
when the language of a ballot measure is presented to the electorate,
many voters are unable to understand the meaning of the legalese
that is often used in the text. 15 7 Nor are they aware of the existing
legal landscape or the likely application of a measure to some later,
unforeseen interpretive controversy. 158 Indeed, the most that can
realistically be expected of voters is that they will grasp the broad
purpose of an initiative measure and vote either to approve or reject a
general policy based on their understanding of information gleaned
159
from media accounts, advertising, and ballot pamphlets.
In sum, direct democratic measures are not self-enacting; nor
do they become codified simply as a result of the will of the people.
Instead, those measures are conceived, drafted, qualified for the
ballot, and promoted by increasingly sophisticated initiative
proponents and their hired consultants.1 60 As explained below,
recognition of the dominant role played by the initiative proponents
has important implications both for judicial review of successful ballot
measures and for the broader project of improving and legitimizing
lawmaking by direct democracy.
C. The PrivilegedStatus of InitiativeProponents in JudicialReview
Although courts and commentators often accept the myth of
popular sovereignty, the initiative proponents are, in fact, the real
driving force behind successful ballot measures. Unlike the voters, the
156. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1-40-115(1) (West 2002) ('Measures shall appear
upon the official ballot by ballot title only."); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 254.145(4) (2001) (providing
that the proposition number and ballot title, rather than the full text of the initiative measure,
are presented to voters when casting their ballots).
157. See Schacter, supranote 5, at 139-40.
158. See id. at 140-41.
159. See id. at 127, 131-44, 146 (describing the sources of voter information in ballot contests
and explaining that "[a] vote in favor of a ballot question will often signify, at best, an electoral
judgment on the salient and general policies in question, not on the rarified points that often
generate interpretive litigation"); see also Frickey, supra note 15, at 529 ("The electorate cannot
plausibly be expected to understand much of the details of what is on the ballot.").
160. Even if truly grass-roots initiative proposals could still succeed, but see supra notes 12526 and accompanying text, the proposals set forth in this Article would still be beneficial. As
explained below, the application of the agency model to direct democracy would provide
procedural safeguards to encourage meaningful deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking by the
initiative proponents. The ability of initiative proponents to utilize direct democracy solely for
their own unexamined, political purposes would therefore be limited. At the same time, the
procedural safeguards would ensure that initiative proponents performed their lawmaking
responsibilities with a sufficient degree of competence. Cf. Gail Diane Cox, Lawmaking By
Amateurs: Initiatives Drafted by Kitchen-Table Legislators Can Have Perverse Results, NAT'L
L.J., Oct. 23, 1995, at Al. The utility of these goals does not depend upon whether the initiative
proponents are "sophisticated" or "amateur" lawmakers.

2003]

THE MYTH OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY

initiative proponents draft the language of proposed ballot measures
and typically have sufficient expertise to understand the legal
landscape into which their measures will fit-including such things as
the canons of construction and existing legal precedent. 161 Moreover,
statements from the proponents are routinely included in the ballot
pamphlets that are sent to voters and sometimes relied upon by courts
in lieu of legislative history. 162 As a result, when courts rely upon
these formal legal sources to interpret the meaning of direct
democratic measures, they are effectively privileging the intentions of
the proponents of such measures in the name of "voter intent."' 63
This insight has important implications for judicial review of
initiative measures. First, because courts routinely privilege the
proponents' intentions when they interpret popular initiatives, the
motivations of those "lawmakers" should also be carefully scrutinized
when evaluating the constitutional validity of ballot measures. 64 The
apparent unwillingness or inability of courts to perform this latter
task with any regularity means that initiative proponents receive the
primary benefits-but not the most significant responsibility-of
lawmaking. Perhaps ironically, then, the current state of judicial
review of direct democracy privileges the status of unelected and
largely unaccountable initiative proponents over that of elected
representatives in the legislative process.
Second, a candid recognition of the dominant role played by
initiative proponents in the lawmaking process could provide a
relatively straightforward solution to the "interpretive dilemmas" that
seem to exist in direct democracy. The judicial tendency to privilege
the intentions of the proponents of direct democratic measures lends a
false air of legitimacy to direct democracy when courts claim to be
implementing the will of the people.' 65 The prevailing theories of
statutory interpretation are problematic in this context precisely
161. See supra note 61.

162. See, e.g., Pac. Legal Found. v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 655 P.2d 306, 308 n.1 (Cal. 1982)
("Statements in ballot arguments in support of a successful initiative measure are properly
considered as evidence of the intent behind the measure."); Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch.
Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 583 P.2d 1281, 1300 (Cal. 1978) ("[w]hen, as here, the
enactment follows voter approval, the ballot summary and arguments and analysis presented to
the electorate in connection with a particular measure may be helpful in determining the
probable meaning of uncertain language."); see also supra notes 145-46.
163. See Schacter, supra note 5, at 128-30.
164. As explained below, focusing on the statements of initiative proponents during the
lawmaking process would eliminate the evidentiary difficulties associated with establishing that
a successful ballot measure was motivated by a discriminatory purpose, which were described by
Professor Eule. See infra note 229 and accompanying text.
165. Cf. Schacter, supra note 5, at 150-52 (claiming that the rhetoric of popular intent allows
courts to attribute their own policy choices to the voters).
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because voters do not read or understand the language of initiative
measures and their surrounding legal context. 166 If, however, courts
were expressly to acknowledge that their use of formal legal sources of
interpretive guidance was designed to convey the meaning intended
by the initiative proponents, rather than the meaning intended by the
voters, these interpretive dilemmas would largely disappear. The
initiative proponents would stand on the same footing as the sponsors
of traditional legislation who take primary responsibility for drafting
their proposals, who guide their bills through the legislative process,
and whose views are often given substantial weight by courts that are
later charged with interpreting successful legislation. 167 In other
words, by rejecting the myth of popular sovereignty in direct
democracy, the inevitable judicial reliance on formal legal sources to
with
interpret the meaning of ballot measures could be squared
168
interpretation.
statutory
of
theories
intentionalist
traditional,
That said, a candid acknowledgment that courts are privileging
the intentions of initiative proponents when they interpret direct
democratic measures brings other, potentially more difficult, problems
to the fore. First, the tension between direct democracy and the
republican form of government endorsed by the Guarantee Clause is
only intensified. 169 Second, the argument that the initiative process
unconstitutionally delegates lawmaking authority to private citizens,
which was so cavalierly dismissed in City of Eastlake based on the
Court's willingness to accept the myth of popular sovereignty in direct
democracy, regains much of its vitality when the courts' interpretation
170
of direct democratic measures is viewed in this more realistic light.
Third, the judicial tendency to privilege the intentions of the
proponents of direct democratic measures intensifies concerns about

166. See id. at 139-44.

167. The leading casebook on the legislative process and statutory interpretation points out
that "the qualms courts and commentators may have about relying on" legislative history "often
disappear when the speaker is the sponsor of the bill or amendment that includes the statutory
provision being interpreted." WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 997 (3d ed. 2001). The authors

also point out that "[a]s the availability of legislative history for state statutes has dramatically
increased, state courts, too, are relying on statements of sponsors to interpret statutes." Id.
168. A textualist approach to the interpretation of ballot measures would even more clearly
result in lawmaking by the unelected and unaccountable initiative proponents who draft such
measures, and would therefore also demonstrate a need for the types of procedural reforms
described below. Cf. Schacter, supra note 5, at 149-50 (rejecting a textualist response to the
interpretive dilemmas in direct democracy, in part, "because the legal terms of art commonly
used in ballot measures are often meaningful only to a small, elite community of lawyers, judges,
and knowledgeable observers").
169. See infra Part III.A.
170. See id.
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the simplistic, partisan, and sometimes misleading nature of initiative
advertising, particularly when the proponents' message to the
electorate is at odds with the meaning suggested by the formal legal
sources that are relied upon by the courts.1 71 These concerns suggest a
need for mechanisms to encourage more honest deliberation in the
process and to hold initiative proponents accountable for their
decisions during ballot campaigns if lawmaking by direct democracy is
to be improved and legitimized. The next part argues that wellestablished and judicially manageable mechanisms for accomplishing
these tasks are readily available.
III. THE NEED FOR REASONED DECISIONMAKING IN DIRECT
DEMOCRACY

A. The ConstitutionallySuspect Nature of "Alternative"Lawmaking
Article I of the Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives."' 172 Moreover, the Constitution provides that "[e]very
Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the
Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the President
of the United States." 173 The president may either sign the bill into
law or refuse to do so, in which case the two chambers of Congress
may override a presidential veto by a subsequent vote of a two-thirds
174
majority of their members.
These constitutional provisions suggest that federal legislation
must satisfy two fundamental requirements. First, such legislation
must overcome the structural hurdles of bicameralism and
presentment, which ordinarily requires a sufficient level of
more
compromise,
and
consensus. 175 Perhaps
deliberation,
fundamentally, the Constitution at least implicitly provides that
federal laws must be enacted by elected representatives of the
people. 176 The absence of these characteristics renders administrative
171. See supranote 138 and accompanying text.

172. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
173. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
174. See id.
175. Sunstein, supra note 10, at 44 ("The system of checks and balances within the federal
structure was intended to operate as a check against self-interested representation and factional
tyranny in the event that national officials failed to fulfill their responsibilities.").
176. Id. at 41-47 (describing the opportunities for collective deliberation and debate provided
by representation).
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lawmaking constitutionally suspect and provides the underlying basis
for the nondelegation doctrine, with which the Supreme Court and
77
public law scholars have been struggling for more than a century.1
Lawmaking by initiative also lacks the structural safeguards of
Article I and is controlled by unelected actors in the political process.
In contrast to the near obsession with this problem in the
administrative context, however, the Supreme Court easily disposed of
a challenge to the constitutional validity of direct legislation on these
grounds in City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc.178 As
discussed above, 179 the Court invoked the rhetoric of popular
sovereignty in describing the ballot measure at issue and simply
concluded that the nondelegation doctrine "is inapplicable where, as

177. See, e.g., David Schoenbrod, Separation of Powers and the Powers That Be: The
Constitutional Purposes of the Delegation Doctrine, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 355, 371-81 (1981)
(explaining that "agencies lack all of the structural features upon which Madison relied to
protect against faction when enlightened statesmen fail"); Sunstein, supra note 10, at 66 ("The
constitutional status of administrative agencies has been uncertain precisely because they evade
the ordinary constitutional safeguards against domination by powerful private groups."); see also
Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 334 (2002) (describing the
"widespread modern obsession with the nondelegation doctrine" in administrative law). See
generally Symposium, The Phoenix Rises Again: The Nondelegation Doctrinefrom Constitutional
and Policy Perspectives, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 731 (1999).
178. 426 U.S. 668, 672 (1976). As this Article was going to press, the Supreme Court issued a
decision in City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Community Hope Foundation,2003 WL 1477301
(Mar. 25, 2003), which held that city officials did not violate the Equal Protection or Due Process
Clauses by placing a referendum involving the city counsel's approval of a low-income housing
project on an election ballot pursuant to the city charter or by delaying the issuance of building
permits pending the certification of the election's outcome. Although the Court did not address
the merits of this successful referendum, which was invalidated by the Ohio Supreme Court on
the grounds that a referendum was not authorized by state law for "administrative acts" of this
nature, see id. at *3,the Court's decision is relevant to this project in at least two respects. First,
although the Court found no evidence of a discriminatory intent by city officials in implementing
the referendum procedure at issue, it recognized that "statements made by decisionmakers or
referendum sponsors during deliberation over a referendum may constitute relevant evidence of
discriminatory intent in a challenge to an ultimately enacted initiative." Id. at *5-6; accord supra
note 164 and accompanying text (arguing that courts should closely scrutinize the statements of
initiative proponents when assessing the constitutional validity of ballot measures under the
Equal Protection Clause); infra note 229 and accompanying text (same); text accompanying infra
note 231 (same). Second, the Court reaffirmed its decision in City of Eastlake, which held that a
referendum "cannot ...be characterized as a delegation of power" because "all power stems from
the people," and therefore concluded that the city's implementation of a referendum procedure
does not "constitute per se arbitrary government conduct in violation of due process." City of
Cuyahoga Falls, 2003 WL 1477301, at *8 (quoting City of Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 672, 675). But see
infra notes 179-88 and accompanying text (criticizing the Court's seemingly broad approval of
direct democracy in City of Eastlake). Although the Court acknowledged that "the 'substantive
result' of a referendum" may violate due process "if it is 'arbitrary and capricious,' " the Court
apparently continues to accept the myth of popular sovereignty in direct democracy. City of
Cuyahoga Falls, 2003 WL 1477301, at *8; see also id. at *6 (describing the "devotion to
democracy" evidenced by the referendum) (quoting James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971)).
179. See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
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here, rather than dealing with a delegation of power, we deal with a
power reserved by the people to themselves."1 80
The Court's broad approval of direct democracy in City of
Eastlake is questionable on a number of grounds. First, the myth of
popular sovereignty in direct democracy was so ingrained in their
thinking that the litigants and the Court naturally viewed "the
people" as the unelected actors to whom lawmaking authority was
allegedly delegated.181 The Court therefore failed to distinguish
between a referendum, which refers legislation to the voters after it is
enacted by elected representatives, and an initiative-which bypasses
the traditional legislative process altogether. Because the case
involved a challenge to a referendum that rejected the city council's
approval of a zoning variance, it was perhaps accurate to characterize
the procedure as "allowing the people the final decision, amounting to
a veto power, over enactments of representative bodies."18 2 Indeed, the
electorate's decision to reject the city council's departure from the
status quo did not result in the creation of a newly enacted law that
was written, financed, and promoted entirely by private parties. It is
therefore not surprising that the Court was unsympathetic to
nondelegation concerns in this particular context.
Because the proponents of ballot measures are the driving force
behind initiatives, however, they are the private persons to whom
lawmaking authority is truly being delegated.183 Although rejection or
ratification of a proposed measure by the electorate provides a
potential safeguard, the real question for nondelegation purposes
should be whether consideration by the electorate is adequate to deter
arbitrary decisionmaking in the process of initiative lawmaking.
Given the limitations on voter knowledge and understanding that are
described above, as well as the absence of other structural safeguards
designed to promote deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking in the
lawmaking process, this prospect seems highly unlikely.1 8 4 While the
180. City of Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 675.
181. See id. at 671 (stating that the respondent sought a declaratory judgment that the city
charter provision requiring any change in land use to be approved by a fifty-five percent vote of
the electorate in a referendum was "invalid as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power
to the people"); id. at 671-72 (explaining that the Ohio Supreme Court "held that a popular
referendum requirement, lacking standards to guide the decision of the voters, permitted the
police power to be exercised in a standardless, hence arbitrary and capricious manner"); id. at
672 (concluding that "[a] referendum cannot... be characterized as a delegation of power"
because "the people can reserve to themselves power to deal directly with matters which might
otherwise be assigned to the legislature") (citing Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 392 (1969)).
182. Id. at 675.
183. See supra Part II.B.
184. See infra Part IV.A (describing the inadequacies of the safeguard provided by the
electorate's consideration of proposed initiative measures).
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absence of adequate structural safeguards in the initiative process
does not necessarily render such lawmaking unconstitutional under
the nondelegation doctrine, the initiative lawmaking process raises
the same concerns as broad delegations of lawmaking authority to
18 5
administrative agencies.
The Court's broad approval of direct democracy in City of
Eastlake is also questionable on other grounds. First, the particular
lawmaking procedure at issue, which required zoning variances
granted by the city council to be approved by a referendum of the
people, was more akin to an adjudication of an individual's property
rights than to a generally applicable regulation. As the dissenting
opinions of Justices Powell and Stevens recognized, adjudications of
this nature are inappropriate for resolution by direct democracy
because of the absence of adequate procedural protections for the
individual whose property rights are at stake. 8 6 Moreover, the Court

185. Although the federal nondelegation doctrine does not apply directly to the states (except
perhaps through the Guarantee Clause), state courts have uniformly adopted their own versions
of the nondelegation doctrine. See Gary J. Greco, Standards or Safeguards: A Survey of the
Delegation Doctrine in the States, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 567, 568 (1994); Jim Rossi, Institutional
Design and the Lingering Legacy of Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52
VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1187-91 (1999). Indeed, some state courts have enforced their nondelegation
doctrines in the agency context more aggressively than federal courts under a variety of
rationales. See Greco, supra, at 578-600; Rossi, supra, at 1191-1216. A number of state courts,
including California, Oregon, and Washington, specifically consider whether the lawmaking
process contains adequate procedural safeguards when assessing the validity of delegations of
authority to administrative agencies. See Greco, supra at 576, 599-600 tbl. III; Developments in
the Law-The Interpretationof State ConstitutionalRights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1324, 1477 (1982).
Accordingly, the argument that initiative lawmaking is in tension with the nondelegation
doctrine would appear even stronger under principles of state law than under federal doctrine.
186. 426 U.S. at 680 (Powell, J., dissenting) (explaining that using the referendum to address
the status of a single small parcel of land owned by a single person affords "no realistic
opportunity for the affected person to be heard, even by the electorate," and is accordingly
"fundamentally unfair"); id. at 688-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that due process
"requires that a municipality protect individuals against the arbitrary exercise of municipal
power, by assuring that fundamental policy choices... are articulated by some responsible organ
of municipal government" and that the city charter provision "ignored these concepts and
blatantly delegated legislative authority, with no assurance that the result reached would be
reasonable or rational"); see also Lawrence Gene Sager, Insular Minorities Unabated: Warth v.
Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARv. L. REV. 1373 (1978)
(arguing that by giving broad approval to the use of direct democracy in the zoning context, the
Court in City of Eastlake ignored principles of "due process of lawmaking," which dictate that
certain decisions be made by a reflective legislative body rather than by the electorate at large).
But see Daniel P. Selmi, Reconsidering the Use of Direct Democracy in Making Land Use
Decisions, 19 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 293, 297-98 (2001) (examining municipal land use
decisions made by direct democracy and concluding that "while the normal regulatory process is
certainly superior to the initiative and referendum, direct democracy can serve valuable
purposes and is not necessarily incompatible with sound land use practices"). The remainder of
this Article explains how the principles of due process of lawmaking discussed by Professor Sager
can-and should-be incorporated into the initiative process. See infra Parts III.C & IV.B.
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failed to address the constitutional provision which provides that
"[t]he United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government ..... 187 Although referenda, which
are referred to the voters after legislative consideration of the proposal
at issue, present fewer problems in these regards than direct
initiatives, which bypass the legislative process entirely, the Court
was apparently oblivious to the fact that the Guarantee Clause seems
to place some limitations on the procedures by which state and local
18 8
governments enact laws.
As indicated above, the Supreme Court had previously held
that federal court challenges to the products of direct democracy under
18 9
the Guarantee Clause are nonjusticiable political questions.
Nonetheless, if the fundamental lawmaking characteristics set forth
in the federal Constitution (i.e., structural filters and representative
democracy) are viewed as the baseline requirements of republican
lawmaking, it becomes apparent that lawmaking by initiative is in
serious tension with those principles and therefore potentially
conflicts with the attributes of a "Republican Form of Government." 190
Viewed against this baseline, the idea that "the people" could "reserve"
unfiltered lawmaking powers to themselves runs counter to the
fundamental tenets of republican democracy. This conclusion is
particularly compelling when one rejects the "myth of popular
sovereignty" in direct democracy and recognizes how courts that
187. U.S. CONST. art. IV.
188. See supra notes 27, 30 & 169.
189. See Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912), dismissing writ of error to
review, 53 Or. 162, 99 P. 427 (1909).
190. Robert G. Natelson has recently argued that an original understanding of the
Guarantee Clause would not prohibit direct democracy on federal constitutional grounds. See
Natelson, supra note 27, at 814; see also Hirsch, supra note 27, at 186 (arguing that "the
founding fathers believed in direct democracy, and the Constitution embodies it"). Although
Natelson's critique of scholarship to the contrary is provocative, this Article does not argue that
direct democracy is absolutely prohibited by the Guarantee Clause. Nor does the Article claim
that direct democracy is constitutionally suspect merely because of the original intentions of the
Framers. Rather, this Article claims that direct democracy is in serious tension with the
structure of government established by the Constitution. Even if the Guarantee Clause does not
require states to adopt the same constitutional structure as the federal government, as Natelson
claims, see Natelson, supra note 27, at 856, this conclusion would mean only that additional
structural safeguards for direct democracy are not constitutionally required. This Article does
not attempt to argue otherwise, but merely contends that jurisdictions which authorize direct
democracy should enact statutory reforms that apply the agency model to direct democracy in
order to encourage deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking in the initiative process. While
some of the Framers, including James Madison, would surely favor reforms that are intended to
provide direct democracy with alternatives to the procedural safeguards provided by the
republican government established by the federal Constitution, contemporary advocates of
deliberative democracy should favor these reforms on pragmatic grounds as well-even if they
are not required by the Constitution.
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review and interpret such measures consistently privilege the
intentions of the proponents of ballot measures.1 9 1 This latter insight,
in particular, reinforces the notion that direct democracy in reality
"delegates" lawmaking authority to the initiative proponents who
actually control the process.
While it is unlikely that courts would consider invalidating
direct democracy in the states under the Guarantee Clause or the
nondelegation doctrine, it seems apparent that lawmaking by
initiative is constitutionally suspect for the same fundamental reasons
as agency lawmaking. 192 Moreover, even aside from the foregoing
constitutional principles, it seems clear that authorizing lawmaking
by unelected actors who are not subject to adequate safeguards
designed to encourage reasoned deliberation, compromise, and
consensus is simply a bad idea from the perspective of those who are
concerned about good government. While such safeguards are
currently lacking in the context of direct democracy, the next section
explains that alternative safeguards that further republican
lawmaking principles have been implemented with considerable
success in administrative law.
B. Deliberationand Accountability in the Administrative State
The Supreme Court has consistently understood the
Constitution to limit the extent to which, or the conditions under
which, Congress may delegate its lawmaking powers to executive or
administrative officials. The Court's early cases upheld congressional
delegations of authority to agencies to "fill in the details" of a
statutory scheme as long as Congress retained for itself the

191. See supra Part II.
192. It is therefore not surprising that both the administrative state and direct democracy
have repeatedly been labeled the "fourth branch of government." See, e.g., Selmi, supra note 186,
at 294 & n.2; Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21", Century
Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 950 & n.30 (2000)
("[A]dministrative bodies ... have become a veritable fourth branch of Government"). The
separation of powers concerns raised by the nondelegation problem are closely related to the
tension between unconstrained "alternative lawmaking" and principles of due process. See
William Funk, Rationality Review of State Administrative Rulemaking, 43 ADMIN. L. REV. 147,
155 (1991) ("At some level, the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment require rationality review" of state administrative action); infra note 197 and
accompanying text (recognizing the procedural due process gloss on the nondelegation doctrine);
see also Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513,

1514-16 (1991) (recognizing that "the structure of the government is a vital part of a
constitutional organism whose final cause is the protection of individual rights" and arguing that
"[wihen government action is challenged on separation of powers grounds, the Court should
consider the potential effect of the arrangement on individual due-process interests.").
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responsibility for setting basic policy.' 93 During the late 1920s, the
Court began to acknowledge the emerging reality that agencies were
necessarily engaging in substantive policymaking and ruled that it
would sustain delegations of legislative power whenever Congress
dictates an "intelligible principle" to which an agency must conform.' 94
Although the Supreme Court invalidated two pieces of New Deal
legislation under this standard during the 1930s, 195 those decisions
proved to be the Supreme Court's last and only applications of the
nondelegation doctrine to overturn congressional acts on the ground
that they lacked sufficient standards-even though the Court has
continued to repeat the message that "sweeping delegation[s] of
legislative power" to administrative agencies are unconstitutional. 96
There is little consensus in the scholarly literature regarding
the reasons for, and the advisability of, the Supreme Court's
reluctance to invalidate acts of Congress under the nondelegation
doctrine. Nonetheless, Congress's enactment of the Administrative
Procedure Act in 1946 and the subsequent acknowledgment by courts
that procedural protections and judicial review can operate like
substantive legislative standards to check potentially excessive uses of
administrative authority have undoubtedly played an important
role. 19 7 Indeed, Kenneth Culp Davis argued in an influential article
193. See United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 522-23 (1911) (upholding a delegation of
authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations protecting public forests and
to establish criminal penalties for violations); Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 494 (1904)
(upholding a delegation to an administrator to " 'establish uniform standards' " for importing
tea).
194. See J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928) (recognizing that the
Tariff Act of 1922 authorized the President to make discretionary economic judgments, but
upholding the delegation of authority because Congress set forth "an intelligible principle" to
guide the President's discretion); Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7-17 (1982) (providing an historical overview of the development of the
nondelegation doctrine); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Schecter Poultry at the Millennium: A
Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1404 (2000) (describing the
initial appearance of "[t]he most familiar judicial formulation of the nondelegation doctrine").
195. See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 433 (1935) (invalidating a provision of
the National Industrial Recovery Act which authorized the President to restrict interstate
transportation of oil produced in violation of state law); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 535, 551 (1935) (invalidating another provision of the National Industrial
Recovery Act which authorized the President to approve "codes of fair competition" recommended
by private industry groups).
196. Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 646 (1980); see also
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (maintaining that Congress must
articulate "an intelligible principle" to guide an agency's discretion when it confers rulemaking
authority on an administrative agency).
197. See Michael Asimow, On Pressing McNollgast to the Limits: The Problem of Regulatory
Costs, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 1, at 127, 127-29 (1994) (claiming that "[s]everal
generations of commentators have agreed that the APA's notice-and-comment procedure strikes
a pretty good balance" in promoting accuracy, efficiency, and acceptability in the rulemaking
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published in 1969 that "[t]he courts should recognize that
administrative legislation through the superb rule-making procedure
marked out by the [APA] often provides better protection to private
interests than congressional enactment of detail.1 98 Davis argued,
however, that "courts need to do much more than they have been
doing through the non-delegation doctrine to provide protection
against arbitrariness."' 199
A number of years later, in the landmark case of Motor Vehicle
Manufacturers Association v. State Farm, the Supreme Court seemed
to follow Davis's suggestion when it held that an agency rule would be
deemed arbitrary and capricious under the APA "if the agency has
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider,
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before
the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a
difference in view or the product of agency expertise." 200 State Farm is
process); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretationsof Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 660 (1996) ("The procedural safeguards
for rulemaking required by the APA are important constraints on an agency's lawmaking
authority."); Shapiro & Levy, supra note 18, at 388 (explaining that hard-look judicial review "is
best understood as a form of heightened scrutiny of the rationale of agency decisions and that the
doctrine of separation of powers requires such scrutiny because of the unique position of
administrative agencies in terms of the constitutional structure of government"); Sunstein, supra
note 10, at 60-61 ("Much of modern administrative law is a means of serving the original
purposes of the nondelegation doctrine, and of promoting Madisonian goals, without invalidating
regulatory statutes"); Zellmer, supra note 192, at 953-54, 963-64 (explaining that "[p]rior to the
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946, unelected agency officials made
important decisions largely free from public scrutiny and judicial review, giving rise to
separation of powers and due process concerns," and that "in the post-New Deal, postAdministrative Procedure Act era, courts have been far more interested in ensuring that
procedural safeguards cabin the exercise of delegated power so that those affected by agency
action are protected from arbitrary and abusive decisions"); see also Clinton v. City of New York,
524 U.S. 417, 489 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the dangers of broad
delegations of authority can be alleviated by "subsidiary rules," including the procedural
requirements of the APA and judicial review, which diminish "the risk that the agency will use
the breadth of a grant of authority as a cloak for unreasonable or unfair implementation");
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N. Am., AFL-CIO v. Connally, 337 F. Supp.
737, 760-62 (D.D.C. 1971) (Leventhal, J.) (approving a broad delegation of authority only after
finding that procedural safeguards and judicial review were adequate to control the actions of
the executive branch); Aranson et al., supra note 194, at 14 (recognizing that although
Amalgamated Meat Cutters was not a Supreme Court decision, the opinion "has been widely
accepted as an authoritative modern statement of the procedural due process gloss on the
delegation doctrine" and explaining that "[iun some of the delegation cases, the [Supreme] Court
has ... indicated that broad delegations of authority without either corresponding procedural
protections or an opportunity for judicial review may violate the Constitution"); supra note 185.
198. Kenneth Culp Davis, A New Approach to Delegation, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 713, 726 (1969).
199. Id.
200. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the United States v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983) ("State Farm"). Professor Davis's procedural approach to the nondelegation
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widely understood to have imposed a requirement on administrative
agencies to engage in "reasoned decisionmaking" during the
20 1
lawmaking process.
The net result of APA procedures and "hard-look" judicial
review under State Farm is to encourage and enforce republican ideals
of deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking in the administrative
lawmaking process. 20 2 Those ideals are generally assumed to be
doctrine was influential in the state courts and consistent with the Supreme Court's
endorsement of hard-look judicial review of administrative action. See Aranson et al., supra note
194, at 14 (describing the judiciary's acceptance of the "procedural due process gloss on the
nondelegation doctrine"); Developments in the Law-The Interpretationof State Constitutional
Rights, supra note 185, at 1477 (describing Professor Davis's approach to the nondelegation
doctrine and explaining that it "had a great deal of influence on the nondelegation doctrine as
applied by state courts"); Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?,98 MICH. L.
REV. 303, 344 (1999) (explaining that Amalgamated Meat Cutters "can be understood as part of a
range of surrogate safeguards, operating in Davis's spirit and promoting nondelegation goals
without invoking the nondelegation doctrine" and that "much of the work of the doctrine, and of
Davis's proposal, ultimately came from judicial review of agency action for arbitrariness" under
the "'hard-look doctrine' "); Paul R. Verkuil, The Emerging Concept of Administrative Procedure,
78 COLUM. L. REV. 258, 274-76 & n.86 (1978) (describing the highly influential Final Report of
the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure and explaining that the "talented
staff' that produced the report "included the budding administrative law scholar, Kenneth C.
Davis"); Zellmer, supra note 192, at 964 & n.118 (describing Professor Davis's approach to the
nondelegation doctrine and explaining that it "gained support in state courts" and "likely
influenced the three-judge panel in Amalgamated Meat Cutters"); cf. Shapiro & Levy, supra note
18, at 396-413 (describing the evolution of administrative law doctrine and concluding that after
State Farm, "[rnationalism has become the primary method of constraining administrative
action").
201. See ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A

NUTSHELL 108-09 (1997) (summarizing the development of hard-look judicial review and
attributing the term "reasoned decisionmaking" to Judge Leventhal of the D.C. Circuit). Despite
the influence of Professor Davis's approach to the nondelegation doctrine, a number of states
have not adopted hard-look judicial review of informal agency rulemaking. See Funk, supra note
192, at 147. Alternative approaches to state administrative law are problematic because they
omit an important structural safeguard that helps to legitimize agency rulemaking in the first
place. See id. (concluding that "nothing in the federal experience or the nature of state
government justifies the denial of judicial review of the rationality of state administrative
rulemaking, which is nothing less than granting discretion to state agencies to make irrational
rules"); Shapiro & Levy, supra note 18 (describing the constitutional underpinnings of hard-look
judicial review).
In any event, this Article's references to "the agency model" refer to the federal agency model
and the model adopted by those states that have authorized hard-look judicial review of agency
action. There is little reason to think that state courts could not adequately conduct hard-look
judicial review in the administrative law or initiative contexts if the legislature explicitly
adopted this version of the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. See Funk, supra note
192, at 170-72, 174-75 (refuting objections to hard-look judicial review of agency action by state
courts and concluding that "there is no reason to suppose that state judges are incompetent with
respect to administrative law issues"). But cf. infra note 227 (describing the problems posed by
the election of state court judges for heightened judicial scrutiny of successful ballot measures
and identifying potential solutions).
202. See Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic State, 105
HARv. L. REV. 1511, 1512 (1992) (arguing that "the political theory of civic republicanism, with
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satisfied in the traditional legislative process by virtue of
representation and the structural safeguards of bicameralism,
presentment, and separation of powers that are enshrined in the
Constitution. 203 Indeed, courts routinely state that laws enacted by the
legislature are entitled to a presumption of validity. 20 4 Thus, when
courts review the constitutionality of traditional legislation, they
normally uphold the validity of a measure as long as they can conceive
of a rational basis for the legislation, even if the purpose attributed to
the measure did not motivate the enacting body. 20 5 Courts do not
ordinarily examine the legislative record to assess the validity of
traditional legislation, except when the ordinary presumption of
validity is unwarranted because the legislation at issue implicates
certain fundamental rights, suspect classifications, or perhaps, more
recently, federalism concerns. 206 In the latter situations, courts

its emphasis on citizen participation in government and deliberative decision-making, provides
the best justification for the American bureaucracy"); Sunstein, supra note 10, at 56-68
(describing administrative law doctrine as "classically republican" because of its requirements of
"deliberation" and "reasoned analysis"); Note, Civic Republican Administrative Theory;
Bureaucratsas DeliberativeDemocrats, 107 HARv. L. REV. 1401, 1416 (1994) (explaining that the
"interest-group model" of administrative lawmaking articulated by civic republican scholars
identified "the problem with delegation" as shifting "policymaking from the inclusive and
accountable forum of Congress to the exclusive and unaccountable site of the agency" and "posed
as a corrective a series of reforms intended to help the bureaucracy approach the kind of
inclusivity that the legislative process affords").
203. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 20, at 444 (explaining that "[flederal constitutional law
conclusively presumes that, when general legislation affects many people, the legislative process"
meets the criteria of due process of lawmaking because it "develop[s] the relevant facts and legal
standards so that people are not deprived of important rights or interests based on erroneous
assumptions" and promotes "participation and dialogue by affected individuals in the
decisionmaking process") (internal quotations omitted); Sunstein, supra note 10, at 65
(recognizing that "conventional understandings of the separation of powers" suggest that "in
reviewing legislative action ... courts ought to give legislators the benefit of every doubt ').
204. See, e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980) (recognizing the "presumption of
constitutional validity" that is ordinarily attributed to acts of Congress); Parham v. Hughes, 441
U.S. 347, 351 (1979) (plurality opinion) ("State laws are generally entitled to a presumption of
validity against attack under the Equal Protection Clause.").
205. See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-3, at 1443 (2d ed. 1988).
206. See, e.g., Attorney Gen. of N.Y. v. Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 906 n.6 (1986) ("It is well
established that where a law classifies by race, alienage, or national origin, and where a law
classifies in such a way as to infringe constitutionally protected fundamental rights, heightened
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause is required.") (citations omitted). The Court's recent
federalism cases have proven controversial, in part, because the Court has closely scrutinized the
legislative records underlying the enactments while purporting to apply the deferential rational
basis standard of review. See Melissa Hart, Conflating Scope of Right with Standard of Review:
The Supreme Court's 'Strict Scrutiny' of Congressional Efforts to Enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1091, 1092-93 (2001) ("In effect, the Court has declared that it will
apply a kind of 'strict scrutiny' to federal legislation that would receive only minimal scrutiny
were a state to pass an identical law."); infra Part IV.B (describing the Court's recent federalism
cases).
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ordinarily subject the legislation to some version of heightened
scrutiny.
In contrast, because the structural constitutional safeguards
provided by representation and the procedural requirements of Article
I are absent from administrative rulemaking, there is no reason to
assume that this method of lawmaking will satisfy the republican
ideals of deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking. 20 7 The procedural
requirements of the APA and hard-look judicial review are therefore
necessary to enforce those ideals. First, the requirements that
agencies publish proposed rules, solicit comments from interested
citizens, and issue general statements of the basis and purpose for a
final rule are designed to encourage reasoned deliberation in the
rulemaking process. 208 Second, when courts examine the validity of an
agency rule under the arbitrary and capricious standard, they do not
simply defer to any rationale proffered by the government to justify
the policy, but will instead examine the administrative record for the
reasoning actually provided by the agency. 209 A rule will be
invalidated or remanded to the agency for reconsideration under State
Farm if the agency has relied on factors prohibited by Congress,

207. See State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 43 n.9 (1983) (rejecting the Department of
Transportation's argument that "the arbitrary and capricious standard requires no more than
the minimum rationality a statute must bear in order to withstand analysis" under the
Constitution, and explaining that "[w]e do not view as equivalent the presumption of
constitutionality afforded legislation drafted by Congress and the presumption of regularity
afforded an agency in fulfilling its statutory mandate"); Shapiro & Levy, supra note 18, at 429
(stating that "administrative agencies, unlike legislatures, are not entitled to the same
presumption of correctness because they are neither politically accountable nor directly subject
to checks and balances"); Sunstein, supra note 10, at 59-68 (recognizing that hard-look judicial
review "may be understood as a form of means-ends scrutiny akin to what we have seen in
constitutional law," but explaining that "[tihe rationale for deference applies with much less
force to actions of administrative agencies, whose constitutional pedigree is far less clear").
208. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000); see also Seidenfeld, supra note 202, at 1560 (stating that "the
paradigmatic process for agency formulation of policy-informal rulemaking-is specifically
geared to advance the requirements of civic republican theory"); Sunstein, supra note 10, at 6164 (explaining that courts have helped to transform informal agency rulemaking into a process
that "favor[s] ... a more deliberative role for administrators").
209. See § 706 (in reviewing agency action under the arbitrary and capricious standard, "the
court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due account shall be
taken of the rule of prejudicial error"); State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (explaining that a court may
not "supply a reasoned basis for the agency's action that the agency itself has not given")
(quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947)); id. at 50 (noting that "an agency's
action must be upheld, if at all, on the bases articulated by the agency itself," not those
articulated after the fact by its lawyers); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971), abrogatedon othergrounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977)
(explaining that judicial review of agency action is to be based on the full administrative record
that was before the Secretary at the time a decision was made and that "post hoc
rationalizations ... have traditionally been found to be an inadequate basis for review") (internal
quotations and citation omitted).
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entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered
an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence in the
administrative record, or provided an implausible explanation for its
decision. 2 10 This form of heightened judicial scrutiny enforces the
republican ideal of reasoned decisionmaking for every legislative rule
211
adopted through the administrative lawmaking process.
Regardless of whether APA procedures and hard-look judicial
review have completely resolved the nondelegation problem, 212 these
administrative law safeguards have undoubtedly made agency

210. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
211. See Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal
Regulatory Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 768, 811
(arguing that the hard-look doctrine is a "protector of increased citizen participation and
deliberative government" that "contributes to legitimacy and thus is a fully warranted exercise of
judicial authority"); Seidenfeld, supra note 202, at 1548 ("In essence, by delegating policymaking
authority to a subordinate agency, Congress allows the courts to review agency decisionmaking
to ensure that it comports with civic republican criteria without forfeiting the primacy that the
Constitution grants to Congress as the body of duly elected representatives of the people.");
Shapiro & Levy, supra note 18, at 440 ("Rationalist review acknowledges the unique
constitutional position of agencies outside of the tripartite system of government envisioned by
the Framers, and compensates through heightened scrutiny of agency decisions in the form of
the requirement that agencies give adequate reasons."); Sunstein, supra note 10, at 63
("Reviewing courts are attempting to ensure that the agency has not merely responded to
political pressure but that it is instead deliberating in order to identify and implement the public
values that should control the controversy.").
212. During the 1970s, a consensus emerged that informal rulemaking under the APA
"offered an ideal vehicle for making regulatory policy." Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on
"Deossifying"the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1385 (1992). Professor Davis expressed
the prevailing sentiment when he enthusiastically characterized informal rulemaking as "one of
the greatest inventions of modern government." KENNETH C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § 6.15, at 283 (1st ed. Supp. 1970). Although informal rulemaking continues to be
viewed as "an exceedingly effective tool for eliciting public participation in administrative
policymaking," the rulemaking process has received a great deal of critical scrutiny in
subsequent years. McGarity, supra, at 1385-86. Some contemporary critics of administrative
rulemaking have argued that existing safeguards are insufficient to constrain the discretion of
agency officials. See, e.g., Schoenbrod, supra note 177, at 381-87. Conversely, numerous
contemporary critics have complained that the existing structural safeguards are too stringent
and have the unfortunate result of ossifying the rulemaking process. See, e.g., McGarity, supra,
at 1385-86 (claiming that " 'ossification' of the rulemaking process ... is one of the most serious
problems currently facing regulatory agencies"); infra note 300 (discussing the ossification
hypothesis in administrative law scholarship). Despite these criticisms, hard-look judicial review
has remained a central feature of administrative lawmaking. Nor has a better approach been
developed to take its place. See, e.g., William S. Jordan, III, OssificationRevisited: Does Arbitrary
and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals
Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 393, 445 (2000) ("Judicial review under the
hard look doctrine is the price we pay for delegating highly complex important public policy
decisions to unelected administrative agencies."); Cass R. Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the
New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 471 (1987) (acknowledging that many of the criticisms of hardlook judicial review "have some basis," but arguing that they "are insufficient to justify
abandonment" of the doctrine because its "requirement of detailed explanation has been a
powerful impediment to arbitrary or improperly motivated agency decisions").
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lawmaking more consistent with republican principles of government
and have therefore substantially improved the democratic legitimacy
of the rulemaking process. Because there is no reason to assume that
the product of direct democracy as it currently exists is consistent with
republican ideals of deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking, a
comparable model is necessary to encourage deliberation in the
initiative process, hold the proponents of ballot measures accountable
for their actions during the lawmaking process, and thereby improve
the democratic legitimacy of lawmaking "by the people." The following
section explains how the administrative law model could be
implemented in the context of direct democracy.
C. Application of the Agency Model to Direct Democracy
In contrast to the requirements for lawmaking by
administrative agencies, the existing procedures for conducting
initiatives in jurisdictions that authorize direct democracy do not
provide adequate alternative mechanisms for promoting republican
values or holding initiative proponents accountable for their decisions
during the lawmaking process. 213 Indeed, there are currently no

213. Kenneth P. Miller, a Ph.D. candidate in political science at the University of California,
Berkeley, has succinctly described the procedural shortcomings of initiative lawmaking as
follows:
At the "front end" of the policy process, the initiative system has two primary features
that undermine democratic values: 1) proponents have absolute control of the framing
and drafting of the measure; and 2) measures are fixed and unamendable at an early
stage of the process. Initiative proponents are accountable to no one, and routinely
exclude the measure's opponents and other interested parties from their decisions on
how to draft the measure's language. There are no open meeting laws, public notice
requirements, hearings to solicit public input, or other guarantees to give the press
and public access to the drafting and editing stages of the initiative policy-making
process. Instead, measures simply "appear" in final form at the titling and circulation
stage. After they have finished drafting, proponents file the measure with the
attorney general's office, which prepares a title and summary, but again no one
involved in that process has the power to amend the proposal. Proponents then
circulate the measure to gather sufficient signatures to place it on the ballot. At that
point, the measure cannot be amended again, even by the proponents, even if it
becomes apparent that the measure contains a flaw that should be corrected.
Miller, supra note 75, at 1051-52 (internal citations omitted).
A number of jurisdictions that authorize direct democracy have adopted procedures that are
intended to improve deliberation in ballot campaigns. For example, the indirect initiative, which
requires legislative consideration of an initiative proposal prior to placing the measure on the
ballot, furthers this objective. See MAGLEBY, supra note 47, at 35-36, 38-39 tbl.3.1 (describing the
indirect initiative and identifying those states in which it is authorized). Moreover, Colorado has
adopted a procedure that requires initiative proponents to submit a proposed ballot measure to
the state for comments and proposed amendments, which can be incorporated into the ballot
measure before signature petitions are circulated to the electorate. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40105 (2002). Similarly, the State of Nebraska requires public hearings on all proposed initiatives
prior to the ballot election. See NEB. SECY OF STATE, HOW TO USE THE INITIATIVE AND
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formal mechanisms for requiring the initiative proponents to
communicate with interested parties to exchange ideas and make
compromises during ballot campaigns. As a result, the initiative
proponents and opponents spend virtually all of their time and money
lobbying to win the electorate's vote rather than attempting to
214
improve the policy at issue.
Moreover, there are currently few mechanisms in place to
encourage initiative proponents to make well-reasoned arguments and
decisions during ballot campaigns. Indeed, even if the initiative

REFERENDUM PROCESS IN NEBRASKA, Part II.B.3(b) (explaining that "the Secretary of State
conducts public hearings on the measures ... in each congressional district.., no more than 8
weeks prior to the general election" and that "[piroponents and opponents are encouraged to
attend
to
provide
their
views
on
the
measure"),
at
http://www.votesmart.org/ce/states/ne/elections/phtml (last visited Feb. 17, 2003). Single-subject rules, which
have been adopted in a number of states, are intended to alleviate voter confusion and thereby
improve public deliberation regarding the merits of initiative proposals. See Collins & Oesterle,
supra note 73, at 87-91, 111 (stating that "[alt least fifteen states, including Colorado," limit the
scope of an initiative to a single subject and arguing that those rules should be enforced to
improve voter understanding); Philip P. Frickey & Steven S. Smith, Judicial Review, The
CongressionalProcess, and the Federalism Cases: An Interdisciplinary Critique, 111 YALE L.J.
1707, 1712 (2002) (claiming that "in recent years the state supreme courts are becoming more
aggressive in enforcing the single-subject requirement, especially in the context of ballot
measures"). Ballot pamphlets, which are made available to the electorate in a number of states,
also attempt to perform this function. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text. Finally, a
number of states that authorize the initiative impose disclosure requirements pertaining to
campaign spending on initiative proponents and require them to comply with anti-false speech
statutes. See, e.g., Buckley, 525 U.S. at 205 (recognizing that the State of Colorado "legitimately
requires sponsors of ballot initiatives to disclose who pays petition circulators, and how much," in
order "[t]o inform the public where the money comes from") (internal quotations and citation
omitted); Kruse, supra note 138, at 129 (explaining that some states prohibit false proposition
advertisements through anti-false speech statutes).
Commentators have also proposed further reforms of the initiative process that would
encourage increased deliberation. For example, the State of Washington is apparently
considering the adoption of a Citizens Initiative Review Commission, which would implement
"the use of randomly-selected citizen panels to inform the judgment of the mass electorate" in
ballot elections. See Gastil et al., supra note 8, at 1021-28 (explaining and endorsing Ned
Crosby's proposal for Citizens Initiative Review). A governmental commission in California
proposed a number of amendments to the initiative process, which would improve deliberation
and allow opportunities for amendment and compromise that do not currently exist. See CAL.
COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 6, at 20-29 (summarizing the Commission's proposals for
reform); see also Miller, supra note 75, at 1061-81 (describing proposals to reform the initiative
process that have been suggested in California). Similar proposals have been recommended in
Oregon by the City Club of Portland. See CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND, supra note 146, at ii-iii
(recommending the use of the indirect initiative and suggesting that constitutional amendments
be subjected to an affirmative vote of sixty percent of the electorate prior to taking effect); see
also Frickey, supra note 20, at 446 (claiming that "[t]he thoughtfulness of these ideas provides
fodder for further useful conversation in Oregon and elsewhere"). Despite the foregoing
procedural requirements and reform proposals, however, no jurisdiction has adopted or, as far as
the author has been able to determine, even considered the application of the agency model to
direct democracy, as described below.
214. See supra Part II.B.
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proponents were presented with a universally acceptable suggestion to
improve or refine the policy at issue, the proponents are typically
prohibited by state and local laws from substantively amending the
language of initiative measures after they have been qualified for the
ballot. 215 Not only are the initiative proponents therefore given little
incentive to consider the views of third parties or monitor their own
conduct during a ballot campaign, but the courts that subsequently
review the meaning and validity of a successful initiative measure
currently have no authority to assess whether the proponents engaged
in reasoned decisionmaking during the lawmaking process.
These shortcomings in the initiative process could be remedied
by amending state and local laws that govern the initiative process to
incorporate procedural safeguards similar to those that are currently
required by the APA. In this regard, the initiative proponents should
be required to conduct a formal proceeding that would provide an
opportunity for opponents, elected officials, and other interested
members of the general public to comment on the advisability of, and
2 16
to offer amendments to, the text of a proposed ballot measure.
Further, the proponents should be required to respond to those

215. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. Examples of initiatives that were approved
by the voters, despite clear drafting errors, are not uncommon. See Cox, supra note 160, at Al.
One constitutional amendment that was enacted by initiative in Nebraska adopted term limits
for elected officials. Although the proponents claimed that they intended to exempt incumbent
politicians, an erroneous citation to the state constitution resulted in the amendment saying
nothing about grandfathering. When the Secretary of State was asked to make a "clerical"
correction to the initiative's text, he declined to intervene because the office "didn't want the
responsibility of saying what was clerical and what wasn't, and if this really isn't what voters
want, then there is the mechanism-another initiative-to correct it." Id. Similarly, a "victim's
bill of rights" that was approved by voters in Alaska provided that "the accused," rather than
"convicted offenders," were liable for restitution to the victims of certain offenses. See id. At the
time of its passage, Proposition 13, the well-known tax-revolt measure that was enacted in
California in 1978, contained "at least 40 ambiguities in [its] language" according to an analysis
conducted by the governor's office. See CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 6, at 81. As of
1995, there were "16 follow-up ballot measures-some launched by the Proposition 13 authors
themselves-to clarify an initiative whose goal was governmental efficiency." Cox, supra note
160, at Al.
A striking example of the failure of initiative proponents to engage in reasoned
decisionmaking when drafting a ballot measure is provided by the "Landowners Bill of Rights"
that was approved by voters in a Northern California County in 1982. While the measure's goal
was to limit local land-use planning, its text included a clause which provided that the measure
preempted any conflicting state or federal law. Several years of litigation followed regarding
whether the blatant illegality of that clause should invalidate the entire measure. Five years
after the measure was enacted, however, a split appellate panel upheld several more innocuous
parts of the initiative by reasoning that, despite the literal language of the measure, the
electorate did not really intend to restrain the United States Congress. See Patterson v. County
of Tehama, 235 Cal. Rptr. 867, 883-96 (1987), review denied and ordered not to be officially
published; Cox, supra note 160, at Al.
216. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2000).

450

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:395

comments with a written statement of the basis and purpose for their
final initiative proposal. 2 17 This document should explain the initiative
proponents' reasoning for rejecting various objections and proposed
amendments. The proponents should also be allowed to amend their
proposed measures in response to comments and suggestions that
would improve or refine their proposals. Finally, courts should be
authorized to review the validity of a successful initiative measure
under an "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review, which would
authorize the judiciary to ascertain whether the initiative proponents
2 18
engaged in reasoned decisionmaking during the lawmaking process.
Courts would therefore be authorized to invalidate successful ballot
measures when the initiative proponents ignored important aspects of
the problem, offered explanations that ran counter to the evidence in
the official lawmaking record, or failed to respond in a cogent fashion
to public comments.
Under this proposal, the proponents of an initiative that
qualified for the ballot would be required to conduct a notice-andcomment proceeding similar to those conducted by administrative
agencies engaged in legislative rulemaking. 219 After a measure
qualified for the ballot, the initiative proponents would be required to
publish the text of their proposed measure in a document that was
readily available to the public. The notice would need to explain that
interested parties have a designated period of time to comment on,
and propose amendments to, the measure. The notice would also need
to explain that commenters are entitled to submit evidence in support
of their positions. Finally, the notice would have to describe the
manner in which comments should be submitted for consideration.
After the period for submitting comments expired, the
initiative proponents would have a designated period of time to

217. Id. § 553(c). Alternatively, the initiative proponents could simply withdraw their
proposal and decline to place it on an upcoming election ballot if they concluded from the noticeand-comment proceeding that the measure was legally invalid or fatally flawed in some other
respect.
218. Cf. § 706; State Farm, 463 U.S. 29, 42-44, 48-49 (1983).
219. For a different proposal to reform direct democracy based on principles drawn from
administrative law, see Troy M. Yoshino, Still Keeping the Faith? Asian Pacific Americans,
Ballot Initiatives, and the Lessons of Negotiated Rulemaking, 6 ASIAN L.J. 1, 52-62 (1999)
(proposing reforms of the initiative process based on the administrative law model of negotiated
rulemaking). The primary problems with the application of a negotiated rulemaking model to
direct democracy include limitations on the number of citizens who could participate in the
deliberative process, the unduly complicated voting procedure described by Yoshino, and the
unaddressed difficulties of judicial review that would inevitably remain. In contrast, the agency
model described below would allow unlimited participation in a notice-and-comment proceeding
by interested parties, while maintaining a streamlined lawmaking process and providing a wellestablished standard of heightened judicial review of successful ballot measures.
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consider and respond to the comments. This response would be in the
form of a statement of the basis and purpose for their final initiative
proposal. Thus, at the end of the period for considering comments, the
proponents would once again be required to publish the entire text of
the measure in its amended form in a document that is readily
available to the public. The proponents would also be required to issue
a statement explaining the reasoning underlying any amendments
that were made to the original text of the initiative. Moreover, the
proponents would be required to explain their reasoning for rejecting
proposed amendments and otherwise respond in a cogent fashion to
the comments that were submitted. The proponents would also be
authorized to support their explanations by referring to any evidence
in their possession that supported their positions or contradicted the
positions taken by commenters during the notice-and-comment
proceeding.
A notice-and-comment proceeding of this nature would provide
opportunities for meaningful deliberation and debate that are
currently absent from direct democracy. 220 Such a proceeding would

220. In addition to the benefits described below, application of the agency model to direct
democracy would likely improve voter understanding of proposed ballot measures. For starters,
the official lawmaking record-including the comments submitted by interested parties and the
response provided in the proponents' statement of basis and purpose--could be made available to
the voters over the Internet. Moreover, a portion of this lawmaking record could be included in
the ballot pamphlets that are already submitted to voters in many jurisdictions. The information
contained in the statement of basis and purpose, along with a reply from the initiative opponents
and an "objective" evaluation of the ballot measure prepared by the state attorney general, would
provide voters with more meaningful information than is currently available.
In this regard, the ballot pamphlets currently provided by most states include statements by
the initiative proponents, its opponents, and the attorney general. See supra notes 145-46. The
statements of the proponents and opponents, however, typically contain simplistic campaign
advertising, rather than a balanced discussion of the substantive merits. See Schacter, supra
note 5, at 142 (explaining that because "[t]hese authors will have every incentive to characterize
the measure in partisan, politically driven ways, rather than to attempt any detached, impartial
summary," their statements "can mislead-and are sometimes designed to mislead-voters
about the effects and potential consequences of the vote"). Replacing the existing advertisements
with a statement of basis and purpose from the proponents and a reply from the opponents
would therefore increase the quality of the information provided to the voters.
Moreover, even if voters ignore the official lawmaking record and the ballot pamphlets
provided to them, the information that is generated by a notice-and-comment proceeding would
almost certainly be presented to the electorate in other ways. As indicated below, the arguments
for and against a measure that are contained in the official lawmaking record would inform the
debate during the subsequent ballot campaign. For example, the initiative proponents and
opponents would be able to challenge the positions of their adversaries in their campaign
advertising. Perhaps more important, the media would become better informed about the merits
of ballot measures and would be able to pass this information along to the voters in the form of
news stories and editorials. In any event, the notice-and-comment proceedings would create an
important new avenue for deliberation and debate, which would contribute to the marketplace of
ideas regarding the merits of proposed ballot measures.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:395

encourage initiative proponents and opponents to communicate with
each other early in the process when opportunities to compromise and
improve the proposed measure are still available. Further, by
authorizing initiative proponents to amend their measure before
placing it on the election ballot, the agency model would expressly
allow any acceptable compromises and substantive improvements to
be incorporated into the measure. Finally, a notice-and-comment
proceeding of this nature would result in the creation of a formal
"lawmaking record" that could improve the debate during the election
campaign and provide a valuable resource for courts that are
responsible for interpreting and reviewing the validity of successful
ballot measures.
The agency model would not interfere with the right of the
proponents and opponents of a ballot measure to campaign on behalf
of their respective positions to the electorate after the notice-andcomment proceeding ended. Instead, the existence of a notice-andcomment proceeding would structure the debate during the campaign
in a more positive fashion. As things currently stand, the proponents
and opponents typically develop their strategies and begin producing
their advertising before the parties have complete knowledge of the
positions that their adversaries will take during the ballot
campaign. 22 1 By requiring the advocates to state their positions "on
the record" before the election campaign begins, a more meaningful
debate of the merits of a proposed measure would be possible. Instead
of simply talking past one another with simplistic and misleading
rhetoric, the parties would be able to address their opponents'
substantive arguments directly. Moreover, a party whose position was
misstated by the opposition would have better "ammunition" to correct
any misrepresentations that persisted during the election campaign.
The agency model would authorize courts to scrutinize
successful ballot measures under the "arbitrary and capricious"
standard of review that currently governs the validity of agency
lawmaking under the APA. In the agency context, courts examine the
"administrative record" initially to determine whether lawmakers
complied with the applicable procedural requirements. 2 22 Thus, courts
are obligated to ensure that the agency provided the public with notice
of a proposed rule and an opportunity to respond, as well as to ensure
that the agency issued a statement of the basis and purpose of its final
rule. Courts are thereby authorized under the APA to verify that the
legislative rulemaking process contained adequate opportunities for
221. See supra Part I.B.
222. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 706 (2000).
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deliberation by lawmakers and third parties who might be affected by
the policy under consideration. If an agency fails to comply with those
procedural requirements, courts are obligated to invalidate a final rule
and remand the matter to the agency potentially to cure the
22 3
procedural defects.
Courts are also authorized by the APA to examine the
administrative record to determine whether an agency engaged in
reasoned decisionmaking during the lawmaking process. Pursuant to
the Supreme Court's decision in State Farm, courts are obligated to
engage in hard-look judicial review by ensuring that lawmakers
considered the important aspects of the problem, responded to the
comments of interested parties in a cogent fashion, and reached a final
policy decision that is justified by the evidence contained in the
administrative record. 224 When an agency fails to engage in reasoned
decisionmaking during the lawmaking process, courts must invalidate
the final rule and remand the matter to the agency for further
225
consideration.
Courts would be authorized under the agency model to engage
in a similar form of "heightened" judicial scrutiny of successful ballot
measures. First, courts would be obligated to examine the "lawmaking
record" that would be created to determine whether the initiative
proponents complied with the procedural requirements of conducting a
public notice-and-comment proceeding and issuing a statement of the
basis and purpose of the final initiative proposal that was presented to
the voters. This requirement would allow courts to ensure that
adequate opportunities were provided for deliberation during the
lawmaking process. Second, courts would be obligated to examine the
lawmaking record to ascertain whether the initiative proponents
considered the important aspects of the problem, responded to the
comments submitted by interested parties in a cogent fashion, and
formulated a final policy proposal that was justified based on the
evidence that was available to the initiative proponents. Finally,
courts would be compelled to invalidate a successful initiative
223. See, e.g., Indep. U.S. Tanker Owners Comm. v. Lewis, 690 F.2d 908, 918-20 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (invalidating and remanding an interim final rule based on an agency's failure to provide
an adequate statement of basis and purpose); PPG Indus., Inc. v. Costle, 659 F.2d 1239, 1249
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (invalidating and remanding an EPA rule because the agency "did not fully meet
the APA's notice requirement").
224. 463 U.S. 29, 42-44, 48-49 (1983).
225. See, e.g., id. at 46-57 (concluding that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's rescission of a passive restraint requirement was arbitrary and capricious and that
further consideration of the issue by the agency was therefore required); Farmers Union Cent.
Exch. v. FERC, 734 F.2d 1486, 1510-28 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying hard-look judicial review to
invalidate a base rate formula adopted by the agency).
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measure when the initiative proponents failed either to comply with
the applicable procedural requirements or to engage in reasoned
decisionmaking during the lawmaking process.
The application of an agency model to direct democracy would
have several advantages over existing proposals for heightened
judicial scrutiny of successful ballot measures. First, the agency model
is directly responsive to the structural shortcomings of direct
democracy. In particular, the proposals described above would
alleviate the tension between direct democracy and republican
government by creating new opportunities for deliberation and
incentives for reasoned decisionmaking. Moreover, the agency model
would not selectively choose certain types of disfavored ballot
measures for more stringent judicial review. Because the structural
shortcomings of direct democracy are pervasive in the current
initiative process, the suggested reforms would apply in a neutral
fashion to every initiative measure that qualifies for the ballot.
In addition to providing a consistent response to the structural
problems inherent in direct democracy, application of the agency
model to direct democracy would provide a manageable form of
heightened judicial scrutiny of successful initiative measures. Indeed,
many courts have already been engaging in hard-look judicial review
of agency lawmaking for two decades. 226 There is little reason to think
that it would be substantially more difficult to apply the arbitrary and
capricious standard in the context of direct democracy. 227 Moreover,

226. For a description of the primary critiques of current administrative law doctrine, see
supra note 212.
227. See infra Part IV (responding to some anticipated objections to the agency model's
application to direct democracy). In addition to having less experience with hard-look judicial
review, see supra note 201, some state courts could have greater difficulty applying heightened
judicial scrutiny of any kind to direct democratic measures than federal courts because state
judges are often elected, rather than appointed to the bench with life tenure. See Holman &
Stern, supra note 13, at 1259. Several commentators have recognized that elected judges may be
hesitant to invalidate direct democratic measures on constitutional grounds because of the
perception that they would be interfering with the "will of the people." See id. at 1259-60; Gerald
F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintainingthe Independence of State Supreme Courts in
an Era of Politicization, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1133, 1133-35, 1147-49 (1997). As a result,
elected judges could fear a potential backlash from voters in response to a decision to invalidate a
successful initiative measure. See Julian N. Eule, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: State Courts, Voter
Initiatives and the Threat of Electoral Reprisal, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 733, 739 (1994) (recognizing
that elected judges are aware of the political consequences of highly visible decisions); Gerald F.
Uelmen, Handling Hot Potatoes: Judicial Review of California Initiatives After Senate v. Jones,
41 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 999, 1000 (2001) (stating that "as a practical matter, elected judges
considering a popular initiative must face the same voters who enacted it to keep their judicial
seats"). Indeed, one judge who faced a retention election in California candidly admitted that
reviewing controversial cases is like having a crocodile in the bathtub while shaving-although
one attempts to ignore the threat of voter reprisal for such decisions, one always knows that it is
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the agency model would provide courts with statutory authority to
engage in hard-look judicial review of successful ballot measures,
while simultaneously leaving the substantive meaning of potentially
applicable constitutional provisions unaffected. Accordingly, courts
that review the validity of successful ballot measures under this model
would not be engaging in a controversial form of constitutional
interpretation by assigning a meaning to the Equal Protection Clause,
for example, in the context of direct democracy different from the
to a
meaning they would assign to the same provision in a challenge
228
statute enacted through the traditional legislative process.
At the same time, however, the agency model would not
foreclose potential challenges to the constitutionality of successful
ballot measures. On the contrary, injured parties would continue to be
able to challenge the constitutionality of successful ballot measures on
the same grounds that are currently available. Indeed, the agency
model would only enable more meaningful constitutional review by
rejecting the myth of popular sovereignty in direct democracy and
expressly recognizing the dominant role played by the initiative
proponents in the process. For example, rather than conducting a
fictional search for a discriminatory purpose by the electorate in an
equal protection challenge to the validity of a successful ballot
measure, the agency model would encourage courts to examine the

there. See Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub, supra, at 1133 (quoting the late Justice Otto
Klaus, who served on the California Supreme Court from 1980 through 1985).
Potential solutions to this problem include appointing state court judges, rather than having
them elected. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 2542-44 (2002)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (criticizing the practice of popularly electing judges). Alternatively,
challenges to the validity of direct democratic measures could be litigated in federal courts where
judges have life tenure under Article III of the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. In
order for the latter solution to be accomplished, plaintiffs would need to challenge the validity of
an initiative measure under a federal constitutional provision, such as the Equal Protection
Clause. Moreover, the federal court would need to be willing to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over related state law claims, including those based on a state or local statute that
authorized judicial review under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. While potential
constitutional claims would remain unaffected by the proposals suggested above, federal courts
would need to apply principles of supplemental jurisdiction relatively liberally (by concluding
that state law claims do not predominate) to engage in the type of heightened judicial scrutiny
under state law that is recommended above. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000) (providing statutory
authority for the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in federal court); cf. City of Chi. v. Int'l
Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 172 (1997) (holding that the federal supplemental jurisdiction
statute authorizes federal jurisdiction over pendent "state law claims for on-the-record review of
administrative decisions," but recognizing that such jurisdiction need not be exercised in every
case).
228. Cf. Charlow, supra note 5, at 561-73 (criticizing proposals for heightened judicial
scrutiny of successful ballot measures on the ground that they "seem to assume a change in the
essential nature of what constitutes a constitutional violation in the special case of direct
democracy").
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actual purposes for the measure that are identified by the initiative
proponents. The creation of a formal lawmaking record during the
notice-and-comment proceeding described above would provide courts
with the concrete evidence that they need to conduct this inquiry. As a
result, adoption of the agency model would help to resolve some of the
evidentiary problems associated with the search for a discriminatory
purpose by the electorate that courts seem to require under current
229
equal protection doctrine.
Similarly, adoption of the agency model would help to resolve
some of the difficult problems of statutory interpretation that courts
face in the context of direct democracy. The creation of a formal
lawmaking record would provide courts with a meaningful "legislative
history" of the enactment that could be utilized to help resolve the
meaning of an initiative measure in subsequent interpretive disputes.
Although concerns about strategic manipulation of the meaning of a
measure by the initiative proponents would not be entirely absent
from this material, the fact that proponents' statements would be
subject to attack by the initiative opponents during the ballot
campaign would likely provide an incentive against blatant
misrepresentations. Moreover, the prospect that the lawmaking record
would be subject to subsequent judicial review for "reasoned
decisionmaking" under the arbitrary and capricious standard would
provide strong incentives for proponents to provide rational
explanations for their actions during the lawmaking process.
Despite the advantages of applying the agency model to direct
democracy, one could still argue that the model does not go far enough
to hold initiative proponents accountable for their actions during
ballot campaigns. Judicial review of agency action under the APA is
typically limited to an examination of the formal rulemaking record
229. In response to Professor Eule's claims regarding the difficulties of establishing a
discriminatory intent of the electorate, see supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text, Lynn
Baker has argued that "[t]o the extent that evidence of a 'bigoted decision-maker' is central to
finding legislation unconstitutionally discriminatory under modern equal protection law, the
courts have had little difficulty obtaining such proof in the case of plebiscitary enactments."
Baker, supra note 5, at 759. Professor Baker pointed out that the Supreme Court has invalidated
successful initiative measures on constitutional grounds under an intent standard based on the
"objective intent" reflected by the plain language of an initiative, the discriminatory impact of
the measure, and the historical background or aberrational procedures leading to its enactment.
See id. at 759-66. Accordingly, Professor Baker concluded that "the fact that a plaintiff (or a
court) neither knows, nor can inquire into, the often complex motivations of each plebiscite voter
should not pose an additional or unique barrier to a successful claim under existing equal
protection doctrine." Id. at 765. Even if Professor Baker is correct that the objective intent of a
ballot measure is the relevant inquiry under equal protection doctrine, the creation of a formal
lawmaking record pursuant to the agency model would assist the courts in conducting this
analysis by providing additional information about the circumstances leading to a ballot
measure's enactment.
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that is submitted to the court. 230 If judicial review of successful
initiative measures were similarly limited to the formal lawmaking
record that would be produced by the notice-and-comment proceeding
described above, sophisticated initiative proponents might be able to
undermine the purposes of the agency model. For example, the
initiative proponents could circumvent the purposes underlying the
agency model if they provided well-reasoned, instrumental statements
on behalf of their positions in the official lawmaking record, but then
proceeded to give false, misleading, or constitutionally suspect
justifications for their proposal to the electorate during the ballot
campaign.
In order to counteract this concern, courts that review the
constitutional validity of an initiative measure should freely examine
the public statements of the initiative proponents during the ballot
campaign-as well as the justifications they provide for their decisions
in the official lawmaking record-for a constitutionally impermissible
purpose. Moreover, the normal tools of civil discovery, including
depositions, document production requests, interrogatories, and
requests for admission, could also be utilized for this purpose. These
litigation devices, in combination with the official lawmaking record
that would be created under the proposals described above, would not
only eliminate the evidentiary problems currently associated with
establishing that an initiative was enacted with a discriminatory
purpose, but they could also make this task substantially easier than
establishing that a law was enacted with a discriminatory purpose
23 1
through the traditional legislative process.

230. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000) (in reviewing agency action under the arbitrary and capricious
standard, "the court shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party, and due
account shall be taken of the rule of prejudicial error"); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. United States
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 470 U.S. 729, 743-44 (1985) ("The task of the reviewing court is to
apply the appropriate APA standard of review to the agency decision based on the record the
agency presents to the reviewing court.") (internal citation omitted); Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419-20 (1971) (explaining that judicial review of
agency action "is to be based on the full administrative record that was before the Secretary at
the time" a decision was made).
231. Indeed, the constitutions of the federal government and most states immunize
legislators from being called into court to defend their lawmaking activities. See U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 6, cl. 2 (providing that members of the Senate and House "shall not be questioned in any
other Place" "for any Speech or Debate in either House"); Tribe, supra note 205, § 5-18, at 370-74
(describing the scope of the legislative immunity conferred by the Speech or Debate Clause of the
United States Constitution); Steven N. Sherr, Note, Freedom and Federalism: The First
Amendment's Protection of Legislative Voting, 101 YALE L.J. 233, 236 (1991) (reporting that "the
constitutions of every state except Florida and North Carolina provide some form" of legislative
immunity); see also supra notes 34-38, 229 and accompanying text (discussing the current
evidentiary difficulties associated with establishing the discriminatory purpose of a law enacted
by initiative).
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For the same reason, jurisdictions that apply the agency model
to direct democracy should also consider authorizing courts to look
beyond the official lawmaking record in evaluating the validity of a
ballot measure under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review.
Courts would, of course, be authorized by the agency model to examine
the official lawmaking record to determine whether the initiative
proponents engaged in reasoned decisionmaking. Nonetheless,
because the ballot campaign is a vital part of the lawmaking process
in the initiative context, courts could also be authorized to consider
whether public statements made by the initiative proponents outside
of the official lawmaking record were compatible with their officially
stated rationale for proceeding in the chosen manner. Accordingly, if
the initiative proponents provided internally inconsistent explanations
of their proposal or otherwise provided voters with misleading
information during the ballot campaign that could not be squared with
the proponents' officially stated rationale in the lawmaking record, a
court could be authorized to invalidate a successful ballot measure
under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review based on the
proponents' failure to engage in reasoned decisionmaking during the
232
entire lawmaking process.
232. See State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48-49 (reaffirming the principle that "an agency must
cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner" under the arbitrary and
capricious standard); cf. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1050 n.23 (D.C.
Cir. 1979) (recognizing that "more exacting scrutiny" under the arbitrary and capricious
standard is appropriate when "the agency has had a history of 'ad hoc and inconsistent
judgments' on a particular question"); Local 777 v. NLRB, 603 F.2d 862, 869-71 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(same).
In one of the only comprehensive treatments of judicial review of direct democracy to date,
Philip Frickey recognized the shortcomings of initiative lawmaking and argued that courts
should consider applying certain canons of construction when they examine the constitutionality
of successful ballot measures and interpret their meaning. See Frickey, supra note 15, at 477; see
also John Copeland Nagle, Direct Democracy and Hastily Enacted Statutes, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 535, 551-53 (advocating special interpretive rules for "hastily enacted statutes" that could be
applied to both initiative lawmaking and traditional legislation). First, Professor Frickey
suggested that "[t]he application of the canon counseling that, if plausible, statutes should be
interpreted to avoid constitutional invalidation potentially plays an important procedural role in
the process of review of the products of direct democracy." Frickey, supra note 15, at 512. The
application of this avoidance canon would encourage courts to interpret ballot measures
narrowly on "subsidiary issues" that raise constitutional concerns when the issues were not
addressed in the text of the initiative or expressly considered by the voters that approved a
proposal. Second, Professor Frickey argued that "a preference for republican lawmaking should
suggest that statutes in derogation of republican processes-both because they were adopted as
ballot propositions and because they might displace existing laws adopted through
representative channels-should not be broadly construed." Id. at 517. In other words, the
traditional canon against repealing existing laws by implication suggests that "because ballot
propositions are in derogation of republican government, there should be a general working
presumption in favor of narrow construction when directly adopted laws are in tension with preexisting laws." Id. at 522. Finally, Professor Frickey suggested that "to the extent a ballot
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In sum, the foregoing reforms would encourage meaningful
deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking in direct democracy.
Moreover, application of the agency model to direct democracy would
hold initiative proponents accountable for their actions during the
lawmaking process. Finally, these reforms would provide courts with a
well-established legal framework, as well as crucial evidentiary
materials, for engaging in heightened judicial scrutiny of successful
ballot measures in a manner that would simultaneously further
republican principles of lawmaking and safeguard other important
constitutional values. Indeed, by directly addressing the structural
problems associated with using direct democracy in a representative
democracy, the foregoing proposals could substantially bolster the
legitimacy of the initiative process-and perhaps improve the quality
of the legislation that it produces as well.

proposition runs up against specialized substantive canons, such as the rule of lenity, those
canons should have somewhat more force than they would in the context of a legislatively
adopted law." Id. at 522-23.
Professor Frickey's canonical approach to judicial review of ballot measures would be a useful
supplement to the application of the agency model to direct democracy. Under the agency model,
courts would assess the constitutionality of a successful ballot measure by examining the
initiative language, the official lawmaking record, statements made by the initiative proponents,
the anticipated effects of a ballot measure, and the circumstances leading to its enactment.
Moreover, courts would be authorized by statute to examine the same sources to determine
whether the initiative proponents engaged in reasoned decisionmaking during the lawmaking
process. If the validity of a challenged measure was upheld under these inquiries, courts would
proceed to examine the initiative language and the official lawmaking record to resolve any
interpretive disputes presented by the litigation. Courts would then be obligated to implement
the unambiguous legislative intent reflected by the initiative language and the official
lawmaking record. When those sources do not unambiguously resolve the interpretive issue,
however, courts would be free to apply the canons identified by Professor Frickey, which suggest
that courts should narrowly interpret the meaning of ballot measures that would otherwise
conflict with constitutional principles of fairness and equality, displace existing law that was
enacted through the traditional legislative process, or undermine other well-recognized legal
process values-such as the principle that criminal statutes should be interpreted narrowly in
favor of the accused.
While examination of evidence outside the lawmaking record is justified for purposes of
judicial review of the validity of successful ballot measures under the agency model, such
information should be viewed skeptically by courts for the purpose of statutory interpretation.
For reasons explained above, the official lawmaking record would provide a sufficiently reliable
source of legislative history for courts to use in ascertaining the meaning of ambiguous ballot
measures. The same conclusion, however, would not necessarily apply to statements made by
initiative proponents outside of the official lawmaking record. First, such statements are less
likely to be challenged by the initiative's opponents during the ballot campaign. Moreover, as
long as those statements do not flatly contradict the rationale provided by the initiative
proponents in the lawmaking record, courts may be reluctant to give such statements the critical
scrutiny they deserve. In short, statements made by the initiative proponents outside of the
lawmaking record about the meaning of the measure are "cheap" legislative history that courts
should not ordinarily deem authoritative.
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IV. A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF THE APPLICATION OF AN AGENCY
MODEL TO DIRECT DEMOCRACY

Advocates of the initiative process as it currently exists could,
of course, criticize the proposed application of an agency model to
direct democracy on a number of grounds. Those critiques would likely
fall into two general categories: those based on claims that direct
democracy already contains adequate safeguards against abuse by
initiative proponents or those which contend that application of the
agency model to direct democracy is flawed in some other significant
respect. The latter form of criticism might include arguments that (1)
principles of "due process of lawmaking" should not be enforced by
courts in the context of direct democracy, (2) invalidation of a
successful ballot measure based on statements made by initiative
proponents conflicts with the First Amendment, and (3) application of
the agency model to direct democracy unduly favors initiative
opponents who already have a number of advantages in ballot
campaigns. Moreover, critics of the current initiative process might be
concerned that application of the agency model to direct democracy
could have the perverse effect of legitimizing what is, at bottom, an
illegitimate enterprise. The shortcomings of direct democracy could be
compounded if the agency model provided a veneer of deliberation and
accountability, but did not effectively accomplish those objectives.
Indeed, courts that upheld the validity of successful ballot measures
under the highly deferential arbitrary and capricious standard of
review might be more reluctant to invalidate those measures under
the Constitution. This part addresses these potential criticisms and
concludes that the need for additional republican safeguards in the
initiative process outweighs any arguably negative consequences of
applying the agency model to direct democracy.
A. The Safeguard of Considerationby the Electorate
This Article has argued that the "myth of popular sovereignty"
in direct democracy should be rejected and that further
responsibilities should be imposed on the initiative proponents who
actually control the content of successful ballot measures. 233 The
Article has also argued that the structural safeguards imposed by the
APA and hard-look judicial review of agency action would provide a
useful model for promoting republican principles of lawmaking in the

233. See supra Part II.
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context of direct democracy. 234 Direct democracy does, however,
contain one significant safeguard that is absent from the agency
model-the electorate's opportunity to ratify or reject an initiative
proposal. 235 There is no question, moreover, that voters reject a
significant number of the initiatives that are placed on election
ballots. 236 Indeed, political science research suggests that, if anything,
a bias exists in favor of the status quo in ballot contests because the
electorate tends to vote against initiative measures about which they
have reasonable doubts. 237 One might therefore be tempted to
conclude that the additional safeguards imposed by the agency model

234. See supraPart III.
235. One could argue that the signature requirement for placing an initiative on the ballot is
another meaningful safeguard that is absent from the agency model. Given the frequent use of
paid petition circulators and evidence that any sufficiently financed initiative proposal can be
qualified for the ballot, the signature requirement no longer appears consistently to satisfy its
purpose of keeping frivolous initiatives off the ballot. See supra notes 118-29 and accompanying
text. Instead, the signature requirement appears only to pose a bar to frivolous proposals (and
probably some meritorious ones as well) that are also poorly financed. In any event, the
signature requirement does not appear to promote any meaningful deliberation and reasoned
decisionmaking about the content of a measure, even if the requirement accurately filters out
initiatives that are not supported in principle by the electorate. Accordingly, additional
safeguards are necessary to promote deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking about the specific
content of an initiative's text even if the signature requirement demonstrates a minimal level of
public support for its broad underlying purpose.
236. David Magleby has reported that only thirty-six percent of statewide initiatives were
approved by voters between 1898 and 1979. See MAGLEBY, supra note 47, at 70-76 & tbl.4.3.
Although the reported numbers vary, there appears to be a general consensus that ballot
measures have passed at higher rates in recent years, especially for particular types of measures.
See GERBER, supra note 109, at 79, 116-19 (reporting passage rates of between thirty-three
percent and one hundred percent by subject area for all statewide initiatives and referenda that
qualified for the ballots in eight states between 1988 and 1992); Lazos Vargas, supra note 12, at
424-25, app. A-H (reporting that "[iun the eighty-two initiatives and referendums surveyed ....
majorities voted to repeal, limit, or prevent any minority gains in their civil rights over eighty
percent of the time"); Donovan et al., supra note 126, at 89-90, tbl.4.1 (reporting a passage rate of
41.5% for initiatives between 1986 and 1996); Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a
Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 261 (1997) (reporting that anti-civil rights ballot
measures enjoyed a seventy-five percent success rate between 1959 and 1993); Elisabeth R.
Gerber, PressuringLegislators Through the Use of Initiatives: Two Forms of Indirect Influence, in
CITIZENS AS LEGISATORS, supra note 112, at 191 (reporting that "only 42% of the 271 statewide
initiatives considered by voters between 1981 and 1990 passed" and that "the initiative passage
rate in many states was considerably lower" in prior decades); Magleby, supra note 1, at 230-31
tbl.7-2 (reporting passage rates of 39.6% and 36.0% for statutory initiatives and constitutional
amendments, respectively, between 1898 and 1992). For a critique of Gamble's study on the
grounds that her sample was "heavily weighted by a nonrandom draw of local cases" that had
attracted the attention of journalists and academics, see Todd Donovan & Shaun Bowler,
Responsive or Responsible Government, in CITIZENS As LEGISLATORS, supra note 112, at 264-70;
see also id. at 272 (arguing that "one of the most enduring critiques of state direct democracythat it is somehow more abusive of minorities than representative processes-rings a bit
hollow").
237. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
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are unnecessary because the initiative proponents already face
sufficient obstacles during the lawmaking process.
This conclusion misses the mark, however, because the
filtering of initiatives that results from ballot elections is not
calibrated to further republican principles of lawmaking. 238 Instead,
direct democracy allows precisely the type of "majority faction" that
239
the structural filters of the Constitution were designed to prevent.
Those structural filters protect determined minorities in the
traditional legislative process by providing a variety of opportunities
to defeat proposed legislation. 2 40 Moreover, the existence of numerous
"vetogates" in the legislative process creates incentives for
amendments and compromise that can minimize objections to
proposed legislation and "tone-down" its adverse impact on
minorities. 2 4 1 Finally, the ongoing nature of the traditional legislative
process allows participants to engage in vote-trading and other
strategic behavior, which reflects the intensity of their preferences
and provides minorities with an opportunity to prevail on issues about
which they care more than the majority. 242 In contrast, the one-shot,
238. Indeed, there are good reasons to question whether consideration of an initiative by the
electorate represents an accurate reflection of the "will of the people" at all. See supra note 102
and accompanying text (describing low voter turnout, a drop-off in voting on initiatives, and raceand class-based disparities in voting). Moreover, the empirical evidence is mixed regarding
whether those who do vote in ballot elections are able to cast "intelligent" votes that are
consistent with their preferences. See CRONIN, supra note 18, at 61-62, 89 (recognizing that
"many analysts who study populist democracy practices develop considerable reservations about
them after finding that citizens and voters often do not fully understand the process, frequently
vote with limited information, and sometimes vote contrary to their own preferences," but
arguing that "[t]he charge that voters are not competent enough to decide on occasional issues
put before them is usually exaggerated"); MAGLEBY, supra note 47, at 142 (reporting that
"studies of voting on statewide propositions have generally found that 10 percent or more of the
voters cast incorrect or confused ballots"); Banducci, supra note 155, at 132-48 (analyzing the
consistency of the actual voted ballots from the 1990 general election in Marion County, Oregon,
which contained eight initiative measures, and reporting that "when voters make choices on a
large number of initiatives, it is reasonable to expect that outcomes 'make sense' after all the
votes are counted"). Of course, the ability of majority voting schemes accurately to reflect the
preferences of legislators has been questioned in representative democracy as well. See, e.g.,
KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963); WILLIAM RIKER,
LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND
THE THEORY OF PUBLIC CHOICE 137 (1982).
239. See supra Part I.A; GERBER, supra note 109, at 3 (describing direct democracy as an
attempt "to counteract excessive minority control" of the legislative process).
240. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 167, at 66 (recognizing that "any legislative proposal
has to surmount a series of hurdles before it becomes a law").
241. See id. (explaining that "scholars have coined the term vetogates to apply to the choke
points in the process, some with the durability of constitutional requirements, others matters of
congressional rule or norm," and recognizing that their existence "means that determined
minorities can often kill legislation or, in the alternative, maim legislation they cannot kill").
242. See Clark, supra note 5, at 462 ("Logrolling simply offers a chance for minorities to
prevail on issues that they care about more intensely than do those in the majority."); Robert
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single-issue, winner-take-all nature of initiative elections practically
eviscerates the protections that are available to minorities in the
243
traditional legislative process.
In addition, one of the primary purposes of republican
safeguards is to encourage lawmakers to refine and improve the
substantive content of proposed legislation. The traditional legislative
process therefore provides opportunities for careful consideration of
the details of the laws that are enacted. An all-or-nothing public vote
on whether to approve a proposed initiative cannot compensate for the
absence of similar opportunities in direct democracy. 244 Even if
Collins, How Democratic Are Initiatives?, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 983, 991 (2001) ("The most
important way that representative legislatures modify majority rule is by reflecting the intensity
of minority preferences."); Eule, supra note 2, at 1556 ("Legislative logrolling over a broad
agenda brings minorities into the process and allows resulting compromises to accommodate
their interests.").
243. See Clark, supra note 5, at 434 (claiming that direct democracy distorts popular input
by precluding the expression of priorities among issues); Eule, supra note 2, at 1553-58
(describing the need for safeguards designed to filter majority preferences in direct democracy);
Hamilton, supra note 4, at 13 (arguing that the flawed procedures of direct democracy "invite[ ]
majoritarian tyranny"); Moglen & Karlan, supra note 4, at 1092 (explaining that the possibility
of increased use of direct democracy "poses new threats to minority rights, which are often better
protected through a less purely majoritarian, less populist process").
244. See, e.g., Frickey, supra note 20, at 435-37 (recognizing that "[tihe legislative process
provides many opportunities for gathering relevant information and deliberating about it," which
are absent from direct democracy); Frickey, supra note 15, at 523-26 (explaining how the
procedural safeguards of the legislative process would likely have killed or refined several
vaguely drafted ballot measures with potentially wide-ranging effects). See generally Nourse &
Schacter, supra note 42, at 575 (describing discrepancies between the judiciary's characterization
of legislative drafting and the practices of the Senate Judiciary Committee and recognizing the
importance of achieving compromise and consensus to participants in the traditional legislative
process). A number of commentators have criticized differential treatment of successful ballot
measures on the grounds that the legislative process does not always operate in an ideal fashion.
See Briffault, supra note 102, at 1350 (arguing that "the legislature is afflicted by flaws similar
in kind to those ... [of] direct democracy" and that the initiative process "serves as a fitting
complement to the legislative process"); Clayton P. Gillette, Is Direct Democracy AntiDemocratic?, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 609, 636-37 (1998) (assessing claims that the initiative
process favors special interests, harms minorities, and lacks sufficient deliberation and arguing
that "it is unclear that the initiative, as we currently employ it, is sufficiently inferior to the
legislature to warrant the attacks visited on it"); Landau, supra note 44, at 533 (arguing that
traditional legislation has many of the same flaws attributed to initiative lawmaking and that
different judicial treatment of successful ballot measures is therefore unwarranted); Tushnet,
supra note 104, at 392 (arguing that "[t]he case for differential judicial review ultimately rests on
a fear of voting" premised on a belief that "[t]he people ... are not as good as they ought to be").
While it is undoubtedly true that "deliberation in the legislative process rarely resembles
anything like an academic symposium," the foregoing commentators underestimate the
pervasive structural flaws of the initiative process. Frickey, supra note 20, at 435-37; see also
Eric Lane, Men Are Not Angels: The Realpolitik of Direct Democracy and What We Can Do About
It, 34 WILLAMEITE L. REV. 579, 581 (1998) (claiming that "with imperfect legislative processes as
the point of comparison, direct democracy still does not provide procedures as accessible or
deliberative as representative democracy"). The concern is not only that "the people" are unable
to engage in reasoned deliberation about the specific content of proposed ballot measures, but
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consideration of a ballot measure by the electorate reflected an
accurate appraisal of the "will of the people" regarding the desirability
of the general policy reflected by an initiative proposal, it would be
impossible for the electorate to express any meaningful intentions
regarding the more specific legal implications of an initiative measure
when it is applied and subsequently interpreted by courts. 245 The
electorate simply lacks sufficient knowledge of the existing legal
landscape and the meaning of the technical legal jargon contained in
the text of most initiatives to approve or reject the specific legal
implications of a successful ballot measure. 246 In short, consideration
of a ballot measure by the electorate does not reflect any meaningful
approval of the precise content of an initiative measure, even if this
requirement accurately filters out initiatives that are not supported in
principle by the electorate. Accordingly, additional safeguards are
necessary to promote deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking by
initiative proponents about the details of a ballot measure's text and
its legal implications, even if an affirmative vote by the electorate
demonstrates a minimal level of public support for an initiative's
247
broad underlying purpose.

that the unelected initiative proponents who actually control the process are not currently
required (or even encouraged) to do so.
245. See Frickey, supra note 15, at 529; Schacter, supra note 5, at 127-28.
246. See Frickey, supra note 15, at 529 ('The electorate cannot plausibly be expected to
understand much of the details of what is on the ballot."); Schacter, supra note 5, at 127-28
(recognizing that "many of the legal consequences of new initiative laws are systematically
unforeseeable to citizen-legislators.").
247. While this section argues that consideration of an initiative proposal by the electorate is
not an adequate substitute for the application of the agency model to direct democracy, it bears
noting that there are additional mechanisms to encourage accountability in the administrative
rulemaking process that are not present in direct democracy. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross,
Shattering the Fragile Case for Judicial Review of Rulemaking, 85 VA. L. REV. 1243, 1290-1301
(1999) (describing the nonjudicial checks on agency action provided by the President and
Congress); Lauren A. Smith, Judicialization:The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1985 DUKE
L.J. 427, 449 (stating that "there is an abundance of both formal and actual controls and
influences upon the administrative process deriving from the two branches of government that
have a popular mandate"). First, administrative agencies are often under the control of a chief
executive who is, of course, an elected official. Second, administrative agencies are subject to
legislative oversight and control, particularly through annual budget appropriations that can be
limited or eliminated when an agency deviates from congressional preferences. In short, while
administrative agencies and the proponents of initiative measures are both subject to forms of
control independent from notice-and-comment procedures and hard-look judicial review,
application of the agency model remains necessary in both contexts to encourage deliberation
and reasoned decisionmaking about the specific content of the laws promulgated by unelected
actors outside of the traditional legislative process.
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B. Due Process of Lawmaking in Direct Democracy
The proposals advocated in this Article would impose
additional procedural requirements on initiative proponents and
authorize judicial review of the lawmaking process for reasoned
decisionmaking. This version of heightened judicial scrutiny would
therefore focus on the adequacy of the lawmaking process and the
quality of the initiative proponents' deliberations, in addition to
requiring
courts
to
continue
assessing
the
substantive
constitutionality of successful ballot measures. Judicial review of the
validity of legislation based on the adequacy of lawmaking procedures
and the quality of legislative deliberations was initially coined "due
process of lawmaking" in a seminal article by Hans Linde. 248
The circumstances under which courts should enforce
principles of due process of lawmaking are currently the subject of
vigorous debate on the Supreme Court and in the scholarly
literature. 249 Despite occasional objections, 250 the conventional wisdom
248. Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 225 (1976); see also
Frickey & Smith, supra note 213, at 1709-18 (describing various models of due process of
lawmaking, including the model of due deliberation).
249. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368-70 (2001) (invalidating
legislation enacted pursuant to the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment based on
inadequate congressional findings); id. at 376-89 app. A (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
legislation should have been upheld under rational basis scrutiny, challenging the majority's
claim that the legislative record was inadequate, and providing an institutional critique of the
Court's approach); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614-15 (2000) (holding that the
Violence Against Women Act exceeded Congress's authority and explaining that while the
statute was "supported by numerous findings" in the legislative record "regarding the serious
impact that gender-motivated violence has on victims and their families," those findings were
"substantially weakened" by Congress's reliance on a legally invalid "method of reasoning'); id.
at 637-38, 647-52 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that heightened judicial scrutiny of the
exercise of congressional authority was inappropriate because of the existence of adequate
political safeguards to protect state interests); id. at 660-64 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Congress,
not the courts, must remain primarily responsible for striking the appropriate state/federal
balance," partly because of existing "procedural limitations in keeping the power of Congress in
check."); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89 (2000) ("Our examination of the ADEA's
legislative record confirms that Congress' 1974 extension of the Act to the States was an
unwarranted response to a perhaps inconsequential problem."); id. at 93 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(arguing that heightened judicial scrutiny was inappropriate because "the Framers designed
important structural safeguards to ensure that, when the National Government enacted
substantive law (and provided for its enforcement), the normal operation of the legislative
process itself would adequately defend state interests from undue infringement"); Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 643 (1999) (invalidating a
portion of a federal patent statute partly because of perceived inadequacies in the legislative
record); id. at 654-55 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out the unfairness of retroactive
application of a requirement of legislative findings and arguing that the legislative record was
adequate to support the legislation); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-31 (1997)
(comparing the legislative records of the Voting Rights Act and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act to assess whether the latter statute was authorized by the Enforcement Clause
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holds that it is appropriate for courts to review an administrative
record to determine whether agency officials engaged in reasoned
decisionmaking during the legislative rulemaking process. 251 In
contrast, the Supreme Court's recent practice of closely examining the
legislative record when it reviews the constitutionality of
congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause and the
Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has provoked a
flood of scholarly criticism. 2 52 Accordingly, this section briefly
examines the relevant circumstances under which judicial review of
the validity of legislation based on the contents of a lawmaking record
is appropriate and concludes that lawmaking by initiative is
compatible with the fundamental criteria for enforcing principles of
due process of lawmaking.
Judicial review of a legislative record to assess the validity of
ordinary congressional legislation is problematic for several related
reasons. 25 3 First, there is no constitutional requirement that the
of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 562-63 (1995) (claiming
that "Congress normally is not required to make formal findings as to the substantial burdens
that an activity has on interstate commerce," but indicating that such findings could enable the
Court "to evaluate the legislative judgment"); see also A. Christopher Bryant & Timothy J.
Simeone, Remanding to Congress: The Supreme Court's New "On the Record" Constitutional
Review of Federal Statutes, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 328, 329 (2001) (arguing that the Court's
approach in its recent federalism cases "is fundamentally ill-advised, most importantly because
it constitutes a constitutionally suspect intrusion on congressional investigative and legislative
procedures"); William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN. L.
REV. 87 (2001) (explaining that the nature of the legislative process belies the existence of a
comprehensive legislative record and that the Court's recent federalism decisions conflict with
separation of powers principles); Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH.
L. REV. 80, 83 (2001) (arguing that "the Court is using its authority to diminish the proper role of
Congress" in its recent federalism decisions by "treat[ing] the federal legislative process as akin
to agency or lower court decisionmaking" and "undermin[ing] Congress's ability to decide for
itself how and whether to create a record in support of pending legislation"); Frickey & Smith,
supra note 213, at 1709 (concluding that "Congress is capable of meeting the Court's factgathering requirements, but cannot satisfy the Court's requirement of due deliberation and
rational, articulated decision").
250. See infra note 300.
251. See, e.g., Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 249, at 126 ("Hard look review of agency
decisionmaking is now well established."); Cross, supra note 247, at 1245 ("The existence of
authority for courts to review agency rulemaking is broadly presumed.").
252. See supra note 249; see also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 376 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the majority for "[r]eviewing the Congressional record as if it were an administrative agency
record").
253. As explained above, courts usually do not examine the legislative record when assessing
the validity of statutes under the rational basis standard of review. See supra notes 203-07 and
accompanying text. That is not to say, however, that courts should never examine the contents of
a legislative record for any purpose when reviewing congressional legislation. For example, the
use of legislative history by courts to interpret the meaning of ambiguous statutes raises
somewhat different questions that require separate treatment. See Colker & Brudney, supra
note 249, at 136-41 (recognizing the tension between the new textualist approach to statutory
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legislative branch compile a formal lawmaking record sufficient for
courts to assess the rationale for a law's enactment. 254 Second, the
legislative records that exist are unlikely to provide the requisite
information because the traditional legislative process is so diffuse,
competitive, and legitimately susceptible to a wide range of informal
influences. 25 5 Perhaps most important, judicial invalidation of
interpretation and legislative record review in the federalism cases); Frickey & Smith, supra
note 213, at 1750-52 (same). Moreover, courts will sometimes examine lawmaking records when
they engage in heightened judicial scrutiny of the constitutionality of legislation that interferes
with fundamental rights or adversely affects members of a suspect class. See, e.g., Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (holding that facially neutral laws with a racially discriminatory
purpose violate equal protection); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973) (holding that the
validity of public aid to church-related schools includes close inquiry into the purpose of the
challenged statute); see also Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 249, at 137 ('The imposition of a
requirement that evidence supporting the enactment appear in legislative materials represents
an approach akin to heightened scrutiny usually applied only in review of legislation implicating
fundamental rights or suspect classifications.").
Indeed, the Supreme Court's recent examination of legislative records in cases involving
challenges to the validity of legislation enacted pursuant to Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment has proven controversial in part
because the Court was essentially applying a form of heightened scrutiny to decisions that had
previously been reviewed under the most deferential "rational basis" standard-while at the
same time claiming that it was not changing the standard of review. See Buzbee & Schapiro,
supra note 249, at 137-39. As a result, much of the debate between the majority and dissenting
opinions involved questions of how much deference was owed to Congress, the appropriate
institutional role of the Court, and the adequacy of the structural safeguards of the legislative
process to protect principles of federalism. See supra note 249.
254. In this regard, the federal Constitution merely requires Congress to "keep a Journal of
its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same ..
U."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
Moreover, the Constitution expressly provides that "each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings .. " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. The Constitution does not further specify the
contents of the legislative journals or the rules of congressional proceedings, and courts therefore
traditionally have been reluctant to entertain challenges to Congress's internal procedures. See,
e.g., United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 3-6 (1892) (rejecting a challenge to the validity of a law
based on the alleged absence of a legislative quorum because "[tihe Constitution empowers each
house to determine its rules of proceedings"); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 668-71 (1892)
(concluding that the contents of legislative journals were left largely to the discretion of the
respective houses of Congress); see also Bryant & Simeone, supra note 249, at 376 (arguing that
"the Supreme Court's recent treatment of the legislative record in constitutional cases appears
inconsistent with the spirit, if not also the letter, of several constitutional provisions and
established jurisprudential doctrines designed to shelter the federal legislative process from the
threat of judicial intrusion"); Frickey & Smith, supra note 213, at 1749-50 (recognizing that "the
judicial intrusion into internal congressional processes seems in tension with the Constitution
itself, which provides that each house is responsible for making its own rules").
255. The nature of the legislative process undermines the utility of the legislative record for
ascertaining the reasoning of Congress for two reasons. First, it is often impossible to attribute a
single instrumental purpose to a statute because Congress ordinarily seeks to accomplish a
number of competing objectives when it enacts legislation. See Frickey & Smith, supra note 213,
at 1740-44 (arguing that the assumption of a deliberative legislature, "where deliberation is
defined as reasoned discussion in which the outcome is consensus on ends and means * * * is
clearly undesirable for a competitive legislative process"); Linde, supra note 248, at 225
("Whatever may be required of agencies in the pursuit of stated goals, it is clear that.., no such
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congressional legislation raises separation of powers concerns because
Congress is a coordinate branch of government that is expressly
authorized by the Constitution to make laws within the scope of its
enumerated powers. Elected representatives take an oath to uphold
the Constitution; they are accountable to their constituents, and they
must overcome the structural filters of Article I, Section 7 to enact
legislation.
Concerns
regarding judicial activism
and the
countermajoritarian difficulty are therefore at their zenith when
courts invalidate the work of the elected branches based on perceived
deficiencies in the lawmaking process. 256 Not surprisingly, review of
the legislative record by the Supreme Court in its recent federalism
decisions has been criticized by commentators on all of the preceding
257
grounds.
In contrast, administrative agencies are required by statute to
compile an administrative record that can be examined by courts to
assess the agency's reasoning in promulgating a challenged policy. 258
model of rational inquiry [can be imposed] on legislative bodies that select and compromise
opposing versions of truth and justice in a single act of lawmaking."). Second, the collective
nature of the legislative process makes it difficult to identify an authoritative rationale for
congressional action or to attribute authoritative weight to any particular legislative records. See
Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 249, at 92 (recognizing that "a complete or 'formal' legislative
record does not exist"); Frickey & Smith, supra note 213, at 1731-36 (explaining that "treating
Congress as a unitary actor that contemplates evidence and creates a legislative record.., is
only a fiction" and that bicameralism "limits the utility of claims about what Congress said or did
not say").
256. See Bryant & Simeone, supra note 249, at 329 (arguing that the Court's new approach
"constitutes a constitutionally suspect intrusion on congressional investigative and legislative
procedures"); Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 249, at 87 ("In defiance of separation of powers
principles, legislative record review actually embodies more rigorous judicial scrutiny than
commonly employed even in 'hard look' review of administrative action."); Colker & Brudney,
supra note 249, at 86-87 ('We are disturbed by the Court's emerging vision in which Congress
has substantially diminished powers to conduct its internal affairs or to engage in factfinding
and lawmaking that the judicial branch will respect."); Frickey & Smith, supra note 213, at 1750
("There is a deep separation-of-powers problem at the heart of what we perceive to be the new
due-deliberation model of due process of lawmaking."). This is particularly true when due process
of lawmaking principles are invoked retroactively to invalidate legislation that was enacted at a
time when courts did not impose any particular factfinding requirements. See Colker & Brudney,
supra note 249, at 111 (explaining that by retroactively applying newly adopted record-keeping
requirements, "the Court required a degree of legislative omniscience that is highly troubling as
a matter of constitutional discourse between the branches"); Frickey & Smith, supra note 213, at
1723 (recognizing that the Court imposed due process of lawmaking requirements "retroactively
upon existing statutes, which were of course enacted in a different time, when Congress had no
notice of the necessity of generating a carefully crafted legislative history").
257. See supra notes 249-56.
258. The APA requires an administrative agency to publish a general notice of proposed
rulemaking in the FederalRegister. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2000). The Act also requires an agency
to "give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission
of written data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation." § 553(c).
Finally, the APA provides that "[a]fter consideration of the relevant matter presented, the
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Second, the nature of the administrative process is far more conducive
to producing an authoritative record that can be utilized by courts to
259
examine the reasoning of lawmakers than is the legislative process.
Third, hard-look judicial review of agency action does not seriously
conflict with separation of powers principles or implicate the
countermajoritarian difficulty. On the contrary, lawmaking by
administrative agencies is itself constitutionally suspect because it
260
lacks the structural safeguards of representative democracy.
Moreover, the scope of an agency's rulemaking authority is much more
sharply circumscribed than the lawmaking authority granted to
Congress by the Constitution. 261 Finally, judicial review of agency
agency shall incorporate in the rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and
purpose." Id. Courts have interpreted this latter provision to require administrative agencies to
provide an explanation sufficient for courts to engage in "hard-look" judicial review of their
actions. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 211, at 779 ("The hard look doctrine is a judicially-enunciated
twist on two standards in the APA: (1) the requirement that an agency 'incorporate in the rules
adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose'; and (2) the 'arbitrary and
capricious' review standard."); Mark Seidenfeld, Demystifying Deossification:Rethinking Recent
Proposalsto Modify Judicial Review of Notice and Comment Rulemaking, 75 TEX. L. REV. 483,
485-86 (1997) (recognizing that "the hard look test" is a "judicially created administrative law
doctrine").
259. In this regard, the legislative rulemaking process is composed of relatively streamlined
procedures-publication of a proposed rule, the submission of "written data, views, or
arguments" by interested parties, followed by the publication of "a concise general statement" of
the "basis and purpose" of the final rule that is promulgated by an agency. See § 553. Moreover,
an agency can relatively easily assign the tasks of compiling an administrative record and
articulating the agency's positions to a small number of employees, who can, in turn, solicit input
from other knowledgeable agency officials. As a result, the administrative record that is provided
to the court is reasonably likely to reflect the agency's actual reasoning in promulgating the final
rule at issue. See Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 249, at 147 ("In the agency setting,... there is
at least the possibility of locating key decisionmakers who can explain the final agency
decision.").
This is not to say, of course, that the agency's explanation for its action will not be influenced
by the prospect of subsequent judicial review. The agency will undoubtedly feel compelled to
engage in a reasoning process that it believes will withstand judicial scrutiny. Proponents of
deliberative democracy tend to believe, however, that the need to justify a policy with publicly
stated reasons that can be accepted by third parties will tend to improve the deliberative process.
See AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT

52 (1996).

As

indicated below, administrative law scholars debate the extent to which this theory operates
effectively in practice. See infra note 300.
260. See supra Part III.B.
261. Indeed, administrative agencies can only engage in rulemaking within the scope of their
delegated authority. Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently maintained that Congress
must articulate "an intelligible principle" to guide an agency's discretion when it confers
rulemaking authority on an administrative agency. See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 473-74. As Hans
Linde explained:
When [agency] officials are delegated the authority to perform some prescribed
function, to manage a program, or to pursue some stated objective, no matter how
broad their discretion may be, they are obliged to justify their actions in
instrumentalist terms, as a means toward a goal within the scope of their assignment.
From this obligation, with or without the aid of administrative procedure acts or
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action under the arbitrary and capricious standard is expressly
authorized by the APA and similar state statutes. 26 2 As a result, the
enforcement of principles of due process of lawmaking has been the
accepted norm in administrative law for decades.
The enactment of state and local laws that impose additional
procedural requirements on initiative proponents and authorize hardlook judicial review of their reasoning would eliminate many of the
otherwise valid objections to the enforcement of principles of due
process of lawmaking in direct democracy. 263 Application of the agency
statutory standards of judicial review, courts have spun out various procedural duties
of agencies which require them to articulate their aims and their assumptions of fact,
to examine available evidence and consider alternative solutions, and sometimes to
subject their hypotheses to scrutiny and possible rebuttal by interested parties.
Linde, supra note 248, at 225. In other words, because administrative agencies are only
delegated authority to accomplish specific instrumental goals, judicial review of the
administrative record is necessary to ensure that agencies are proceeding in a reasoned fashion
toward their stated objectives. See Buzbee & Schapiro, supra note 249, at 121-25 (claiming that
judicial review of agency action ensures that "legislative desires made manifest in a statute
prevail over potentially different executive branch and agency preferences").
A related distinction between lawmaking by administrative agencies and the legislature is
that while rulemaking is justified in part by an agency's expertise, Congress is authorized to
engage in purely political decisionmaking. See id. at 122 (recognizing that "one of the key
justifications for the administrative state is to allow expert agencies to exercise their judgment
and experience in resolving tasks delegated by Congress"). Because administrative agencies
must necessarily exercise policymaking discretion to fill gaps in their statutory authority,
however, this distinction is typically one of degree rather than of kind. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc.
v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45 (1984) (explaining that courts should
defer to an agency's reasonable resolution of policy questions not specifically addressed by
Congress).
262. Indeed, the scope of judicial review of agency action-and, specifically, hard-look judicial
review of the administrative record for reasoned decisionmaking-is governed by those
authorizing statutes and could therefore arguably be narrowed or even eliminated by the
legislature. See Seidenfeld, supra note 258, at 503-24 (describing and evaluating various
proposals to relax hard-look judicial review of agency action). But see Shapiro & Levy, supra note
18, at 440 (arguing that hard-look judicial review of agency action has constitutional
underpinnings and claiming that "[s]uch an understanding of the reasons requirement is
preferable to the common assumption that the requirement is solely a product of the APA's
arbitrary and capricious standard of review"). As indicated above, a number of states have
declined to authorize hard-look judicial review of legislative rules adopted by state
administrative agencies. See supra note 201. This approach is in tension with the view that hardlook judicial review has constitutional underpinnings.
263. A couple of commentators have summarily rejected judicial review of successful ballot
measures for reasoned decisionmaking. For example, Hans Linde argued as follows:
Initiated laws like all others must meet constitutional standards. They will fail if by
design or in effect they overstep constitutional bounds. But can it be contended that
one of those standards is a rational way of matching means and ends? The initiative
process flies in the face of the idea. Whatever the private goals of the sponsors, once a
measure is drafted it is past systematic factfinding, analysis, amendment, or
compromise. Aside from newspaper editorials or an occasional official voters'
pamphlet, the debate leading to decision is left to the electioneering slogans of
competing advertising firms. Yet such a measure may repeal, alter, or contradict the
most carefully studied and best designed enactment of the legislature.
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model to direct democracy would enable initiative proponents to adopt
amendments, accept compromises, and engage in the type of factfinding necessary to allow reasoned decisionmaking to occur in the
first place. Moreover, the enactment of APA-like procedures in the
initiative context would result in the creation of a formal lawmaking
record that courts could utilize to engage in hard-look judicial review.
The provision of express statutory authority for heightened judicial
scrutiny would also foreclose objections that the invalidation of
successful ballot measures under an arbitrary and capricious standard
was the result of unwarranted judicial activism. Finally, adoption of
the agency model in this context would streamline the initiative
process and thereby enable courts to discover the officially articulated
reasoning of the initiative proponents. Because the initiative
proponents would be entirely capable of expressing an authoritative
rationale for their actions in precisely the same manner as
administrators, the problems courts face when they attempt to
attribute a single animating purpose or authoritative basis for
congressional action would be almost entirely absent from heightened
judicial scrutiny of successful ballot measures.264
While application of the agency model to the initiative process
would therefore be judicially manageable, the normative appeal of this
approach depends largely upon whether one accepts the myth of
popular sovereignty in direct democracy. For example, if one believes
that the initiative process constitutes lawmaking by "the people,"
judicial invalidation of successful ballot measures would represent the
epitome of the countermajoritarian difficulty. 26 5 This conclusion would

Linde, supra note 248, at 227-28; see also Baker, supra note 5, at 766-72 (rejecting judicial
enforcement of principles of due process of lawmaking in the initiative context). While Justice
Linde's description of the existing initiative process is undoubtedly accurate, the application of
the agency model to direct democracy would be specifically designed to encourage "systematic
factfinding, analysis, amendment, [and] compromise" in the initiative lawmaking process. Not
only are such reforms desirable, but the adoption of the proposals advocated in this Article would
render judicial enforcement of principles of due process of lawmaking possible as well.
264. This Article previously suggested that courts should accept evidence from outside of the
lawmaking record when reviewing the validity of an initiative on statutory or constitutional
grounds-by considering, for example, public statements or deposition testimony from the
initiative proponents. See supra Part III.C. Although this practice could limit the practical
benefits of a strictly record-based review, the difficulties associated with judicial consideration of
"extra-record evidence" in this context would be limited. Unlike the legislature, which typically
consists of two chambers and hundreds of members-not to mention committees, support staff,
and agencies responsible for assisting lawmakers, the initiative proponents are a relatively
discrete and easily identifiable group of people. See supra note 106. Accordingly, courts should
have relatively little difficulty determining which statements are entitled to probative value for
purposes of reviewing the validity of successful ballot measures.
265. See Miller, supra note 98, at 1053 (describing the Washington courts' invalidation of an
initiative as "a sweeping counter-majoritarian act" and claiming that "[olne solitary judge, and
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probably hold true regardless of whether the initiative proponents
engaged in reasoned decisionmaking or whether courts were given
statutory authority to make this determination. Similarly, this view of
the initiative process would probably lead one to claim that the power
of initiative-being reserved by state constitutions to "the people"stands on the same constitutional footing as lawmaking by the
266
legislature.
Rejecting the myth of popular sovereignty in direct democracy,
however, leads to some very different conclusions. The initiative
proponents who control the lawmaking process are hardly a coequal
branch of government-or even elected officials who are held
accountable for their decisions by significant institutional constraints.
The imposition of additional procedural requirements on initiative
proponents is not inconsistent with a "reservation" of direct
lawmaking authority for "the people," but it is necessary to replace the
structural safeguards of the traditional legislative process and thereby
hold initiative proponents accountable for their decisions. In these
fundamental respects, the similarities between the work of initiative
proponents and unelected bureaucrats are unmistakable, and the
contrast between these alternative lawmaking processes and laws
enacted by the legislature could not be more stark. Not only should
successful ballot measures therefore routinely be given less deference
by courts than statutes enacted by Congress, but heightened judicial
scrutiny of a lawmaking record for reasoned decisionmaking by
initiative proponents is consistent with principles of separation of
powers.
Even if one rejects the myth of popular sovereignty in direct
democracy, however, judicial review of successful ballot measures for
reasoned decisionmaking by initiative proponents is not entirely
without difficulties. There is admittedly one significant difference
between agency rulemaking and lawmaking by initiative proponents
that may be in tension with the justifications for hard-look judicial
review based on a lawmaking record. As explained above, the scope of

after him, eight justices of the Washington Supreme Court overturned the will of nearly a million
voters"); id. at 1054 (claiming that the invalidation of a successful ballot measure "nullifie[s] the
decisions of the people themselves"); Pak, supra note 12, at 238 (claiming that the countermajoritarian difficulty "increases when judicial review is exercised to overturn voter-enacted
initiatives, which are conceptualized as the direct will of the people"); Lazos Vargas, supra note
12, at 404 (claiming that "when courts review actions taken directly by the public, rather than
their elected representative, the judiciary's counter-majoritarian hubris is more readily
apparent").
266. See Charlow, supra note 5, at 583 ("The public as lawmaker... plays an official part in
the separation of powers structure of the governments in those states that provide for
plebiscites.").
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an agency's rulemaking authority is much more sharply circumscribed
than the lawmaking authority granted to Congress by the
Constitution; agencies can only engage in rulemaking within the scope
of their congressionally delegated authority. 2 67 Accordingly, hard-look
judicial review is premised in part on the need to ensure that agencies
follow the legislature's instructions and take reasoned actions towards
accomplishing an instrumental goal.
In many state and local jurisdictions, however, the initiative
power-like the lawmaking power of the legislature-can be utilized
for any purpose that is consistent with constitutional limitations. 268 In
theory, then, successful initiatives may not have a specific
instrumental goal to which courts can be expected to enforce
adherence. In practice, however, most jurisdictions have single-subject
rules and other procedural requirements that are designed to ensure
that initiative proposals have an identifiable purpose. 269 Moreover,
although the finer points of an initiative's meaning are often
ambiguous, the general purpose of such a measure is typically
apparent to interested observers. 270 Finally, the progressives who
originally championed direct democracy, as well as its modern-day
supporters, have emphasized that the initiative process is only
intended to supplement representative democracy when the
problems. 271
to identifiable
proves unresponsive
legislature
267. See supra note 261.
268. Some jurisdictions do, however, place subject-matter limitations on the use of the
initiative. For example, some states preclude the use of the initiative process to adopt laws that
interfere with the legislature's ability to collect revenue. See NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1408
(2002):
The Secretary of State shall not accept for filing any initiative or referendum petition
which interferes with the legislative prerogative contained in the Constitution of
Nebraska that the necessary revenue of the state and its governmental subdivisions
shall be raised by taxation in the manner as the Legislature may direct.
Similarly, the State of Mississippi precludes the adoption of initiative measures that would alter
the state's bill of rights. See MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(5)(a).
269. Although many jurisdictions also have single-subject rules applicable to the legislature,
courts tend to enforce these requirements more stringently in the context of direct democracy.
See supra note 213. Many jurisdictions also have provisions, for example, that require an
initiative's caption and summary to state its chief purpose plainly. See CAL. COMM'N ON
CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 6, at 228-35 (describing state procedures for preparing the captions
and summaries that appear on initiative petitions and election ballots).
270. See Schacter, supra note 5, at 146 (recognizing that initiative laws are frequently "a
general policy approved by a majority of voters" and "that policy is a relevant consideration for
interpretation"); see also supraParts IB, IIB-C.
271. See Briffault, supra note 102, at 1368 (arguing that "[t]he best case for direct legislation
in a system of representative government is that it may play an important role in just those
areas in which institutional pressures cause representatives to stray from the interests of
popular majorities: government structures and regulation of the political process, taxation, and
spending"); Hirsch, supra note 27, at 205 (claiming that "[w]e can benefit from the advantages of
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Accordingly, there would appear to be no barriers to judicial review of
a lawmaking record to ensure that initiative proponents engage in
reasoned decisionmaking because direct democracy is often used to
272
accomplish identifiable, instrumental goals.
The greatest difficulty in applying hard-look judicial review to
successful ballot measures would involve those initiatives that address
questions of morality upon which reasonable people are virtually
certain to disagree. 273 For initiatives that address questions of moral
judgment, judicial acceptance of purely moral reasoning could turn the
arbitrary and capricious standard into a tautology. 274 For example, if
courts were to accept as an explanation for an anti-gay rights
initiative that the proponents "believe that homosexuality is wrong,"
the statutory requirement of reasoned decisionmaking would lose
much of its force. On the other hand, it is sometimes difficult to
conceive of alternative explanations that could be considered
substantially more "reasonable" for such legislation. The problem is
simply that some ballot measures are not particularly conducive to
275
purely "rational" argument or explanation.
a representative system, subject to the availability of initiatives when citizens find
representation inadequate"); Selmi, supra note 186, at 307 ("The initiative and referendum are
intended as exceptional political instruments to be employed when representative government
becomes unresponsive to the citizenry."); see also 2 RAY STANNARD BAKER & WILLIAM E. DODD,
THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 287-88 (1925) (describing President Wilson's view
that direct democracy was intended "to restore, not destroy, representative government");
CRONIN, supra note 18, at 59 ("The growing paradox of the direct democracy crusade is that even
though its most fervent champions often intended less to strengthen representative democracy
than to bypass or punish it, it simultaneously helped remedy the defects of representative
political institutions.").
272. Of course, in the agency context, the instrumental goal is identified by Congress.
Application of the agency model to direct democracy would, however, require the purpose of a
ballot measure to be identified by the initiative proponents. There is no reason to think that the
entity that identifies the instrumental purpose of legislation should matter for purposes of hardlook judicial review. Cf. DAVIS, supra note 212, § 3:15 (arguing for a reformulation of the
nondelegation doctrine that would encourage courts to examine the totality of legislative and
administrative standards and safeguards to determine whether administrative discretion has
been adequately confined); Bressman, supra note 194, at 1401-02 (arguing for a nondelegation
doctrine that focuses on whether administrative agencies have adequately limited their own
discretion).
273. Although the highest profile initiatives occasionally present such questions, many direct
democratic measures address more mundane issues. See supra note 3 (citing a database of all
statewide initiatives that have appeared on ballots since 1990); MAGLEBY, supra note 47, at 133
(providing a "health science bond" proposal in California as an example of "relatively obscure
legislatively initiated measures").
274. Hans Linde has pointed out that when a rational basis "challenge is to a law that
reflects such a non-rational human impulse, judges will sometimes try to credit the law's
acceptance of that impulse with being itself a rational policy." Linde, supra note 248, at 234.
275. Justice Linde recognized this problem in one of his articles about direct democracy. See
Linde, supra note 8, at 42 ("Of course proponents may pretend utilitarian goals for any measure,
but initiatives of this type will rarely obscure their noninstrumentalist, emotional wellsprings.").
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There are at least two potential solutions to this admittedly
difficult problem. First, jurisdictions could prohibit the use of the
initiative for addressing certain moral questions on the grounds that
direct democracy is not an appropriate procedure for addressing such
issues. 276 This categorical limitation on the use of the initiative would
go a long way toward eliminating abuse of the initiative process and
placating those who have expressed legitimate concerns about the
"tyranny of the majority" that often results from direct democratic
measures. 277 Alternatively, courts could engage in judicial review for
"reasoned decisionmaking" by requiring initiative proponents
to
respond to comments by amending their proposals to minimize their
rejection of the opponents' positions to the greatest extent possible. 278
In other words, courts could require initiative proponents to accept
proposed compromises that would minimize objections to their
proposal without undermining the primary purpose of the ballot
measure. In any event, courts should, at least, require initiative
proponents to articulate the reasons for their actions and explain how
existing empirical evidence supports their positions. As Clayton

276. Cf. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 116 (1976) (recognizing that due process
requires certain deprivations of important liberty interests to be imposed by an accountable
governmental body); Brown, supra note 192, at 1516 (arguing that "government action that
jeopardizes government process poses a concomitant danger to individual rights and that the
potential for such danger should be a significant factor in separation-of-powers analysis"). The
definitional problems of this suggestion, of course, have not escaped the author's attention. The
most promising solution probably would be to prohibit initiative measures that limit the "civil
rights" of certain segments of the population. Cf. Gamble, supra note 236, at 246, 251 (defining
anti-civil rights initiatives for purposes of her study).
277. See William E. Adams, Jr., Is it Animus or a Difference of Opinion? The Problems
Caused by the Invidious Intent of Anti-Gay Ballot Measures, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 449, 451,
467-77 (1998) (arguing that "direct democracy is comparatively more dangerous than
representative democracy" with respect to biases against gays and lesbians and "may, in fact,
intensify them"; Bell, supra note 12, at 20-21 (claiming that direct democracy "reflects all too
accurately the conservative, even intolerant, attitudes citizens display when given the chance to
vote their fears and prejudices, especially when exposed to expensive media campaigns"); Eule,
supra note 2, at 1550 (stating that "my principal concern is with laws that are unduly insensitive
to minority rights"); Linde, supra note 8, at 21 (arguing that the 'legitimate use" of statewide
initiatives "must exclude measures for motives that the designers of republican government most
feared"); Lazos Vargas, supra note 12, at 425 (claiming that "direct democracy, for the most part,
has been an important lawmaking mechanism that has decreased the content of, or staved off
advances in, minority rights"); Jodi Miller, Note, "Democracy in Free Fall": The Use of Ballot
Initiatives to Dismantle State-Sponsored Affirmative Action Programs, 1999 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 1,
3, 23-38 (arguing that "the ballot initiative is particularly unsuited to the issues involved in
affirmative action"). But see Baker, supra note 5, at 710 (purporting to refute "confident claims
that racial minorities are better served by representation than direct lawmaking processes" and
arguing that heightened judicial review of successful ballot measures is unwarranted).
278. See GUTMANN & THOMPSON, supra note 259, at 84-85 (describing an "economy of moral
disagreement" in which "citizens should seek the rationale that minimizes rejection of the
position they oppose" when "justifying policies on moral grounds").
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Gillette has explained, when assessing whether legislation serves the
"public interest," there may be no "single conception of the good on
which all informed individuals would agree," but "individual
decisionmakers acting in the public interest would be able to justify
their decisions by reference to the resulting increased welfare for
society at large." 279 While an arbitrary and capricious standard might
be difficult to apply in some cases, lawmaking authority should not be
exercised in our republic without safeguards to assure this minimal
level of deliberation and accountability.
In sum, the enactment of procedural safeguards that (1)
require initiative proponents to compile a lawmaking record; and (2)
authorize judicial review of that record for reasoned decisionmaking is
entirely appropriate in the context of direct democracy. The adoption
of APA-like lawmaking procedures for the initiative process would
ensure that the application of hard-look judicial review is manageable.
Furthermore, rejection of the myth of popular sovereignty in direct
democracy compels the conclusion that heightened judicial scrutiny of
ballot measures is consistent with principles of separation of powers
and necessary to promote deliberation and reasoned decisionmaking
in the lawmaking process. Although some cases will undoubtedly
present difficult questions of application for the agency model of
judicial review, the need for "the give-and-take of moral argument
about the substance of controversial political issues" suggests that
those who value deliberative democracy should be willing to bear that
80
risk. 2
C. The Agency Model and the FirstAmendment
The agency model would authorize courts to review the validity
of successful initiative measures based, in part, on the contents of a
formal lawmaking record. Moreover, the proposals advocated in this
Article contemplate that courts would also examine other public
statements of the initiative proponents when assessing the validity of
successful ballot measures. A successful initiative could be invalidated
by a court under these proposals based on what the initiative
proponents said or failed to say during the lawmaking process. This
prospect could, in turn, have the effect of "chilling" the initiative
proponents' speech during the initiative campaign and subsequent
litigation proceedings. At the same time, the agency model would force
initiative proponents to address issues in the notice-and-comment

279. Gillette, supra note 5, at 932.
280. GuTrMAN & THOMPSON, supra note 259, at 37.
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proceeding, which they might otherwise have preferred to ignore.
Accordingly, one could argue that a jurisdiction's application of the
agency model to direct democracy would constitute a "law...
abridging the freedom of speech" in violation of the First
28 1
Amendment.
Such an argument is without merit for a number of reasons.
First, application of the agency model to direct democracy would not
impose any limitations on the amount of speech-related activity in
which initiative proponents could engage. In contrast to restrictions on
campaign contributions or expenditures, which have been invalidated
in the context of ballot elections, 28 2 the initiative proponents would
remain free under the agency model to raise and spend as much
money as they want to qualify an initiative for the ballot and convince
the electorate to vote in its favor. The agency model would also leave
all of the existing avenues for reaching qualified voters unaffected.
The initiative proponents could therefore continue to hire consultants,
pay petition circulators, engage in unlimited broadcast advertising,
appear on talk shows, write editorials, or use any other available
method of promotion and persuasion they deem appropriate.
Second, application of the agency model to direct democracy
would not impose any limitations on what the initiative proponents
could say. Although one of the goals of the proposals advocated in this
Article is to improve the quality of the deliberations surrounding
initiative campaigns (and thereby further the values underlying the
First Amendment), the agency model would not require the initiative
proponents to change the content of their message in any respect.
Indeed, initiative proponents could lawfully promote their proposals
under the agency model by invoking appeals to the electorate that
were nonsensical, misleading, false, racist, or even libelous. 28 3 While a

281. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
282. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 414 (1988) (holding that a state's prohibition of paid
circulators of initiative petitions violated the First Amendment); Citizens Against Rent Control
v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300 (1981) (holding that a city ordinance that placed
limitations on contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures violated
First Amendment rights of association and free expression); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 767 (1978) (holding that state limits on corporate contributions or
expenditures for ballot campaigns violated the First Amendment); cf. Biddulph v. Mortham, 89
F.3d 1491, 1498 (11th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that "[aibsent some showing that the initiative
process substantially restricts political discussion of the issue [a proponent] is seeking to put on
the ballot, [the foregoing precedent] is inapplicable").
283. Although the initiative proponents could be subject to legal sanctions based on certain
deliberately false, libelous, or defamatory statements, such liability would result from existing
legal remedies rather than the agency model's application to direct democracy. See generally
Kruse, supra note 138 (describing state statutes that prohibit false initiative advertisements and
assessing their validity under the First Amendment).
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successful initiative based on such appeals might subsequently be
invalidated for violating the Constitution (under, say, the Equal
Protection Clause) or the arbitrary and capricious standard of review,
the initiative proponents would not otherwise be punished for their
statements.
The First Amendment is typically invoked to challenge laws
that limit designated speech or speech-related activity and subject
persons who fail to comply with the law to potential criminal
prosecution, civil penalties, or civil liability. 2 4 In contrast, the agency
model does not threaten initiative proponents with legal sanctions
under any circumstances. The initiative proponents could rest assured
that they would not be subject to legal penalties or civil liability under
the agency model regardless of what they said during the lawmaking
process. As a result, the underlying basis for the challenge in a typical
First Amendment case simply does not exist in the present situation.
The initiative proponents could nonetheless complain that their
required participation in a notice-and-comment proceeding, where
they would be obligated to respond in a reasoned fashion to the
concerns raised by interested commenters, constitutes compelled
speech of the kind that has raised First Amendment problems in other
contexts. 28 5 Moreover, they could argue that the threat of judicial
invalidation of a ballot measure based on their statements is a
meaningful penalty that undermines their right to free speech,
especially when this threat would likely lead savvy initiative
proponents to hedge what they say during ballot campaigns to
minimize the risk of subsequent judicial invalidation. In this regard,
initiative proponents could attempt to invoke the unconstitutional
conditions doctrine and argue that the government cannot condition
284. See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990) (holding that a federal
statute criminalizing flag desecration violated the First Amendment); N.Y. Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964) ('What a State may not constitutionally bring about by means of a
criminal statute is likewise beyond the reach of its civil law of libel."); cf. Laird v. Tatum, 408
U.S. 1, 11-14 (1972) (holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the Army's surveillance
of lawful civilian political activities under the First Amendment because "[a]llegations of a
subjective 'chill' are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a
threat of specific future harm" and distinguishing other cases on the ground that "the challenged
exercise of governmental power was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the
complainant was either presently or prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or
compulsions that he was challenging").
285. For example, the Supreme Court has held that the compelled disclosure of group
membership is subject to strict scrutiny where it would chill freedom of association. See NAACP
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (invalidating an Alabama law which
required out-of-state corporations to meet certain disclosure requirements and recognizing "the
vital relationship between freedom to associate and privacy in one's associations"); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-88 (1960) (invalidating a state law that required all teachers to
disclose their group memberships on an annual basis).
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the benefit of using direct democracy to enact laws on their
28 6
willingness to forgo the right to speak freely.
The notion that the proposals described above would "compel
speech" or otherwise impose unduly burdensome procedures on
initiative proponents in violation of the First Amendment is without
merit. In the context of direct democracy, the agency model would
simply require initiative proponents to explain in a cogent fashion the
meaning of, and rationale underlying, their proposals. They would
also be required to explain, in response to comments from interested
parties, why their proposal is desirable and why they rejected
alternative approaches to the problem. The neutral imposition of such
requirements on unelected lawmakers is not unreasonable and may,
in fact, be necessary if courts are to engage in meaningful judicial
review of successful initiative measures. Most states that authorize
the direct initiative already place analogous procedural burdens on
initiative proponents, such as requiring them to participate in the
drafting of the titles, summaries, and statements in support of their
measures that appear on the ballots and ballot pamphlets presented
to voters. 28 7 Those requirements have never been thought to "compel
speech" by initiative proponents or otherwise raise First Amendment
difficulties. 288
286. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 545 (1983)
(stating that "the government may not deny a benefit to a person because he exercises a
constitutional right") (quoting Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972)); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 518-19 (1958) (holding unconstitutional a California law that conditioned
a property tax exemption on the disavowal of a belief in overthrowing the government by force or
violence on the grounds that this requirement would "have the effect of coercing the claimant to
refrain from the proscribed speech"); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 11.2.4.4, at 795-98 (1997) (describing the Supreme Court's
inconsistent application of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine).
287. See CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 6, at 227-53.
288. In Biddulph v. Mortham, the Eleventh Circuit rejected an initiative proponent's First
Amendment challenge to provisions of Florida's initiative process that authorized the state
supreme court to remove an initiative petition from the election ballot if the ballot title or
summary was unduly ambiguous. 89 F.3d 1491, 1493-94 (11th Cir. 1996). The plaintiff argued
that those procedures were required to withstand strict scrutiny because "initiative sponsors
must complete Florida's costly and time-consuming initiative requirements without any
assurance that the supreme court will ultimately deem their initiative proposals legally
sufficient.for ballot inclusion." Id. at 1496. In rejecting this argument, the court explained that it
was not required by precedent "to subject a state's initiative process to heightened First
Amendment scrutiny simply because the process is burdensome to initiative proposal sponsors."
Id. at 1497. The court recognized that "the Constitution does not require Florida to structure its
initiative process in the most efficient, user-friendly way possible," and held that "a state's broad
discretion in administering its initiative process is subject to strict scrutiny only in certain
narrow circumstances." Id. at 1500-01. The court explained:
We obviously would be concerned about free speech and freedom-of-association rights
were a state to enact initiative regulations that were content based or had a disparate
impact on certain political viewpoints. We also would be troubled were a state to apply
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Similarly, the prospect of judicial invalidation of an initiative
measure based in part on the statements of initiative proponents
should not raise any First Amendment problems under the
unconstitutional conditions doctrine. The fundamental purpose of
judicial review is not to sanction lawmakers for their statements or
limit what can be said during the lawmaking process, but rather to
ensure that regulated parties are subject to a valid rule of law. 28 9 A

facially neutral regulations in a discriminatory manner. Nor as Meyer held, could a
state impermissibly burden the free exchange of ideas about the objective of an
initiative proposal.
Id. at 1500; accord Marijuana Policy Project v. D.C. Bd. of Elections and Ethics, 191 F. Supp. 2d
196, 198-99 (D.D.C. 2002) (invalidating congressional legislation that prohibited the District of
Columbia from expending any monies to enact a ballot measure that would decrease the
penalties for use or distribution of a Schedule I controlled substance on the grounds that the
statute "is a viewpoint discriminatory restriction on plaintiffs' political speech and is
consequently unconstitutional" under the First Amendment). As the Eleventh Circuit recognized,
however, "[miost restrictions a state might impose on its initiative process" including, by
analogy, those provided by the agency model-"would not implicate First Amendment concerns."
Biddulph, 89 F.3d at 1500.
Indeed, the requirement that initiative proponents submit petitions signed by a substantial
number of registered voters to qualify for the ballot is a significant hurdle which-while
arguably compelling speech-has never been thought to raise First Amendment problems. See
Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 205 (1999) ("To ensure grass roots
support, Colorado conditions placement of an initiative proposal on the ballot on the proponent's
submission of valid signatures representing five percent of the total votes cast for all candidates
for Secretary of State at the previous general election."); Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425-26 (recognizing
that the state's "interest in ensuring that an initiative has sufficient grass roots support to be
placed on the ballot ... is adequately protected by the requirement that no initiative proposal
may be placed on the ballot unless the required number of signatures has been obtained"). On
the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that certain regulations of petition circulators have
violated the First Amendment. See Buckley, 525 U.S. at 186 (holding that a Colorado statute
violated the First Amendment by (1) requiring circulators of initiative petitions to be qualified
voters, (2) requiring circulators of initiative petitions to wear badges identifying their names,
and (3) requiring initiative proponents to report the names and addresses of all paid circulators
and the amount paid to each circulator). This precedent is perfectly consistent with the claim
that the neutral imposition of reasonable procedural requirements on initiativeproponents raises
no First Amendment difficulties. See id. at 195 n.16 ("[T]oday's decision ....
like Meyer,
separates petition circulators from the proponents and financial backers of ballot initiatives.");
id. at 204-05 ('Through less problematic measures, Colorado can and does meet the State's
substantial interests in regulating the ballot-initiative process ....
To inform the public 'where
the money comes from,... the State legitimately requires sponsors of ballot initiatives to
disclose who pays petition circulators, and how much.") (internal citations omitted). It is
perfectly sensible for the Court to allow greater regulation of initiative proponents than petition
circulators under the First Amendment because the former group's role is not limited to
advocating ideas, but also extends to lawmaking itself.
289. See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American
Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 14 (1998) (explaining that "[a] constitutional right is a
legal right targeted against a particular rule-a rule with the wrong predicate or history[,]"
which "furnishes the rights-holder a legal power to secure, in some measure, the judicial
invalidation of a particular rule"; Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and Federal
Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 242-51 (1994) (claiming that all persons have a right to be judged
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law will therefore be invalidated under the agency model if a court
determines that lawmakers relied on an impermissible purpose or
failed to engage in reasoned decisionmaking during the lawmaking
process. The basis for the judicial invalidation of a law under this
model is not the existence of inappropriate "statements" by the
lawmakers, but rather the flaws in the resulting law that are
evidenced by those statements. When viewed in this light, judicial
review under the agency model would not sanction initiative
proponents for their statements, but would merely consider those
statements as probative evidence to prevent the application of an
invalid rule of law.
This understanding of judicial review explains why using the
statements of lawmakers as evidence of a law's invalidity has never
been thought to raise First Amendment problems in other contexts.
For example, while the subjective intentions of particular legislators is
an unusual basis for invalidating laws under the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has occasionally used statements made by legislative
sponsors as persuasive evidence of a statute's impermissible
purpose. 290 Moreover, courts routinely examine the statements of
agency officials when evaluating the validity of legislative rules under
the APA. The notion that judicial reliance upon such statements to
invalidate a law would violate the First Amendment rights of those
lawmakers seems absurd-but only if one recognizes that judicial
review operates to prevent the application of invalid rules of law
rather than to regulate the statements of lawmakers.

by a valid rule of law); Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 3 ("[A] litigant
has always had the right to be judged in accordance with a constitutionally valid rule of law").
290. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56-60 (1985) (relying on the statements of a
state law's sponsor in deposition testimony and other legislative records to conclude that the law
lacked a secular purpose and therefore violated the Establishment Clause); Hunter v.
Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 224-30 (1985) (relying in part on the proceedings of the state's
constitutional convention to invalidate a facially neutral provision of the Alabama Constitution
because it was enacted with the intent of disenfranchising African-Americans); see also Doe v.
Sch. Bd., 274 F.3d 289, 293-95 (5th Cir. 2001) (relying on statements of an amendment's
sponsors and other legislators to conclude that the word "silent" was deleted from a statute
authorizing school prayer for the impermissible purpose of promoting prayer in public schools);
Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc. v. Pataki, 117 F. Supp. 2d 257, 269 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing
a legislator's statements as evidence that a law preventing a utility rate increase was an
unlawful bill of attainder because it was intended as punishment for alleged negligence on the
part of the utility company); United States v. Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1066-69 (N.D. Ohio
1980) (relying on statements of elected officials to conclude that the City of Parma engaged in
intentional discrimination when it denied building permits for an affordable housing project).
The unusual nature of these cases is partly a function of the immunity conferred upon legislators
by the Speech or Debate Clause of the U.S. Constitution and similar state constitutional
provisions. See supra note 231.
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In sum, the application of the agency model to direct democracy
is consistent with the First Amendment because it would not impose
any limitations on the amount of speech-related activity in which
initiative proponents could engage or on the content of those
statements. To the extent that it would require initiative proponents
to explain and justify their proposals, the agency model would merely
impose reasonable procedural requirements of the kind that have
never been considered problematic. Finally, because the nature of
judicial review of legislation (under the agency model or otherwise) is
to ensure that citizens are only subject to valid rules of law, using the
initiative proponents' statements during the lawmaking process as
evidence to assess the validity of a ballot measure should pose no First
Amendment difficulties. Indeed, the application of the agency model to
direct democracy would merely treat the statements of initiative
proponents in the same manner as those of other lawmakers. When
the myth of popular sovereignty in direct democracy is rejected, one
should not expect otherwise.
D. Stacking the Odds Against InitiativeProponents?
Advocates of direct democracy may be concerned that the
agency model would unfairly disadvantage the initiative proponents
and render ballot measures unduly difficult to enact and defend in
subsequent judicial proceedings. First, the notice-and-comment
proceedings required by the agency model would impose additional
costs and burdens on initiative proponents. Second, the heightened
judicial scrutiny authorized by the agency model would render more
successful ballot measures vulnerable to invalidation based on the
failure of initiative proponents to engage in reasoned decisionmaking.
Finally, it could be considered inequitable to impose these procedural
requirements on initiative proponents without imposing similar
requirements on the initiative opponents-who are probably already
better situated to use large sums of money during ballot campaigns to
29 1
defeat initiative measures about which the voters are undecided.
291. Several commentators have concluded from empirical studies that substantial spending
during ballot campaigns can be sufficient to defeat a measure by its opponents, but not to ensure
its enactment by proponents. See GERBER, supra note 109, at 61-62 (explaining that "[wihen...
the goal is to pass a new initiative, monetary resources are simply not enough," but that
"[b]ombarding voters with paid campaign advertisements that promise horrible consequences if
the measure passes, even if the messages contained in these ads are barely believable, may be
enough to create sufficient concern" to defeat a ballot measure); Lowenstein, supra note 138, at
511 (examining spending and election outcomes in a number of initiative campaigns and
concluding that "there emerges a strong pattern indicating that one-sided spending has been
ineffective when it is in support of the proposition but has been almost invariably successful
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Although these concerns are worthy of consideration, they ultimately
do not present compelling arguments against the application of the
agency model to direct democracy.
The costs of a notice-and-comment proceeding would vary
depending on the degree of interest in a ballot measure and the
technical complexity of the subject matter. 292 Those costs are likely to
be manageable for most initiative measures. While a few particularly
controversial ballot measures receive substantial publicity, most
initiatives do not engender widespread public interest until
immediately before the election and could therefore be expected to
293
result in a limited number of comments from interested parties.
Responding to those comments would not entail an inordinate amount
of difficulty, time, or expense. Moreover, proposed initiatives that
address nontechnical policy questions are unlikely to be informed by a
great deal of empirical data. The initiative proponents would be
required to explain the reasons justifying their proposals, but they
would not be faced with the substantial burdens associated with
squaring their decisions with potentially voluminous and conflicting
scientific data. While the absence of any experience with notice-and-

when it is in opposition"); Robyn R. Polashuk, Comment, Protecting the Public Debate: The
Validity of the Fairness Doctrine in Ballot Initiative Elections, 41 UCLA L. REV. 391, 405-08
(1993) (describing several major studies on the influence of spending on ballot initiative elections
and concluding that "[tihe result in every study is the same: Money is an overwhelming factor in
defeating ballot initiatives, and is a slight, but notable, factor in passing such measures.").
292. Although the costs of the APA's rulemaking procedures have been the subject of
voluminous debate, see infra note 300, empirical data quantifying those costs is surprisingly
difficult to obtain. See HOUSE COMM. ON COMMERCE, THE COSTS OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

(conducting a survey of thirteen federal agencies on the costs of rulemaking and reporting that
"[algencies do not maintain documents of the administrative costs specifically associated with
regulatory activities"), at http://www.house.gov/commerce/fedregs/regshome.htm (last visited
Feb. 17, 2003). Nonetheless, it is axiomatic that the costs of administrative rulemaking will
depend largely on the number of comments submitted in response to a proposed rule, its
technical complexity, and the amount of relevant data available. Numerous legal scholars have
pointed out the difficulties associated with rulemaking in areas of scientific uncertainty. See, e.g.,
THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE
FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 5-6 (1991) (arguing that regulators should employ a "rationality that
recognizes the limitations that inadequate data, unquantifiable values, mixed societal goals, and
political realities place on the capacity of structured rational thinking, and it does the best that it
can with what it has"); Frank B. Cross, Pragmatic Pathologies of Judicial Review of
Administrative Rulemaking, 78 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1041 (2000) (recognizing that "[r]egulatory
decisionmaking typically requires the use of scientific evidence, ranging from epidemiology to
economics," and that "science seldom offers conclusive answers").
293. See MAGLEBY, supra note 47, at 123-30 (describing political science studies on the
interest and knowledge of voters regarding ballot campaigns and reporting that "[s]ubstantial
proportions of the electorate report not having seen or heard anything about even very
controversial or highly publicized propositions," and that "[vioters are not very interested in most
; they become very interested in only a few
propositions-including some controversial ones.
initiative propositions").

484

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:395

comment proceedings in the context of direct democracy renders any
conclusions on this score necessarily speculative, many initiative
measures seem likely to have one or both of the characteristics
associated with relatively simple and inexpensive procedures of this
nature. 294
On the other hand, some proposed initiative measures, such as
those dealing with controversial environmental issues, would likely
engender a great deal of public interest and empirical debate. Noticeand-comment proceedings involving issues of this nature could very
well involve a significant amount of time and expense. 295 Although the
cost-effectiveness of these procedures has certainly been questioned in
the administrative law context, the prevailing view for many years
has been that the time and expense of notice-and-comment
proceedings is justified by the increased deliberations and
accountability that result from the agency model. 296 Indeed, we should
expect-and perhaps encourage-unelected lawmakers to face more
substantial procedural hurdles when they seek to enact laws involving
highly contested policies on controversial issues.

294. A description of every initiative to have appeared on statewide ballots since 1990 is
readily available, see BALLOT MEASURES DATABASE, supra note 3, but more empirical work is
needed regarding the level of public attention devoted to initiative measures and their technical
complexity, particularly at the local level. It would seem to be a plausible hypothesis, however,
that the most technically complex measures would be most likely to fly beneath the general
public's radar screen, while those raising purely "moral issues" would generate the greatest
public interest. A challenge to this simple hypothesis may be the "English only" propositions to
eliminate bilingual education that have appeared on ballots in several states. Those measures
raise conflicting empirical evidence while simultaneously involving highly controversial issues of
moral judgment. See Linda A. Cistone-Albers, Deconstructionist and PragmaticAnalyses Reveal
the "Intent to Discriminate"in Proposition227-A CaliforniaInitiative, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 215,
at 252-54 (2000) (describing the federal court's self-declared incompetence to consider empirical
evidence submitted in litigation regarding a ballot initiative to end bilingual education in
California); Lisa Ellern, Proposition227. The Difficulty of Insuring English Language Learners'
Rights, 33 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 11-15 (1999) (describing the debate regarding the
effectiveness of bilingual education that surrounded the English-only ballot measure in
California).
295. For example, E. Donald Elliot, the former general counsel of the EPA, estimated in 1994
that it cost the agency about $2 million and took approximately two years to adopt a rule,
without considering the additional delays imposed by judicial review and potential judicial
remand. Asimow, supra note 197, at 134 n.42; see also Cross, supra note 292, at 1038 (arguing
that the "EPA is probably the best example of the disadvantages of judicial review").
296. See, e.g., Asimow, supra note 197, at 127-29 (claiming that notice-and-comment
rulemaking "provides an ingenious substitute for the lack of electoral accountability" of agency
officials because "people who care about legislative outcomes produced by agencies have
structured opportunities to provide input into the decisionmaking process"); Manning, supra note
197, at 660-61 (recognizing that notice-and-comment rulemaking holds agency officials
accountable and provides opportunities for public participation and deliberation). But cf. infra
note 300 (discussing the ossification hypothesis in administrative law scholarship).
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In any event, it is unnecessary to impose all of the costs of the
agency model on the initiative proponents. On the contrary, some or
all of the costs associated with notice-and-comment proceedings could
be financed with public funds. In developing a public financing scheme
for this purpose, some factors that would need to be considered include
(1) whether the proponents of every initiative that qualified for the
ballot would be eligible or whether financial assistance would be
limited to "grass-roots" organizations, (2) whether initiative
proponents would be entitled to have all, or a certain designated
amount, of their costs reimbursed, (3) the appropriate source of such
funding at a time when many state and local governments are facing
serious budget problems, 297 and (4) whether the difficulty of qualifying
for the ballot should be increased to limit the number of proposed
initiatives that would qualify for public funding. Whatever the precise
details of such a scheme, it must be acknowledged that direct
democracy is a state-authorized institution that results in the
enactment of binding state and local laws. It is, therefore, appropriate
for the government to take some responsibility for ensuring that this
lawmaking institution operates in an accountable, deliberative, and
effective manner. Indeed, most states that authorize direct democracy
have implicitly recognized this principle by bearing the substantial
costs associated with the creation of a ballot pamphlet, which
describes the initiatives that will appear on an upcoming election
ballot, and the dissemination of such material to millions of registered
voters. 298
At the same time that the agency model would impose
additional procedural requirements on the initiative proponents
during the lawmaking process, it would also authorize hard-look
judicial review of successful ballot measures under an arbitrary and
capricious standard. Because this form of heightened judicial scrutiny
of ballot measures is not currently authorized in any jurisdiction, the
application of the agency model to direct democracy could only lead to
297. Ironically, those budget problems have been exacerbated in many jurisdictions by
previously enacted ballot measures. See, e.g., SCHRAG, supra note 7, at 222 (describing the
"widely known" phenomenon of "ballot box budgeting" in which each successful initiative "eats
up an ever greater chunk of the public purse and makes it still harder for government to
establish priorities and respond to new needs"); Gastil et al., supra note 8, at 1029 ("Initiatives
passed by voters have severely limited the tax money available to provide needed state
services.").
298. According to David Magleby, the costs of voter pamphlets during the 1980s ranged from
$350,000 per election in Massachusetts to over $2 million per election in California. MAGLEBY,
supra note 47, at 138; see also CAL. COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., supra note 6, at 236 (recognizing
that "California invests over $5 million in printing and mailing the [ballot] pamphlets each
election"); Collins & Oesterle, supra note 73, at 99 (stating that a ballot pamphlet is mailed to all
registered voters in Colorado at no charge to the initiative proponents).
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the judicial invalidation of more successful initiative measures.
Although the same ballot measures could often be reenacted by the
electorate after the initiative proponents repeated the lawmaking
process and cured the defects identified by the courts, the adoption of
hard-look judicial review would undoubtedly impose additional-and
sometimes substantial-costs on the lawmaking process. 299
As with the additional costs associated with notice-andcomment procedures, the costs of hard-look judicial review have been
accepted for many years as a central feature of lawmaking by
administrative agencies. 300 Previous sections have explained that the
299. It would, however, be unnecessary for the initiative proponents to recirculate signature
petitions when a successful ballot measure was invalidated and "remanded" to the initiative
proponents under the agency model. The affirmative vote on the original measure by the
electorate would typically constitute a sufficient display of public support for the proposition to
appear on a subsequent election ballot in this situation.
300. It must be acknowledged, however, that many prominent jurists and legal scholars have
criticized hard-look judicial review on the grounds that it tends to "ossify" the informal
rulemaking process. See, e.g., McGarity, supra note 212, at 1410-26, 1462 (concluding that the
courts have played a prominent role in the ossification of informal rulemaking and the
consequent inability of regulatory agencies to implement their statutory missions and suggesting
that one partial solution to the ossification problem is for the courts to "back off" by applying a
more deferential standard of review); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 65-66 (1995) (claiming that "courts have transformed the
simple, efficient notice and comment process into an extraordinarily lengthy, complicated, and
expensive process that produces results acceptable to a reviewing court in less than half of all
cases in which agencies use the process"); see also Jordan, supra note 212, at 394 (claiming that
"it has become a virtual article of faith that judicial review of agency rules under the current
hard look version of the 'arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion' standard has been a major
culprit in the 'ossification' of informal rulemaking"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The APA and
Regulatory Reform, 10 ADMIN. L.J. 81, 82-83 (1996) ('There is a broad consensus among scholars
that ossification of the rulemaking process is the largest single implementation problem [facing
the APA] today."). Professor Jordan has recently summarized the "ossification hypothesis" as
follows:
Those who believe that hard look review has caused the ossification of informal
rulemaking present two basic arguments. The first is that hard look review is so
intrusive that agencies ultimately stop trying to pursue their regulatory goals through
informal rulemaking. The second is that hard look review results in excessive data
gathering, analysis, and long-winded explanations, often of marginal points, all of
which imposes unnecessary costs and delays upon the agencies' regulatory programs.
Both of these positions are frequently accompanied by an assertion that, whatever its
burdens, hard look review does not improve either the substance of regulation or the
regulatory process.
Jordan, supra note 212, at 394-95. The proposed solutions to the ossification hypothesis include
the adoption of alternative tribunals to consider challenges to agency lawmaking, application of a
more deferential method of judicial review of agency rules, and, most radically, the complete
abolition of judicial review of agency lawmaking. Id. at 402-03 (summarizing proposals to modify
hard-look judicial review); Seidenfeld, supra note 258, at 503-24 (same); see also Cross, supra
note 247, at 1334 (arguing that the burden of proving "that the intervention of courts can
improve" administrative rulemaking "cannot be borne successfully").
It is beyond the scope of this Article to provide a comprehensive defense of hard-look judicial
review of agency action, but see supra Part III.B (claiming that the procedural requirements of
the APA and hard-look judicial review of agency action have made rulemaking more consistent
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with republican principles of government and have played an important role in checking
potentially excessive uses of administrative authority), but many others have attempted to do so.
See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 211, at 811-26 (defending hard-look judicial review as a protector of
deliberative democratic values); Seidenfeld, supra note 258, at 487-90 (claiming that the
undesirable effects of hard-look judicial review are likely outweighed by its considerable benefits,
which include "the need to ensure that agencies act not only within acceptable legal and political
bounds, but also exercise their discretion in a deliberative manner"); see also Jordan, supra note
212, at 403-04 (summarizing some of the most prominent defenses of hard-look judicial review
and arguing that the consequences of abandoning the doctrine "could be quite serious");
Seidenfeld, supra note 202, at 1543-51 (advocating a civic republican model of judicial review of
agency rulemaking, which "explicitly provides that the reviewing court's proper function is to
ensure that the agency interpreted the statute in a deliberative manner").
While a complete evaluation of this debate would require a separate article (or two), several
points bear noting for purposes of this project. First, the claim that hard-look judicial review of
agency action ossifies the rulemaking process has not been proven empirically, but rather
continues to be hotly contested. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 212, at 445 (reviewing ten years of
decisions of the D.C. Circuit and claiming that "[i]t is clear that agencies that do pursue informal
rulemaking are generally able to achieve their regulatory goals, usually with no significant
judicial interference," but that "[miore research is needed for a complete understanding of the
value and effects of judicial review"); Patricia M. Wald, Regulation at Risk: Are CourtsPart of the
Solution or Most of the Problem?, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 634-37 (1994) (claiming that judicial
review, at least in the D.C. Circuit, "is not a major cause of delay in the implementation of a
rule," and that the court only invalidated agency action under the hard-look doctrine in six out of
the thirty-six cases surveyed). Compare Mark Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity,
and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 490 (2002) (presenting a
"modest defense" of judicial review of agency rulemaking and arguing "that the psychology of
individual decisionmaking biases and group decisionmaking dynamics suggests" that hard-look
judicial review "does improve the overall quality" of administrative rules), with Cross, supra note
292, at 1013 (arguing that "the consequences of judicial review of rulemaking are consistently
and inescapably perverse"). Second, one of the major premises of the ossification hypothesisthat courts are incompetent to evaluate highly technical decisions by expert agencies-is
essentially inapplicable in the context of direct democracy. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial
Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 388 (1986) (questioning the
extent to which "a group of men and women, typically trained as lawyers rather than as
administrators or regulators, operating with limited access to information and under the
constraints of adversary legal process, [can] be counted upon to supervise the vast realm of
substantive agency policymaking"); ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM. ON ADMIN. PROCEDURE, FINAL
REPORT ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 77-79 (1941) (stating that judicial review should serve
only as a retrospective check on the legality and rationality of administrative action, not as a
means of influencing or insuring "correct" administrative decisions; while review must be
available, it "must not be so extensive as to destroy the values-expertness, specialization, and
the like-which ... were sought in the establishment of administrative agencies"). Many ballot
measures do not involve highly technical subjects and, when they do, there are no assurances
that the initiative proponents have the necessary expertise or will apply their knowledge in a
remotely "neutral" fashion. Accordingly, there is an even greater need for alternative structural
safeguards in the context of direct democracy than in the agency context. Third, the most
common proposals to remedy agency ossification advocate a more deferential application of the
hard-look doctrine, rather than the abandonment of notice-and-comment rulemaking and judicial
review of the reasoning of agency action. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Judicial Review of
Agency Actions in a Period of Diminishing Agency Resources, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 61, 72, 91 (1997)
(claiming that "inadequate reasoning is the most frequent basis for judicial rejection of agency
decisions" and arguing that "a persuasive case can be made in support of adopting a less
demanding version of the duty to engage in reasoned decisionmaking in response to the
phenomenon of diminishing agency resources"); McGarity, supra note 212, at 1410-26, 1462.
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agency model's safeguards are necessary to replace the structural
filters of the traditional legislative process and counteract the
otherwise constitutionally suspect nature of lawmaking by unelected
actors in our political system by ensuring a sufficient degree of
deliberation and accountability. 30 1 While those who criticize the costs
associated with the application of heightened judicial review and other
procedural requirements in the administrative context might object to
the agency model's extension into other spheres of lawmaking, the
presence of similar shortcomings in the initiative process suggests
that similar procedural safeguards are necessary in direct democracy
as well.
In any event, a cost-benefit analysis of the agency model's
procedural requirements may be misguided. Those procedural
requirements are arguably justified-regardless of their costs-by the
otherwise constitutionally suspect and ill-advised nature of
lawmaking outside of the parameters set forth in Article I,
Section 7.302 Moreover, it is commonly recognized that the structural
safeguards of the Constitution, which are absent from administrative
lawmaking and direct democracy, contain an inherent status quo bias
and were intentionally designed to make lawmaking difficult and
prevent majority faction. 30 3 If the alternative structural safeguards

Those proposals are not entirely incompatible with the ideas set forth in this Article. On the
contrary, a relatively deferential application of the reasoned decisionmaking requirement in the
context of initiative lawmaking would be vastly superior to the current situation where no such
judicial review occurs-and, indeed, where no mechanisms to encourage deliberation and
reasoned decisionmaking exist. Finally, assuming that the ossification hypothesis is correct, the
consequences of those problems are likely to be much more severe in the administrative context
where the prospect of hard-look judicial review would interfere with the objectives of ongoing
regulatory programs that have already been authorized and funded by the legislature. See, e.g.,
Cross, supra note 292, at 1027-39 (claiming that judicial review of agency rulemaking disrupts
the agendas of regulatory programs and results in the misallocation of resources); McGarity,
supra note 212, at 1392 ("[T]he fact that the ossification of the informal rulemaking process
frustrates statutory goals is a primary reason for inquiring into the causes of and cures for the
ossification phenomenon."). In contrast, the costs and delays attributable to hard-look judicial
review are more justifiable when unelected initiative proponents seek to adopt newly enacted
laws entirely of their own accord-often in the form of amendments to a state's constitution.
301. See supra Part III.B.
302. Cf. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 18, at 440 (arguing that hard-look judicial review of
agency action has constitutional underpinnings and claiming that "[s]uch an understanding of
the reasons requirement is preferable to the common assumption that the requirement is solely a
product of the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard of review").
303. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 167, at 66-68 (describing the "hurdles" that bills must
overcome before they are enacted into law and explaining that "[tihe Framers believed that the
Constitution's requirement of bicameral approval and presentment to the President... would
assure that most social and economic problems would not generate legislation at all, because the
two bodies would have different views about what should be done"); Eule, supra note 2, at 152228 (describing the structural safeguards provided by representative democracy, which are absent
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that are provided by the agency model increase the difficulty of
enacting and defending laws outside of the context of Article I,
Section 7, those procedural requirements are perfectly consistent with
this constitutional design, especially when the requirements would
increase deliberation and encourage reasoned decisionmaking in the
lawmaking process.
For similar reasons, the fact that the agency model would
impose procedural requirements on initiative proponents that would
not be imposed on the initiative opponents is hardly surprising. The
initiative proponents would be required to conduct a notice-andcomment proceeding and engage in reasoned decisionmaking under
the agency model precisely because they are the relevant lawmakers
in the context of direct democracy. The same cannot be said for the
initiative opponents. Thus, while agency officials are required to
comply with the foregoing procedural requirements when they engage
in legislative rulemaking, no one could seriously complain that the
agency model is unfair because similar requirements are not imposed
upon parties who submit comments in opposition to a proposed rule
but do not act in any formal lawmaking capacity.
While it seems perfectly logical to limit the requirements of the
agency model to those who are acting in a lawmaking capacity, this
limitation raises unique difficulties in the context of direct democracy
because, unlike a proposed agency rule, a proposed ballot measure
must subsequently be submitted to the voters for ratification or
rejection. Moreover, an initiative measure is submitted to the voters
following a ballot campaign in which proponents and opponents
vigorously contest the adoption of a proposal. By requiring the
initiative proponents to engage in reasoned decisionmaking during the
ballot campaign, without imposing similar constraints on the
initiative opponents, the agency model might make it substantially
more difficult to enact direct democratic measures.
Although equitable concerns of this nature are certainly
legitimate, the desire for evenhanded treatment of initiative
proponents and opponents is outweighed by the need for reasoned
decisionmaking by those who are delegated lawmaking authority in
our republic. The initiative opponents may very well engage in
rhetoric that is blatantly false, misleading, inconsistent, or even
racist. The state and local governments that authorize direct
democracy, however, can and should take a principled stand against
allowing those who make laws on their behalf from freely

from direct democracy); Schoenbrod, supra note 177, at 371-81 (describing the structural
safeguards provided by representative democracy, which are absent from agency lawmaking).
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reciprocating in kind. Moreover, if the purpose of judicial review of
successful ballot measures is to ensure that citizens are subject only to
valid rules of law, the relevant lawmakers should be required to abide
by constitutional limitations and give reasoned explanations for their
decisions during ballot campaigns regardless of the tactics of their
opponents. In other words, we should require lawmakers to engage in
reasoned decisionmaking-and for courts to invalidate laws when
unelected lawmakers fail to do so-even if the initiative opponents fail
to satisfy our aspirations and obtain a tactical advantage during the
ballot campaign based on their admittedly regrettable conduct.
In any event, it is unlikely that the imposition of a reasoned
decisionmaking requirement only on initiative proponents would give
the initiative opponents a meaningful advantage during ballot
campaigns. First, the notice-and-comment proceeding required by the
agency model would provide the initiative opponents with new
incentives to present their objections to a ballot measure during the
early stages of an initiative campaign. 3 4 The initiative proponents
would then be required to respond to those objections as part of the
formal lawmaking record, either by amending their proposal to
respond to those concerns or by explaining in a cogent fashion why
those concerns are being rejected. More important for present
purposes, the initiative proponents would be informed of the primary
objections to their proposals early in the lawmaking process and would
therefore be in a better position to address those concerns during the
ballot campaign. Rather than simply being ambushed with a host of
unknown objections during the final weeks of an election campaign,
the initiative proponents would be able to address the primary
concerns of the opponents in a meaningful fashion in their campaign
advertising.
One would hope that the initiative opponents would also focus
their campaign advertising on the substantive merits of the issues
addressed during the notice-and-comment proceeding. Nonetheless, if

304. Hard-look judicial review of a final agency rule is typically limited to the objections
raised by commenters during the rulemaking process. See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. U.S. Dep't
of Interior, 134 F.3d 1095, 1111 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Our cases.., require complainants, before
coming to court, to give the agency a fair opportunity to pass on a legal or factual argument.")
(quotations and citations omitted); R.I. Consumers' Council v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 504 F.2d 203,
212 (1974) (indicating that this requirement is implicit in hard-look judicial review because "the
agency cannot reasonably be expected to take a hard look" if the objecting party fails to
"participate in the task of identifying the hard problems" and bring "to light pertinent
information and analysis"). As Professors Buzbee and Schapiro recently explained, "the record
requirement seeks to enhance the rationality of the agency's deliberative process by requiring
that all information, both positive and negative, be presented to the agency." Buzbee & Schapiro,
supra note 249, at 130.
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the initiative opponents raised novel or misleading objections to the
proposed measure in their campaign advertising, the initiative
proponents would be better situated to respond to those attacks by
explaining that such concerns were not timely raised during the
lawmaking process-when something could have been done about the
alleged problem-or that the opponents' claims are contradicted by the
official lawmaking record. 30 5 In short, the legitimate issues addressed
during the notice-and-comment proceeding could be debated in a more
meaningful fashion on the merits during the ballot campaign, while
the misleading arguments and scare tactics of the parties would
simultaneously be easier to debunk.
Rather than providing the initiative opponents with a
substantial advantage during ballot campaigns, application of the
agency model to direct democracy would likely improve the quality of
the campaign advertising about proposed initiative measures. Even if
this is wishful thinking, however, there is no reason to think that the
imposition of additional procedural requirements on initiative
proponents would make the quality of the rhetoric surrounding ballot
campaigns any worse-and, indeed, some commentators have
30 6
suggested that the quality of this rhetoric could not get much worse.
In any event, state and local governments should not be shy about
attempting needed reforms of direct democracy that would almost
certainly increase deliberation, improve accountability, and encourage
reasoned decisionmaking by those who are delegated lawmaking
authority in our republic-particularly when such reforms are
unlikely to be cost-prohibitive or unduly disadvantageous to the
initiative proponents, and when they could, in fact, markedly improve
the quality of the campaign debates surrounding ballot measures.
E. Legitimizing an Illegitimate Enterprise?
Application of the agency model to direct democracy would
impose greater responsibilities on initiative proponents and authorize
heightened judicial scrutiny of successful ballot measures. By
providing alternatives to the structural safeguards required by the
Constitution in the traditional legislative process, the agency model
would alleviate the constitutionally suspect nature of direct democracy

305. Daniel Lowenstein has pointed out that some of the most blatant attempts by initiative
proponents to mislead the voters typically fail because such tactics are "too easily unraveled"
during the ballot campaign. See Lowenstein, suora note 138, at 563-67. As explained above, the
application of an agency model to direct democracy would similarly enable initiative proponents
to more easily "unravel" misleading claims made by opponents during a ballot campaign.
306. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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and potentially improve the quality of the laws that are enacted. Such
reforms would therefore directly address the fundamental problems
with initiative lawmaking and thereby help to legitimize direct
democracy. The immediately preceding sections of this Article have
responded to the primary concerns that advocates of direct democracy
are likely to raise in response to these proposals. This section
addresses a potential concern of those who believe that lawmaking by
initiative is irredeemably flawed-namely, that the application of the
agency model to direct democracy would fail to achieve its intended
purposes and have the perverse consequence of legitimizing an
illegitimate enterprise.
The agency model would likely improve the operation of direct
democracy for the reasons described above.3 0 7 It should be obvious,
however, that APA procedures and heightened judicial scrutiny of
initiative measures are additional safeguards that do not currently
exist. In theory, nothing would be lost if the imposition of those
additional structural safeguards did not operate in precisely the
intended manner. On the other hand, critics of direct democracy could
argue that the imposition of additional structural safeguards on
initiative proponents could have the unfortunate by-product of lending
an appearanceof legitimacy to direct democracy that could backfire if
the suggested reforms were ultimately ineffective.
The application of the agency model to direct democracy could
potentially backfire in two ways, both of which assume that a
successful initiative measure was upheld under the highly deferential
arbitrary and capricious standard of review. 30 8 First, the agency model
would arguably delegate greaterlawmaking authority to the initiative
proponents by authorizing courts to use the official lawmaking record
created during the notice-and-comment proceeding for interpretive
guidance. Second, courts might be tempted to review the
constitutionality of direct democratic measures in a more deferential

307. See supra Parts III.C & TV.D.
308. Courts routinely acknowledge that the scope of review under the arbitrary and
capricious standard is narrow and that the judiciary is not to substitute its judgment for that of
the relevant lawmaking official. See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43; Nat'l Treasury Employees
Union v. Horner, 854 F.2d 490, 498 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Instead, the agency model would merely
require initiative proponents to articulate a thorough and cogent explanation for their actions
and to respond to significant criticisms by participants in the notice-and-comment proceeding.
See GELLHORN & LEVIN, supra note 201, at 108 (describing hard-look judicial review under the
APA). On pure questions of policy that do not involve technical expertise, courts would typically
uphold the initiative proponents' decisions under the agency model when they could plausibly "be
ascribed to a difference in view." See, e.g., State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43; Natural Res. Def. Council,
Inc. v. EPA, 822 F.2d 104, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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fashion after they have concluded that the initiative proponents
engaged in reasoned decisionmaking during the lawmaking process.
As explained above, however, courts already privilege the
intentions of the initiative proponents when they interpret direct
democratic measures. 3 9 While they tend to couch their analyses in
terms of "voter intent," courts routinely interpret direct democratic
measures by relying on formal legal sources that are controlled by-or
at least accessible to-the initiative proponents. Courts should
therefore reject the myth of popular sovereignty in direct democracy
and more candidly acknowledge that their interpretations of
successful initiatives are, in reality, the implementation of the
intentions of the initiative proponents. Judicial reliance on statements
of the initiative proponents during the lawmaking process for
interpretive guidance would merely provide courts with an additional
tool for more accurately ascertaining that intent.
Moreover, the conclusion that the initiative proponents
engaged in reasoned decisionmaking during the lawmaking process
should have no bearing on the constitutionality of a successful
initiative measure. Judicial review of the validity of a law under the
APA and the Constitution are entirely distinct analytical inquiries.
Courts should have no problem maintaining this distinction when
initiatives involve suspect classifications or fundamental rights.
Indeed, such measures would be more likely to be invalidated under
the agency model because courts could examine the statements of the
initiative proponents for evidence of an impermissible purpose. On the
other hand, courts might be tempted to conclude that a successful
initiative that survived APA review must also be rationally related to
a legitimate government purpose. While this conclusion would be true
in the vast majority of cases, there may well be important exceptions.
For example, the Supreme Court's conclusion that the state
constitutional amendment at issue in Romer v. Evans was
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause 310 would have
been unaffected even if the proponents of the initiative measure had
engaged in reasoned decisionmaking throughout a lawmaking process
conducted pursuant to the agency model. As long as courts understand
that the statutory validity of a successful initiative measure under an
APA-like standard of review requires an inquiry distinct from the
assessment of a ballot measure's constitutional validity, application of
the agency model to direct democracy would not undermine-and
should, if anything, strengthen-constitutional rights.
309. See supra Part I.C.
310. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623 (1996).
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In any event, the use of direct democracy is here to stay in
many jurisdictions and will probably only increase in the foreseeable
future. 3 11 Adoption of the agency model would address the
fundamental problems that currently exist in direct democracy by
providing essential structural safeguards that do not currently exist to
encourage deliberation and hold initiative proponents accountable for
their decisions during the lawmaking process. This model, which has
proven workable during many years of operation in the agency
context, could therefore substantially improve the legitimacy of direct
democracy. Although the staunchest critics of direct democracy would
undoubtedly be disappointed by such an outcome, those who favor
good government-and recognize the inevitability of the continued use
of direct democracy-should nonetheless conclude that such reform
proposals are worth a try.
CONCLUSION

The inherent tension between direct democracy and the
republican form of government adopted by the Framers of the United
States Constitution has been recognized for some time now. Several
commentators have also recognized that direct democracy poses
challenges for courts because of the difficulties associated with
ascertaining the intentions of the voters. These fundamental problems
with direct democracy can be squarely addressed, however, by
recognizing the dominant role played by initiative proponents in the
lawmaking process.
Initiative proponents are not the only unelected lawmakers in
our democracy. Administrative agencies have freely engaged in
legislative rulemaking based on broad delegations of authority from
the legislature for more than half a century. Although still considered
constitutionally suspect, this development has continued unabated in
large part because adequate structural safeguards have been adopted
to replace those provided in the traditional legislative process by
representation and the provisions of Article I, Section 7. The
procedural requirements of the APA and hard-look judicial review
ensure that agency officials engage in deliberation and reasoned
decisionmaking during the lawmaking process and have thereby
legitimized administrative lawmaking.
Application of an agency model to direct democracy would
provide the alternative safeguards needed to legitimize initiative
lawmaking as well. Meanwhile, the creation of an official lawmaking
311. See supranote 4 and accompanying text.
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record would help courts overcome the difficulties of judicial review
that are currently associated with initiative lawmaking. Courts could
also examine the public statements of initiative proponents for
persuasive evidence from which to evaluate the validity of successful
ballot measures. These reforms would, of course, require state and
local governments to acknowledge the dominant lawmaking role
played by the initiative proponents. This Article has argued that it is
time for those states that champion initiative lawmaking to reject the
myth of popular sovereignty in direct democracy and adopt reforms
that would improve the process and hold the private citizens that
exercise lawmaking authority in our republic to meaningful standards
of accountability.

